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Abstract 
 
The academic discipline of Sociology has rarely broached the subject of war and its recursive 
relationship with society.  This paper addresses three major approaches in several disciplines that 
can be deemed ‘economically deterministic’: Marxist, Liberal, and Realist.  These approaches 
can be useful for certain questions, but also leave out, or cloud other non-economic variables in 
understanding war – notably culture and military variables themselves.  By using Karl Polanyi’s 
thesis regarding the “Myth of the Hundred Years’ Peace” (1815-1914) as a foil, the historical 
case of war in the nineteenth century is used to highlight the nature of war in European 
modernity and capitalism. 
  
iv 
 
Contents 
 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
1. War, Modernity, and Capitalism ............................................................................................. 6 
2. Economistic Theories of War and Modernity ....................................................................... 11 
2.1. Marxist Perspectives ...................................................................................................... 12 
2.2. Realist Perspectives ........................................................................................................ 27 
2.3. Liberal Perspectives ....................................................................................................... 41 
2.4. A Synthetic Critique of Marxist, Liberal, and Realist Perspectives ............................... 54 
3. The Myth of the Hundred Years’ Peace: War in the Nineteenth Century ............................. 63 
3.1. Polanyi’s Hundred Years’ Peace .................................................................................... 66 
3.2. Measuring War and Peace in the Nineteenth Century ................................................... 74 
4. Culture, Ideology, and War in the Nineteenth Century ....................................................... 126 
Conclusion: “Capitalism” vs. “Civilization” .............................................................................. 166 
References ................................................................................................................................... 173 
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................. 192 
Vita .............................................................................................................................................. 207 
 
 
 
v 
List of Tables 
 
 
3.1 Wars Involving Great Powers 75
3.2 Great Power Wars According to Polanyi’s Criteria 77
3.3 Armies (in 000s) 90
3.4 Navies (In Number of Battleships) 93
A.1 Wars, Revolutions and the Bond Market, 1830-1914 192
A.2 Wars between “Western” Powers, 1815-1914 193
A.3 Wars by “Western” Powers against Lesser States, 1815-1914 194
A.4 Wars Involving “Western” States and Non-State Actors, 1815-1914 195
A.5 Wars and Issues, 1815-1914 196
A.6 Issues that Generated Wars, 1815-1914 199
A.7 Progress of Railway Building 200
A.8 Density of Railway Network, 1880 201
A.9 Wars, New Technology and Weapons, 1800-1914 202
A.10 Central State Expenditures in Current Prices, 1800-1910 205
A.11 Land of the British Isles Held in Estates of 1,000+ Acres, 1880 206
 
  
vi 
List of Figures 
 
 
3.1 Three Economically Deterministic Theories of War 63
3.2 Four Pillars of Nineteenth Century Civilization 66
3.3 Magnitudes of Great Power War by Century, 1500-1975 76
3.4 Wars by Western Powers, 1815-1914 79
3.5 Key Issues in War, 1715 – 1914 81
3.6 Military Expenditure by the Great Powers, 1880-1914 97
3.7 Relative Concentration of Capital and Coercion as Determinants of States’ 
Paths of Growth. 
105
3.8 Increase in Territory per State, 1876-1915 115
3.9 Export of European Capital to 1914 118
4.1 Merits and Weaknesses of Theories in Relation to Nineteenth Century War 128
 
1 
Introduction 
 
 The origins of this project stemmed from research I had begun in 2008 dedicated to 
understanding the American military-industrial complex and the U.S. wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  During the course of this research I discovered a number of fascinating 
sociological theories of war, including Baran and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capitalism and the world-
systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein.1  Though these perspectives provided insight into the 
role of the economy and its relationship to war in the twentieth century, I soon realized these 
frameworks had limits.  For example, how does one explain the strange sense of obliviousness 
within U.S. culture to the fact that we are at war?  If the wars in Iraq were truly about oil, or 
reactions to over-accumulated surplus capital, why did President Bush have to frame the 
endeavor in terms of national security and spreading democracy?  Why did the public buy and 
support this agenda?  Could these not legitimately be the reasons to go to war held by the 
administration and the public, and not simply cover for ulterior economic motives?   
 As I tried to find other sociological theories of war, I discovered a number of 
perspectives, such as that of Charles Tilly, which highlighted the role of war in generating the 
nation state in early modern Europe.  Max Weber, Stanislaw Andreski, Norbert Elias, and others 
noted the role of military organization in bureaucracy and court society around the same period.2  
However, I found that between the end of the Napoleonic Wars in the early nineteenth century 
and the beginning of total war in 1914, there was a considerable gap in terms of understanding 
                                                            
1 P Baran and P Sweezy, Monopoly Capital; an Essay on the American Economic and Social Order, Monthly 
Review Press, New York, 1966; I Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2004. 
2 S Andreski, Military Organization and Society 2nd edn., Routledge & K. Paul, London, 1968; N Elias et al., The 
Civilizing Process : Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations Rev. edn., Blackwell Publishers, Oxford ; 
Malden, Mass., 2000. 
2 
                                                           
these two trends.  If surplus capital and hegemony were the driving forces for war in the 
twentieth century, when did this trend begin?  If war was the most important factor in the 
generation of the modern state, how did this trend continue to develop over the course of the 
nineteenth century?  Precisely during the period we typically identify as the formative era of 
modern society in Europe, the various theories begin to lose their explanatory power.   
 I soon connected this problem to what I consider an overemphasis on economic variables 
in explaining war and peace.  Relying especially on Michael Mann’s Sources of Social Power, 
vol. II, both for historical material, as well as a theoretical framework that identified four sources 
of social power - Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political (I.E.M.P) - without granting 
primacy to any over the other, I realized that the questions related to war and society in the 
nineteenth century could begin to be addressed.3   
 Additionally, I found that, whereas in sociology, the subject of war is incredibly under-
theorized and under-researched, in the discipline of history, since the mid-1970s a trend known 
as “new military history” had been developing that was explicitly dedicated to the relationship 
between ‘war’ and ‘society’.  The historiography of the rise of the new military history was 
described by Robert Citino in the American Historical Review.4  Citino identified three schools 
of military history: operational, social, and cultural military history.  The first, operational 
military history, is essentially a more rigorous and contextual version of Great Leader/Great 
Battle history.  Wars and battles are examined in tremendous detail to determine which 
movement on the battlefield led to which outcome.  Attention is given to arms technology and 
the agency of officers, as well as the contingencies of weather, topography, and luck on the 
 
3 M Mann, The Sources of Social Power Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1993. 
4 R Citino, 'Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction', The American Historical Review, vol. 112, issue  4, 
2007. 
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particular day a battle is fought.  Though this operational history has lost favor within the 
academic discipline of history, much of the historical materials consumed by popular audiences, 
whether at Barnes and Noble or on the History Channel, are of this sort.  The second school of 
military history can be termed social or “sociological,” in as much as new military history is 
interested explicitly in the connection between war and society.  The connection between the two 
is, rightly, assumed to be a recursive one, in which social structure impacts the way in which 
wars are fought, while wars, in turn, affect society and change social configurations.  The third 
development in military history is cultural history of war, following a general trend in many 
disciplines since the 1970s known as the “cultural turn.”  Of the three trends in military histories 
old and new - operational, sociological, and cultural - clearly the sociological is the least 
developed.  The promising project of new military history, directed toward understanding the 
recursive connection between war and society, seems to rely on a relatively weak conception of 
“society” as part of the equation.  Particularly in terms of economy and social structure, society 
remains under-theorized in much new military history literature.   
 This realization led me to try to reinsert the overly economic theories, which I had found 
to be deficient, into the detailed, but under-theorized historical material that has been generated 
by new military historians.  This process forced me to identify specifically what socioeconomic 
processes and mechanisms were relevant in establishing the link between war and society.  In the 
case of the nineteenth century, these theories helped me identify precisely those economic 
structures that were missing or minimized within the new military history literature.  At the same 
time, particularly in reference to cultural history, I found that these economic variables could not 
hold up as the solely determining influences in war and peace.  
4 
                                                           
 What follows is an attempt to retrace the experience of these discoveries and insights in a 
slightly different chronological order.  In section one, I define precisely the social phenomena I 
am interested in exploring in relation to each other, namely ‘war,’ ‘modernity,’ and ‘capitalism.’  
In section two, I retrace and critique three major theories from various social science disciplines 
that have tried to deal with these questions: Marxist, Realist, and Liberal.  In their traditional 
forms, all suffer from an overly economic perspective, which prevents us from seeing non-
economic variables, such as autonomous military and cultural developments, that influence 
decisions of war and peace. 
 In section three, I use Karl Polanyi’s notion of a “Hundred Years’ Peace” (1815-1914) as 
a hypothesis against which I can test insights gained from the new military and cultural history 
literature.5  Using a number of quantitative as well as qualitative measures I deconstruct 
Polanyi’s thesis to demonstrate how exactly a simply economic interpretation of war and peace 
will not suffice.  
 The fourth section then introduces cultural material that has been neglected in materialist 
analyses of war in the nineteenth century.  Though it is difficult at this tentative stage to identify 
precisely what elements of culture are most important at what time, I have suggested several 
sociocultural and sociopsychological mechanisms that seem to be related to war in nineteenth 
century Europe.  I conclude by identifying what these cultural considerations suggest in terms of 
future research and theoretical development.     
 Though I have not found the precise answers to my initial questions regarding our present 
wars in the Middle East, during the course of my research on nineteenth century Europe, I have 
found conspicuous similarities between our world and theirs - particularly during the late period 
 
5 K Polanyi, The Great Transformation : The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon Press, Boston, 
MA, 2001. 
5 
                                                           
immediately preceding World War I.  At the moment the modern world was becoming conscious 
of itself, with the power of new technologies ready at hand – it was unclear whether theirs was a 
civilization of peace or of a militant hegemon.  On the one hand, in 1914 very few had 
experienced war, at least within Continental Europe.  The “Great War,” as the Napoleonic Wars 
were called, had been fought by grandfathers and great grandfathers.  International institutions 
had prevented war for ages, and seemed ready to do so indefinitely.6  On the other hand, 
atrocities and failures witnessed by a new popular press, such as the Boer War and King 
Leopold’s rubber plantations, began to shake the assumptions underlying imperialism: that 
Europe was the center and pinnacle of human civilization; that European militaries were not out 
for their own interests, or in support of naked greed.  At the time, it must have been difficult to 
understand the nature of modernity, war, and society, because one did not want to think of one’s 
own society as warlike.  Today, it seems just as hard to understand.  Whether we like it or not, 
this essay is an attempt to see war’s actual influence on our past, present, and future society.                  
 
  
 
6 Of course, this was only an impression of peace, since the nineteenth century was full of war as will be discussed 
below. 
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1. War, Modernity, and Capitalism 
 
 Understanding war requires an understanding of society as a whole, while, conversely, 
society cannot be understood without accounting for war and violence.  The latter side of this 
argument, however, has not been sufficiently internalized within the discipline of sociology, 
leaving war to political scientists and anthropologists to frame in terms of politics and culture.7  
When sociologists do approach war, it is often within the materialist framework of Marxist 
theory, highlighting the causal role of the contradictions of capitalism.   Indeed, what is modern 
society if not capitalist?  However, the key question in this regard is whether economics are the 
determining factor needed to explain modern war.  Are wars simply the games powerful classes 
play with the lower classes as pawns?  Are wars that are justified by participants as nationalistic, 
racial, or liberal simply the cynical rationalization for material self-interests?  Though material 
interests are always present in any mobilization or execution of war, the idea that actors cannot 
have any non-material motivation for engaging in war represents economic determinism – an 
assertion I will suggest is refutable.  I would suggest that the notion of economic primacy is a 
reflection of “capitalist” modernity itself.8  The task of the historical sociologist should be to 
deconstruct this notion and identify the evolution of this trend towards valuing economic matters 
in the execution of war and peace.  For this reason, the case of war in the nineteenth century will 
                                                            
7 In 1999, Edward Tiryakian described war “as a societal and trans-societal phenomenon…the most understudied, 
underanalyzed field of sociology”; E Tiryakian, 'War: The Covered Side of Modernity',  International Sociology, 
vol. 14,issue 4, Dec 1999, 473-89; Gregory Hooks and James Rice, reviewing three prominent sociological journals, 
American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, and Social Forces, found that out of 1575 articles 
between 1990 and 1999, only 23 articles were related to war;  G Hooks and J Rice, 'War, Militarism, and States: The 
Insights and Blind Spots of Political Sociology', in R Janoski, A Hicks, and M Schwartz (ed.), The Handbook of 
Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005. 
8 An argument that is to follow will consider, and ultimately challenge, the semantic use of the term “capitalism” as 
the definition of modernity.  Since this argument will come considerably later in the paper, I will use the term 
traditionally until the argument is made.  
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be important to the theoretical argument of this essay, providing the historical material against 
which the hypothesis of economic determinism can be assessed. 
 Before proceeding, adequate definitions of three terms - war, modernity, and capitalism - 
will need to be outlined.  War has been defined at various points for statistical purposes as 
violent conflict between two or more political groups resulting in at least 1000 battle deaths.9  
While the adequacy of this definition for statistical use has been debated elsewhere in terms of 
which wars are, or are not, included according to this criterion, it is relatively uncontroversial for 
the purposes of this thesis.  I would, however, add some characteristics that highlight the social 
aspects of war in addition to the political characteristics listed above.10  Wars are mass 
mobilizations of (typically) men designed to murder, maim, or capture members of an opposing 
group of warriors and/or civilians.  As Lewis Mumford quite dramatically put it, “War is that 
special form of conflict in which the aim is not to resolve the points of difference but to 
annihilate physically the defenders of opposing points or reduce them by force to submission.”11  
While the above definitions are especially general, it will be the task of the rest of this paper to 
deal with what particular motivational content has filled the generic form of war in the modern 
era. 
 Defining modernity once and for all seems impossible if the ongoing debate between 
postmodernists, modernists, traditionalists, and radical modernists provides any indication.12  
However, in terms of pure historical dating, a useful benchmark is Reinhart Koselleck’s 
 
9 D Singer and M Small, The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook, Wiley, New York,, 1972; J Levy 
and W Thompson, Causes of War, John Wiley & Sons, Malden, Mass, 2010. 
10 Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.”  C Clausewitz and 
A Rapoport, On War, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968.; cf. J Keegan, A History of Warfare, Alfred A. Knopf , New 
York, 1993 for a critique of Clausewitz’ dictum. 
11 L Mumford, Technics and Civilization, Harcourt, New York, 1963. p. 308  
12 J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition : A Report on Knowledge, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1984; A Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1990; J Habermas, 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity : Twelve Lectures, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987. 
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suggestion that modernity began sometime in the mid to late eighteenth century Europe as 
society became reflexively self-aware.13  Koselleck suggested that the period from around 1750 
to 1850 should be considered a Sattelzeit (saddle-time) between the early modern and the modern 
period.  Elsewhere, Mark Raeff described that “what emerged into the open in the eighteenth 
century in most of Western and Central Europe - was society's conscious desire to maximize all 
its resources and to use this new potential dynamically for the enlargement and improvement of 
its way of life.”14  In this sense, modernity can be read as a set of modern institutions – the 
modern nation-state, the modern economy, modern technology, and so forth.  Modernity can also 
be characterized by particular forms of consciousness, such as one that distinguishes between 
“Man” and “Nature.”15  Modern society, therefore, maintains a “constitution” that distinguishes 
it from previous epochs. 
 Included within the constitution of modernity is the social system defined as capitalism.  
In political-economic terms capitalism requires a legal framework that provides adequate 
protection and reproduction of private property, free labor, and (relatively) free markets.  Capital 
is a factor of production that is not consumed within the production process, and includes money, 
fixed assets like machinery, and social assets such as network contacts and education.  For 
capital to accumulate it must remain in a state of movement, for it requires the commodity form 
and money as both a means of exchange and as a commodity itself.16  This movement and 
accumulative tendency provides capitalism with its dynamic character.  Because capital can 
 
13 R Koselleck and T Presner, The Practice of Conceptual History : Timing History, Spacing Concepts, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, Calif., 2002. pp. 154-169 
14 M Raeff, 'The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-
Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach', The American Historical Review, vol. 80,issue 5, 1975, 
1221-43. 
15 Leading Bruno Latour to conclude that “We have never been modern,” since this distinction was never real, and 
that reality is always characterized by “hybrids” between human products and nature.  B Latour, We Have Never 
Been Modern, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1993. 
16 K Marx, Capital: Oxford Abridged Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.  Pp 51-92, 93-100. 
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never rest, neither can the social system of capitalism remain static.  The social consequences of 
this process were described by Marx in terms of the contradictions within the logic of the system 
itself, particularly in terms of the class relations between owners of the means of production and 
labor.17  Further contradictions have been highlighted by Marxists such as David Harvey, who 
demonstrated the tendency within capitalism to generate fiscal crises,18 and Moishe Postone who 
suggested that the fundamental contradiction relates to the modern notions of abstract value and 
abstract time.19  Postone argued that traditional Marxists, that is, the majority of academic and 
political disciples of Marx, have misread the dialectic Marx tried to explain in Capital and The 
Grundrisse.20  The details of Postone’s argument will be discussed later, but for the purposes of 
defining capitalism here, a necessary distinction needs to be made between capitalism as an 
economic system and capitalism as a social system.  In other words, is capitalism to be equated 
with the “totality” of modern society, or is capitalism the particular structure of economic 
relations and transactions?  Providing a hard answer to this question at this point would be 
premature and will occupy much of the considerations that follow. 
 The relationship between war, modernity, and capitalism is of primary importance for 
establishing an adequate analysis of the question of whether war is immanently contained within 
the constitution of modern society, or whether war is an atavism of previous epochs that has not 
been removed or contained by modern international institutions.  This issue is fundamentally a 
sociological question, in the sense that sociology is interested in understanding modern society.  
However, the discipline of sociology has rarely addressed this problem or incorporated the 
 
17 op. cit. Marx 1999; K Marx and F Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Penguin Classics, New York, 1967. 
18 D Harvey, The Limits to Capital, B. Blackwell, Oxford, 1982. 
19 M Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination : A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge England ; New York, NY , USA, 1993. 
20 op. cit.  Marx 1999; K Marx, Grundrisse; Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), Allen 
Lane, New Left Review, London,, 1973. 
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question of war in its mainstream sociological theories, a legacy, perhaps, of the mindset of the 
classical sociological theories of Spencer, Durkheim, and Parsons.21  In other words, despite the 
overwhelming obviousness that war is essential to understanding society, as evidenced by the 
actuality of the occurrence of wars throughout the modern era, sociologists have, to this point, 
implicitly or explicitly assumed the position that war is not an immanent feature of modernity.   
 Of course, there are exceptions to this generalization about the mainstream of sociology.  
Several scholars, such as Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, Hans Joas, and others have demanded 
that we confront the violence inherent in modern society, especially in the form of the modern 
nation-state.  The work of these sociologists will be of great importance to the theoretical project 
outlined below.  Furthermore, the work of Marxist scholars from Vladimir Lenin to Immanuel 
Wallerstein has dealt with the issue of war by drawing on the implications of Marx’s analysis of 
capitalism.  In this sense, these scholars, more than any other, have confronted the very issue of 
whether war is contained within the logic of modern society.  However, this project will consist 
of a specific critique of the economic determinism of these analyses – that is, the focus on 
resources, markets, and distribution, toward the relative exclusion of cultural, political, and 
social factors that, in orthodox Marxism, are accorded the position of the “superstructure.”      
   
 
21 M Mann, States, War, and Capitalism : Studies in Political Sociology, B. Blackwell, Oxford [England] ; New 
York, NY, USA, 1988; H Joas, War and Modernity, Blackwell Pub.,Malden, MA, 2003. 
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2. Economistic Theories of War and Modernity 
 
 I will begin with an outline of four theories that have been developed to understand war 
and modern society, all of which can be deemed economically deterministic: Marxist, Realist, 
Liberal, and Communitarian.  The relative popularity of these theories is by no means 
proportional, and they exist across social scientific disciplines.  Synopses of the assumptions of 
the respective theories are as follows:  
• Marxist – The class contradictions of capitalist accumulation generate a condition 
that necessitates that surplus capital which has been over-accumulated must be 
exported, leading to economic and military imperialism.  On a world-systemic 
scale the global division of labor between core, semi-periphery, and periphery 
leads to hegemonic cycles in which the core nation-states battle, often militarily, 
for primacy. 
 
• Realist – States exist within an anarchic international state system that has no 
over-arching regulatory control mechanism.  The stability, or balance-of-power, 
that exists is maintained by states acting in their objective state interest, which is 
the accumulation of power.  Power is defined in military and economic terms – 
weapons, people, land, resources, money, and so forth.  If states do not act 
according to their objective state interests this can cause imbalances of power 
which can lead to war.   
 
• Liberal – Industrial society and enlightened political economy provide the 
conditions upon which cosmopolitan peace can exist.  Free markets, democracy, 
and international law provide the framework through which true enlightened 
modernity can become actualized.  War is considered atavistic, feudal, or 
uncivilized.  Markets and industrial production are considered politically neutral 
in this reading, and, in fact, are beneficial in stimulating transnational 
relationships.  War is considered irrational and needs to be overcome through 
liberal projects such as free markets, education, and, ironically, interventionist 
war. 
 
• Communitarian – This position, like communitarianism in general, is not 
explicitly codified in any one place.  Yet, I use the term to describe the specific 
argument made by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation regarding the 
Hundred Years’ Peace.22  This position can be defined by what it is not: namely, 
                                                            
22 K Polanyi, The Great Transformation : The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time,  Beacon Press, Boston, 
MA, 2001. 
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Marxist, Liberal, or Realist.  Yet it is compatible with some elements of the 
Marxist and Liberal readings.  The economic argument is essentially that of the 
Liberal, which suggests that free markets and international economic integration 
led to peace in the nineteenth century.  However, another side of Polanyi’s 
argument suggests that this Liberal economic system was superficial and based on 
a false understanding of human society.           
My analytic position will draw from a combination of all four of these readings, finding none 
entirely adequate on their own.  In order to see the merits and inadequacies of the respective 
theories they will need to be outlined in greater detail.     
2.1. Marxist Perspectives 
 
 Three of the above theories can be defined, to a certain extent, by their utopian 
elements.23  This is especially important to understanding the Marxist perspective.  Because war 
and other social problems are, in the final analysis, related to the contradictions of capitalism, 
removing or overcoming these contradictions will lead to a more just society and the removal of 
the causes of war.  Whether this overcoming is through communism, socialism, or another form 
of political economic organization is less important than the critique of capitalism as it is 
currently constituted.  In fact, a positive aspect of capitalism is that it allows the possibility of 
overcoming itself.   Capitalist society’s form is not determined by ethical social relations, as was 
the case in traditional or “primitive,” societies.  Rather modern capitalist society is solely 
determined by the economic relations of the exchange and production of commodities.  Only 
through concerted analytical effort and political revolution, the deeply rooted motor of capitalist 
accumulation and class conflict could be eliminated.  War and the military will exist as long as 
class-antagonist state societies exist and will finally be overcome only when the state ceases. 
 
23 The exception, of course, is Realism, which is more or less defined by its rejection of idealism, instead claiming to 
look at the “reality” of human nature.   
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 Before returning to the Marxist critique of the current socio-economic situation, I need to 
digress on a consideration of violence in the overcoming of capitalism itself (i.e. revolution), for 
it will lead to an important assumption regarding the state in the Marxian framework.  Marxist 
perspectives related to violence are not universally held by all Marxian activists and scholars.  
However, one reading of Engels, via Lenin, indicated that a classless society is only possible 
following a certain amount of war.  Though Marx did not clearly explicate a consistent and 
thorough theory of the state, Lenin combed through Marx and Engels’ writings in search of a 
definitive perspective.24  Citing Engels’ Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,25 
Lenin asserted,  
Here we have…the basic idea of Marxism on the question of the historical role 
and meaning of the state.  The state is the product and the manifestation of the 
irreconcilability of class antagonisms.  The state arises when, where, and to the 
extent that the class antagonisms cannot be objectively reconciled.  And, 
conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are 
irreconcilable.26 
 
This led Lenin to reassert Engels’ declaration that the state should be abolished in the classless 
society.  He continued,  
If the state is the product of the irreconcilable character of class antagonisms, if it 
is a force standing above society and “increasingly separating itself from it,” then 
it is clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without 
a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state 
power.”27  
 
 Any revolution that shatters the state apparatus finds itself in conflict with the former 
dispossessed ruling class who will attempt to regain control of this armed body and the state.  
 
24 V I Lenin, 'The State and Revolution', in A. Giddens and D. Held (ed.), Classes, Power, and Conflict: Classical 
and Contemporary Debates,Macmillan Press,London, 1982. 
25 F Engels, Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State, Resistance Books, Newtown, AUS, 2004. 
26 op. cit. Lenin 1982, p. 48 emphasis in original 
27 ibid. p. 49 emphasis in original 
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This revolution is protected by “special bodies of armed men” that protects the new state from 
the old.28    
 The concept of a revolutionary power, whether interim or permanent, led critics to 
suggest that the revolution was merely cloaked opportunism, allowing one group of dissidents in 
society to replace the current ruling class for another in the form of a revolutionary vanguard.29  
However, Lenin asserted a five-fold argument against the claim of opportunism and the validity 
of the ‘withering away’ argument.  Firstly, the state, as defined as the container for class 
antagonism, would cease to be “a state” as traditionally defined.  Secondly, the state’s “special 
repressive force” would convert from a bourgeois force oppressing the proletariat to its opposite: 
a proletarian force oppressing the bourgeoisie.  Thirdly, the state would wither away as the 
communist government became pure democracy.  Fourthly, the revolutionary state must exist in 
order to prevent anarchy.  Finally, the logic of dialectics makes it imperative that the state be 
replaced by violent revolution, which is essentially a development of an anti-state - the 
proletarian state.  This violent revolution would then wither away.    
 Lenin draws our attention to the role of violence and lethal force in revolution.  All this is 
achieved through Lenin and Engels’ redefinition of the state as both outside society and 
composed of violent bodies.  This claim, however, does not hold up to scrutiny.  Excepting 
anarchy, there cannot be a removal of the state, if the state is defined as the monopoly of 
coercive force.30  Any state, even one ostensibly representing the masses, must establish a 
system of justice which needs to be backed up by armed force.  As Foucault argued in his 
 
28 ibid. p. 50 
29 V Pareto, Les Systèmes Socialistes, V. Giard & E. Brière, Paris, 1902. 
30 This definition of the state, developed by Max Weber, will not be wholly assumed in this paper.  Instead Michael 
Mann’s critique of this definition will be described and applied below.  However, the definition of the state as the 
monopoly of coercive force is so widely assumed that to point out that Lenin and Engels are redefining the state 
seems valid.  
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discussion with the Maoists, this force or legal system can never be truly neutral for it will 
always represent a certain ideology and structure of power.31   For this reason, the Soviet Union 
did not transcend or overcome the antagonist class relations of the bourgeois state and resulted, 
instead, in something like what Frederick Pollock described as “state capitalism.”32  Legitimate 
arguments can be made that Leninism, Maoism, or other violent forms of Marxism are somehow 
misunderstandings of Marx’s true mission, or that Marx’s scientific program should be separated 
from his political program.33  However, I would argue that Lenin’s interpretation and the 
consequences in the Soviet Union do in fact stem from Marx and Engels’ understanding of the 
state as something that exists outside society – as something that can be seized.34      
 Other Marxists, including Nicos Poulantzas, Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, and Maurice 
Zeitlin have suggested that the state can be defined only in relation to specific modes of 
production.35   For example, Poulantzas wrote that the state has “the particular function of 
constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation.”36 That is, states 
perform a functional role for reproducing classes and the conditions for economic production.   
The state functions “require” expansion of the “repressive and ideological state apparatuses” – 
 
31 M Foucault and C Gordon,  “On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists,” Power/Knowledge : Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 1st American edn., Pantheon Books, New York, 1980, pp.1-36. 
32 F Pollock, 'State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations', Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, vol. 9, 
1941, 200-25.  Pollock’s analysis is problematic and has been credited with the static political economy perspective 
that led to the pessimism of the Frankfurt School critical theorists.  See op. cit. Postone pp. 84-122; see also H 
Dahms 'Postliberal Capitalism and the Early Frankfurt School: Toward a Critical Theory of the Inner Logic of 
Social Value Spheres', Current Perspectives in Social Theory, vol. 19, 1999, 55-88..   
33 P Paolucci, Marx's Scientific Dialectics : A Methodological Treatise for a New Century, Haymarket Books, 
Chicago, IL, 2009 suggests that there are distinctions between Marx’s political economy analysis, his analysis of 
history, and his political program.   
34 Of course, Marx and Engels retreated from their initial position in The Communist Manifesto that declared that all 
that needed to be done to achieve revolution was to seize the state apparatus.  The failure of the Paris Commune led 
them to reconsider this notion which had been modeled after the successful capture of the state in the bourgeois 
French Revolution.  op. cit, Marx and Engels p. 54 
35 see A Giddens and D Held ed., Classes, Power, and Conflict : Classical and Contemporary Debates, University 
of California Press, Berkeley, 1982. pp 93-100 (Poulantzas); 249-256 (Offe and Ronge); 196-223 (Zeitlin). 
36 N Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, NLB; Sheed and Ward, London, 1973. p. 44 
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police, welfare, education, mass media, etc.37  This functional analysis is not exclusive to the 
state alone, but is also related to the concept of social reproduction as Giddens pointed out in 
Central Problems in Social Theory.  In many readings of Marx,  
Capitalism has its own ‘needs’, which the system functions to fulfill.  Since the 
system needs a reserve army, one comes into being.  The argument is sometimes 
stated in reverse.  Since the operation of capitalism leads to the formation of a 
reserve army, this must be because it needs one.38 
 
Functionalist conceptions of social systems suggest that the system, or totality, has ‘needs’ or 
‘reasons’ of its own.  This proposition cannot be easily defended, for it is the actors and 
institutions that compose the system that have needs or reasons, not the system itself.  Any social 
reproduction of economic modes of production are due to the actions of actors or the unintended 
consequences of action, which is not to say that unintended consequences are the same as latent 
functions.39   
 Functionalism is also present in the post-Marxist world-systems analysis of Immanuel 
Wallerstein.  In describing the peripheralization of Poland and the Baltic States in the fifteenth 
century, Wallerstein stated: “Either eastern Europe would become the ‘breadbasket’ of western 
Europe or vice versa.  Either solution would have served the ‘needs of the situation’ in the 
conjuncture.”40  Like Giddens’ example of the reserve army above, the argument can be framed 
in two ways:  either the capitalist world-system needed some region to become a periphery and 
made it so, or, in reverse, because Eastern Europe became peripheralized it must be because the 
 
37 L Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays, New Left Books, London, 1971, p. 123-73. cited from M 
Mann, The Sources of Social Power Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1993.  p. 46.   
38 A Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory : Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979. pp. 112-113 
39 R Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1957; A Giddens, The Constitution of 
Society : Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Polity Press, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire], 1984. 
40 I Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vol. I : Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-
Economy in the Sixteenth Century, Academic Press, New York, 1974. pp.  98-99 
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capitalist world-system needed it to be so.  This functionalist logic is problematic in terms of war 
when the world-systems concept of hegemony enters the picture.  Wallerstein wrote,  
The longer hegemonic cycles involve a struggle between two major states to 
become the successor to the previous hegemonic power by becoming the primary 
locus of the accumulation of capital.  This is a long process, which eventually 
involves having the military strength to win a “thirty years’ war”  Once a new 
hegemony is instituted, its maintenance requires heavy financing which 
eventually and inevitably leads to a relative decline of the current hegemonic 
power and struggle for a successor.41  
 
While Wallerstein’s analysis leads to interesting conclusions regarding the transition from Dutch 
hegemony to British hegemony to American hegemony, the world-systems perspective seems to 
indicate a “law” of hegemonic cycles, in which over-extension of militaries “inevitably” leads to 
relative decline.42  William H. Sewell Jr. suggested that this represents a kind of teleology due to 
Wallerstein’s misapplied cosmology analogy.  Rather than explaining social phenomena in terms 
of the principles governing its smallest entities (human individuals, local communities, states, 
etc.), Wallerstein indicates that “the fates of local communities are determined not by local 
causes but by the operation of global, system-level causes.”43  Furthermore, Wallerstein argued a 
posteriori back from the current state of the capitalist world-system to its prior state, establishing 
a “big bang” event (the discovery of the New World) that foreordained all subsequent 
development.  In fact, all of the history he recounted was incredibly contingent, from the politics 
of Portugal in the late 1400s to the ascension of William III to the throne of England in 1689.   
 
41 I Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2004 p. 437. 
42 This argument is similar to the one made by economic historian, Paul Kennedy.  P Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of 
the Great Powers : Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 1st edn., Random House, New York, 
NY, 1987, which has also been criticized for explaining everything via teleological hindsight.  cf. N Ferguson, The 
Cash Nexus : Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000, Basic Books, New York, 2001. pp. 406-410. 
43 W. H. Sewell, Jr, Logics of History : Social Theory and Social Transformation, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2005. P. 86; Maurice Zeitlin made a similar argument as summarized in A So, Social Change and 
Development : Modernization, Dependency, and World-Systems Theories, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, Calif., 
1990, pp. 220-224 
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 While there are means by which the system, or rather the totality, can impact the social 
reproduction of the actors who constitute the system through socialization, psychological 
repression, and class solidarity,44 this does not seem to be the angle from which these Marxian 
analyses are coming from.  Rather, the structure of the arguments of Poulantzas and others that 
characterize the state as functional to capitalism turns the state into a “place,” as Michael Mann 
has pointed out.  “The state is not an actor, but a place where classes and class ‘fractions’ or 
‘segments’ organize.”45  While Mann would argue this is wrong because the state is neither an 
“actor” nor a “place,” but rather is an “active place,” the Marxian notion of the state as a place 
leads right back to Lenin and Engels’ analysis concerning the seizure of the state.  If the state is a 
neutral place that is perverse only because it is the “committee for managing the common affairs 
of the whole bourgeoisie,”46 it follows that seizure of the state by the proletariat is a reasonable 
expectation.  One imagines a series of buildings with teletype machines that need only be 
reprogrammed before being turned off, or withering away.  In fact, the state consists of the 
institutions that provide legacies of time and space, as well as the actors that compose and 
operate the centralized “state machinery,” as well as the population and territory that exists 
within borders.    
 This excursus into the Marxian conception of the state is relevant in relation to 
imperialism and hegemony, two subjects that are central to the Marxist analysis of war and 
modernity.  Lenin, adapting J.A. Hobson’s analysis of surplus capital,47 suggested that, in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, imperialist growth had become a necessity generated 
 
44 This is position of critical theorists such as Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno, and will be discussed in the 
conclusion of this essay.  H Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, Sphere, London,, 
1969; T Adorno, Negative Dialectics, Seabury Press, New York,, 1973. 
45 op. cit. Mann, 1993. p. 46 
46 op. cit. Marx and Engels p. 82 
47 J.A. Hobson Imperialism; a Study, J. Pott & Company, New York, 1902. 
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by capitalism.  As he said in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, “under capitalism the 
home market is inevitably bound up with the foreign market.”48  The inevitability of this 
relationship with foreign markets stems from the need within the capitalist mode of production to 
expand.  As Marx said, “The tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept 
of capital itself.  Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome.”49  The accumulation of 
surplus value from the laborer to the capitalist generates the need to reinvest (in overseas 
investment) and distribute (in the form of market exchange) that surplus to the non-capitalist 
world.  The process requires the integration of the non-capitalist outside into the capitalist inside 
in a perpetual process of extraction and expansion.50   
 The significance of this process as related to war was best expressed by the Resolution 
adopted at the Seventh International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart in 1907 constructed by 
Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg.  It was agreed that,  
Wars between capitalist states are, as a rule, the outcome of their competition on 
the world market, for each state seeks not only to secure its existing markets, but 
also to conquer new ones. In this, the subjugation of foreign peoples and countries 
plays a prominent role. These wars result furthermore from the incessant race for 
armaments by militarism, one of the chief instruments of bourgeois class rule and 
of the economic and political subjugation of the working class.51 
 
The statement above highlights the destruction wrought by capitalism upon the peoples of what 
would later be termed the Third World or the Global South.  The Statement furthermore insisted, 
simply, that “wars…are part of the very nature of capitalism.”52  Wars also distract the masses, 
 
48 V I Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline, Foreign Languages Pub. House, 
Moscow, 1917. Ch. 5 
49 op. cit. Marx 1973, p. 408 
50 This model of imperialism is also taken up by contemporary Marxist philosophers, Hardt and Negri.  See M Hardt 
and A Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000. pp. 221-239 
51 Second International, International Socialist Congress, 'Resolution Adopted at the Seventh International Socialist 
Congress at Stuttgart ', <http://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/1907/militarism.htm>, 
accessed 11-29-09 2009. 
52 ibid. 
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through ideological and nationalist sentiments, from recognizing their positions as alienated 
producers in conflict with capital - a phenomenon known as “social imperialism.”  Because wars 
are fought by soldiers who are largely drawn from the proletariat, wars in the interest of the 
capitalist ruling class should be avoided at all costs.  But should a war arise, it was the 
responsibility of the International Socialist community to “intervene in favor of its speedy 
termination and with all their powers to utilize the economic and political crisis created by the 
war to rouse the masses and thereby to hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule.”53 This was 
precisely what Lenin managed to achieve in Russia, and what Luxemburg attempted in Germany 
– the exploitation of the sufferings of war to highlight the horrors of the capitalist system in order 
to encourage the proletarian masses and soldiers to overthrow the system.   Lenin’s analysis of 
the capitalist mode of production in the imperialist stage suggested that the destruction wrought 
by the rapid expansion across the global landscape reflected the violence inherent in capitalism 
most visibly.  Imperialism was capitalism laid bare.  Eventually, Lenin thought that this division 
of the world between capitalist associations in conjunction with the division of the world 
between the great powers would inevitably lead to a conflict between the great powers, i.e. 
World War I.   
 Before comparing Lenin’s economically deterministic theory of imperialism to that of the 
other theories listed above and outlined below, I will demonstrate that this Marxist-Leninist 
interpretation is not fundamentally dissimilar from other Marx-inspired analyses of imperialism 
and surplus capital.  The concept of Military Keynesianism, for example, dominated mid-
twentieth century considerations of the military, inspired by the Vietnam War and the American 
military-industrial-complex.  To a large extent, this analysis of militaries within modern 
 
53 ibid. 
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capitalist society has not been superseded.  Marxist scholars Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy argued 
in Monopoly Capital that giant firms dominated the U.S. economy in the mid-twentieth century 
against the interests of society.  Large corporations rigged the rules of the game so that surpluses 
would travel through the economy to a select group of firms organized in monopolized or 
oligopolized configurations.  Among the means by which these firms were able to do this was by 
taking advantage of Military Keynesianism, or government defense expenditures.   As Baran and 
Sweezy said: “Here at last monopoly capitalism had seemingly found the answer to the ‘on what’ 
question: On what could the government spend enough to keep the system from sinking into the 
mire of stagnation?  On arms, more arms, and ever more arms.”54 Military spending is capable of 
absorbing surplus because  
1. It is fungible and can be easily diverted into different military products  
 
2. It generates a virtually continuous demand because of the destruction and 
obsolescence of military weaponry 
 
3. Military strength assures U.S. global hegemony enhancing the profitability of 
U.S. firms 
 
4. The fiscal conservatism that restrains other forms of government spending is 
blunted by the anti-communist ideologies of the Cold War 
 
5. Military spending does not threaten private profitability and ostensibly, it does 
not have the redistributive consequences of alternative forms of government 
spending.55  
 
Baran and Sweezy did place a limit on the level to which this Military Keynesianism can be 
effective, related to technological development.  As the military focuses more and more on 
science, technology, and research and development, less and less people are employed by the 
 
54 P Baran and P Sweezy, Monopoly Capital; an Essay on the American Economic and Social Order, Monthly 
Review Press, New York, 1966. p. 211; Marxist analyses related to monopoly capitalism continues in the work of 
John Bellamy Foster and the Monthly Review.   
55 M Wallace, C Borch, and G Gauchat, 'Military Keynesianism in the Post-Vietnam War Era: A View from the 
American States', Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 36,issue 2, 2008, p. 217 
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Military Industrial Complex limiting the overall stimulus to the labor economy.  Beyond this 
level, investment in the military (i.e. in military technology) results in stagnation and does not 
further absorb the economic surplus.  
 The application of military spending is also covered in James O’Connor’s work, The 
Fiscal Crisis of the State, which dealt with Vietnam era social and military expenditures of the 
U.S. government, also with a Marxist lens.  Again, the military provided a relief valve for 
surplus accumulation.  O’Connor considered the imperial growth of American hegemony to be 
economically motivated, in tandem with an industrial arms cartel that received most of the 
military contracts outside the realm of a “free market”.  These government expenditures were 
factored into his four categories of state expenditures (all of which primarily benefit 
monopolies):  
1. Social capital – expenditures required for profitable accumulation 
 
2. Social investment – projects and services that increase labor productivity 
 
3. Social consumption – projects and services that lower reproduction costs of 
labor 
 
4. Social expenses – projects and services required to establish the legitimacy of 
the state.56  
 
Military expenditures typically stimulate or contribute to several of these categories at once 
which is why they are so often employed.  For example, the military’s Interstate Highway 
System (IHS) was developed for increased mobility of troops, and was therefore a “legitimate” 
social expense.  However, as the highway system allowed workers to move to and from work it 
was also a form of social consumption.  As a means of commercial freight transport, the IHS was 
also a form of social investment.   
 
56 J O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1973. p. 7 
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 For O’Connor, the military was a relatively popular choice for which the state could 
expend monies because it fulfilled so many roles at once and remained relatively outside the 
purview of ideological and political considerations through which other expenditures were 
typically scrutinized.  The “legitimized” state - that is, the state that publicly operates according 
to its professed values - is therefore a welfare-warfare state, while the actual state proceedings 
have intended and unintended effects that primarily benefit the monopoly sectors of the 
economy. 
 While Baran and Sweezy’s and O’Connor’s analyses have been empirically demonstrable 
in many ways,57 and continue to stimulate considerable debate and research, there are two 
identifiable problems that would prevent an application of their approach more generally, even 
within a sociological theory of modern society.  First, the analyses are historically specific in that 
they seem to exist only within the framework of welfare-state capitalism, monopoly capitalism, 
and the Cold War.58  This is not necessarily a bad thing, in the sense that good contemporary 
research and conclusions have been drawn from the perspective.  However, the second problem 
is that the military and war remain functional in the analysis.  The military exists for surplus 
capital to be laundered.  The cache of excess armaments lying around seems to stimulate 
imperial ambition, which serves another function in establishing safe markets for U.S. exports.   
 
57 Wallace, Borch, and Gauchat, op. cit. disaggregated from national statistics economic variables from individual 
states and regressed them against military expenditures to determine whether military spending was being used to 
prop up distressed state economies.  The data demonstrates clear evidence of countercyclical fiscal policy in the 
post-Vietnam era in which state managers arranged for military industrial investment to support a sagging economy.  
Their additional research and analysis showed that corporate influence was an important factor in securing spending 
levels, as most of the beneficiaries of spending were either Fortune 500 companies or firms with five hundred or 
more employees.    
58 Admittedly, the Global War on Terror since 2001 could be read as a recreation of the ideological/political 
conditions of the Cold War that make the Military Keynesianism argument work.  But this might require, or lead to 
a firm position attributing responsibility for 9/11 on “Capital” - in other words, Dick Cheney, Halliburton, or 
someone similarly motivated to generate a “New Pearl Harbor.”     
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  Again, the problem with functionalism is that the system does not ‘need’ to export 
surplus capital – particular members of society need to invest capital, and choose military 
armament firms.  In this sense, Baran and Sweezy’s description of the specific reasons these 
investments would be attractive ventures are on the mark;  as is O’Connor’s analysis that 
military expenditures are not as politically suspect as other government spending.  However, the 
idea that the system also ‘needs’ to imperialize to establish safe markets abroad does not seem 
adequate.  Certain firms, which have developed due to historically contingent circumstances, 
may lobby to invade Vietnam or Nicaragua or Iraq for economic reasons, but so might exile 
groups from Tibet or Sudan lobby to deal with a humanitarian crisis.  The state responds to the 
interests of those who have access to power.  Typically, economic power (e.g. Boeing) trumps 
deliberative power (e.g. the Dalai Lama), but these transactions are mediated through specific 
interactions between actors and institutions with particular goals and means.  The actions are not 
directly derived from the system’s functional requirements.     
 In the context of postwar, postliberal society and the U.S. military, a more adequate 
analysis from a “Marxist” perspective comes from C. Wright Mills’ Power Elite.59  Mills 
outlined the realms of power within mid-century American society indentifying groups or classes 
of people who occupied those positions of power.  The military represented one of three major 
groups (military, political, business) which acted upon the country and, due to the geopolitical 
position of the United States, thereby acted upon the world and “made” history.”60  Military men 
 
59 C. W. Mills, The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999.  Mills, himself, would have probably 
not identified himself as a Marxist, and would have instead cited Max Weber as a more substantial sociological 
influence.  However, many Marxist scholars have incorporated Mills’ analysis of class, and class actors.  This 
Marxist-appropriated Mills is analyzed here.  Politically, Mills identified with anarchism, as in the “Wobblies” of 
the Industrial Workers of the World; C W Mills, K Mills, and P Mills, Letters and Autobiographical Writings, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 2000. p. 252  
60 Ibid. p. 22.  “The fact is that although we are all of us within history we do not all possess equal powers to make 
history.  To pretend that we do is sociological nonsense and political irresponsibility.” 
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came from the upper middle class, and yet, within the overall class structure of the country, their 
status role fell somewhere between politician and manager.  Because, for the most part, military 
officials did not begin life in the highest classes, a sublimation of politics and ideology was 
needed to proceed through up to 25 years of gradual mobility leading military officials to orient 
themselves to their immediate superiors and inferiors in expected directions relative to rank.  
Indeed, as Morris Janowitz explained in Sociology and the Military Establishment, a vast system 
of authoritative and communicative controls are in place within the military organization such 
that, more so than perhaps in any other realm of society, a role within the military hierarchy can 
be considered static and independent of the individual personality of the officer.61  For similar 
reasons, the Prussian military was one of the inspirations for Max Weber’s ideal type of 
bureaucracy.62   
 Critics of Mills might suggest that the military exists in a subservient status relative to 
civilian authority, and, by that measure, remains subservient to capital as well.  This position, 
however, would miss on several points.  For one, the civil-military relations of the postwar era 
are especially historically contingent.  It has not been the norm for militaries to be answerable to 
the state, and the evolution of this civil-military relation took place largely in the nineteenth 
century, as will be discussed below.  Additionally, the military has at its disposal advanced 
technological means to deliver lethal violence.  As Michael Mann pointed out in his I.E.M.P 
model, military power must be considered as analytically separate from political power.63  For 
example, the fact that a military coup can happen demonstrates that the military is distinct from 
 
61 M Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment, Russell Sage Foundation, New York,, 1959. 
62 M Weber, Economy and Society : An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2 vols., University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1978. Pp. 980-982; see also H Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy; the Prussian 
Experience, 1660-1815, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,, 1958. 
63 M Mann, The Sources of Social Power Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1993. p. 8 
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the state if it can overthrow the state.  Beyond lethal power, the military has developed politically 
instrumental techniques such as “systems analysis.”  Though systems analysis, developed by Ed 
Paxson at the RAND Corporation, was not used for its intended purpose (determining nuclear 
bombing strategies), the Air Force did use the mathematical techniques to manipulate 
Congressional funding approval for defense projects.64  All of this is to suggest that the military 
does have autonomous power even within the relatively constrained civil-military relationship 
that existed in the 1950s. 
 The final, and most important reason Mills’ analysis is relevant for considering the 
military’s power in modern society is that he points to the specific class relations that are 
reproduced through the recruitment of upper middle class officers.  While the military goes to 
great lengths to depoliticize soldiers in terms of Democratic or Republican party leanings, this 
process is never fully complete.  Evidence of this can be seen in the appointment of ex-military 
officials in ambassadorships, congressional posts, and even the presidency.65  Ultimately, it is 
through the class relationship shared among members of the power elite, that the “system” gets 
its necessary actors to reproduce the particular configurations of power needed to maintain the 
modern political-military-economic framework.  The analysis of class, particularly the class 
character of General Staffs and diplomats, remains an essential feature of any discussion of war 
and modernity.  In principle, if not always in the particular form of the U.S. military-industrial-
complex analyzed in The Power Elite, Mills’ attention to the specific actors who hold positions 
of power, and their relation to those class structures they draw power from and reproduce, seems 
applicable to many times and places in the modern era.   
 
64 A Abella, Soldiers of Reason: The Rand Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire, Harcourt, Inc, New 
York, 2008. p. 63  
65 op. cit. Mills, pp. 202-205 
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 Ultimately, it must be said that Marxists have paid attention to the role of war in the 
constitution of modern society.  However, as has been demonstrated above, this can be 
problematic when phenomena are treated in a functionalist manner.  This can be seen in Lenin’s 
theory of imperialism, Baran and Sweezy’s conception of Military Keynesianism, and 
Wallerstein’s law of hegemonic cycles.  To be sure, the events these analysts described 
happened, and in many instances the Marxist lens that was utilized uncovered material left 
obscured by other perspectives.  However, in attributing causal significance to economic factors 
stemming from contradictions in the distribution of surplus value (i.e. class antagonism), 
Marxists run the risk of excluding other ‘non-economic’ factors, including nationalism, 
humanitarianism, or aggressive impulses to dominate for its own sake.  Orthodox Marxists could 
conclude that even these categories are superstructural and determined by the economic base in 
the final analysis, but this is not a position I am willing to accept as scientific.  Still, many of the 
Marxist, neo-Marxist, and post-Marxist assumptions cannot be denied.  For example, capitalism 
was, and is, an important feature of modern society, if not the most important feature.  To reject 
an over-emphasis on economic and material concerns should not suggest a rejection of the 
validity of these concerns.  This would represent what I call the “see-saw effect” typical of social 
theory debates in which stating “it’s not all economics” is taken to mean “it’s all culture.”  Of 
course it is both.  Indentifying the particular influence of capitalism and the economic sphere in 
relation to other, non-economic factors will be the ultimate goal of this essay.  The Marxist 
perspective will remain an important foil against which the other economistic theories and the 
broader historical analysis of the nineteenth century will have to be assessed. 
2.2. Realist Perspectives    
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 The Realist International Relations (IR) perspective, often associated with conservative 
political persuasions, is not typically considered next to Marxism in terms of their similarities.  
However, I would argue that both maintain similar emphases on the materialist motivations of 
money and power, while also reverting to systemic causal explanations.  Additionally, in certain 
versions of the theories, modern society is considered ahistorically, or, rather, transhistorically, 
projecting the present condition of society backward in time.   
 However, as mentioned above, the utopian sentiments of a better future society or an 
ideal natural past, which are keys to understanding the other theories of war, are not inherent in 
the Realist perspective.  Realism, in fact, is considered by its proponents to be emphatically not 
idealistic or utopian.66  The Realist tradition, which harkens back to classical and early modern 
philosophers like Thucydides and Niccolo Machiavelli, can be considered derivative of Thomas 
Hobbes’ influential work, Leviathan.67  Essential to the model of international and domestic 
politics is the idea of homo lupus – man as wolf.   Man’s natural condition is to be in the state of 
war.  Hobbes wrote in 1651, “During the time men live without a common Power to keep them 
all in awe, they are in that condition with is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, 
against every man.”68  War is like weather – it comes and goes in spurts and is not necessarily 
ever-present.   It is, however, inevitable and, ultimately, natural, in the sense that men following 
their human nature are prone to fight and engage in violent conflict.  Only through the 
development of the strong national state can men escape this “poore, nasty, brutish, and short” 
life.69  Scholars have noted that the particular life history of Thomas Hobbes, who lived through 
 
66 Though one might call Realism anti-idealist rather than non-idealist, in the sense that it is often based on a 
negative, as opposed to a positive vision of Human Nature.   
67 T Hobbes, Leviathan; or, the Matter, Forme & Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill, University 
press, Cambridge,, 1904. 
68 ibid. p. 83. 
69 ibid. p 84 
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the brutal English Civil War of the 1640s as well as the devastating Thirty Years War in which 
up to a third of the population of the Holy Roman Empire was destroyed,70  left an imprint on the 
author that indicated that war was, indeed, the normal condition of human society.  
 While Hobbes advocated the construction of a strong centralized state to impose order by 
force based on his assessment of seventeenth century warfare, Realist scholars see the period 
following the Thirty Years War as significant for establishing the modern international state 
system in Europe.  The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 ended the wars of religion that plagued 
Europe since the Protestant Reformation, and secularized the causes of conflict.  The 
consequences of this stalemate between religions were at least two-fold in terms of international 
relations.  First, the treaty, as an agreement to disagree on matters of faith, institutionalized what 
IR scholars call the “anarchic” international state-system.  Second, the secularization of conflict 
drew states’ focus away from theological debates and towards the increase of power itself.  Each 
of these conclusions has consequences for Realist and Neorealist IR theory, as will be dealt with 
below. 
The first issue is international anarchy.   Because there is no authority above the state, the 
international state system is said to be in a state of anarchy.71  Whatever stability does exist is 
said to be maintained by multi-state balance-of-power, bipolarity, or hegemony.  Balance-of-
power theories are based on the assumption that states act reasonably rationally to maximize 
their security.72  Though balance-of-power theory was consequential to the extent that statesmen 
internalized and acted upon the international system based on the idea of it, the explanatory value 
 
70 see C.V. Wedgewood, The Thirty Years War, P. Smith, Gloucester, Mass., 1969 for both the horror of 
devastation, as well as the utter pointlessness of the war.  
71 H Bull The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977. 
cf. R Little and J Williams, The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
[England], New York, 2006. 
72 op. cit.Levy and Thompson, pp. 38-43. 
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in the context of IR is suspect when it is turned into a law of history.  Paul Schroeder described 
the defective concept of balance-of-power well:  
Balance-of-power arguments generally, explain any outcome equally well.  War 
or peace can be accounted for either by a balance or by an imbalance of power.  
Wars arise because conflicts end too indecisively, like the War of the Austrian 
Succession (1740-8), or because they end too decisively, like the Seven Years 
War, because one side gains a dangerous superiority, like Britain on the high seas, 
or because neither has the upper hand, like Austria and Prussia in Germany.  Thus 
the balance-of-power argument fails really to explain anything and begs the 
question.  Worse, it conceals the main fact: balance-of-power rules and practices 
were not a solution to war…but a major part of the problem.73 
 
Furthermore, one of the assumptions behind balance-of-power is that states will act to prevent 
conditions of hegemony or bi-polarity as existed (simultaneously?) during the Cold War.  
However, as the Cold War example demonstrates, the international system can be stabilized or 
unstable in these other conditions.  Why are these objective state interests (maintaining balance-
of-power) something that leads to objectively similar conditions as lack of these state interests 
(hegemony)?   
This is the case because peace and survival are not the only state interest, as indicated in 
the second consequence of Westphalia mentioned above – the secularization of power.  Rather, 
attainment and increase of power can, and likely will be in the state’s interest, often trumping 
maintenance of peace as a goal.  Initial Realist perspectives on power were defined in the 1940s 
by Martin Wight in his book Power Politics, and Hans Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations. 74  
Power politics (Machtpolitik) is a state of international relations in which sovereigns protect their 
own interests by threatening one another with military, economic, or political aggression.  
Machtpolitik, and its related concept raison d’etat, imply a separation of morality from the 
 
73 P Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, Clarendon Press, New York, 1994. p. 6 
74 M Wight, Power Politics, Royal institute of international affairs, London, 1946; H Morgenthau, Politics among 
Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace, A. A. Knopf, New York, 1948. 
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objective interest of state, which should be the increase of more power.  As Wight explained, 
“Every dominant power aspires, by giving unification to the whole of international society, to 
become a universal empire.”75  Thus obtaining hegemony is the goal of every state, and 
according to the principles of competition, every other power is duty bound to prevent another 
state from attaining this position of dominance.  Interestingly, as can be seen in Morgenthau’s 
quotation, “The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power 
among other powers,” the semantic use of the word “power,” meaning “state,” and “power” 
meaning “resources” establishes a kind of cannibalistic notion in which powers gobble other 
powers using power to gain more power.76 
And yet, power is rarely defined explicitly in Realist and Neorealist texts.  Kenneth 
Waltz, for example, tried to clarify that power can be considered either as a “means to an end” or 
an “end in itself.”77  Yet, this does not define what power actually is.  From a sociological and 
philosophical perspective, leaving power undefined seems inadequate, and assumes that 
everyone knows what power means based on common sense.78  Steven Lukes, for example, 
defined three dimensions of power in his work, Power – A Radical View.79  The first dimension 
of power corresponds with Max Weber’s definition of power as “the possibility of imposing 
one’s own will upon the behavior of other person,” or in terms of A‘s authoritative power of 
command (domination) over B.80  The second dimension relates to the power of decision making 
 
75 op. cit. Wight, p. 37 
76 op. cit. Morgenthau, p. 165 
77 K Waltz, Man, the State, and War; a Theoretical Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York,, 1959, p. 35. 
78 S Lukes ed., Power, New York University Press, New York, 1986 contains several essays from the likes of 
Bertrand Russell, Max Weber, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and others, demonstrating that power cannot be 
defined as exclusively one thing. 
79 S Lukes, Power : A Radical View 2nd edn., Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire New York, 
2004. 
80 M Weber, Economy and Society, p. 942-946 
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and non-decision making.81  The third dimension relates to ideological power, or the power to 
“manipulate consensus by definitional fiat” - in other words, having the power to make others 
accept the existing order of things because they can see no alternative to it, or because they see it 
as natural and unchangeable.82  Furthermore, Weber’s, Barach and Baratz’, and Lukes’ 
definitions of power concern only distributive power, to say nothing of collective power, as 
described by Talcott Parsons in his critique of C. Wright Mills’ Power Elite.   
Power is a generalized facility or resource in the society.  It has to be divided or 
allocated, but it also has to be produced and it has collective as well as distributive 
functions.  It is the capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the 
attainment of goals for which a general ‘public’ commitment has been made, or 
may be made.  It is mobilization, above all, of the actions of persons and groups, 
which is binding on them by virtue of their position in the society.83 
 
Indeed, Mills’ statement that “Politics is a struggle for power,”84 implies that power is a zero-
sum game between “ins” and “outs” – an image of power that seems compatible with other 
materialist conceptions of power, like the Realists’. 
 Within the Realist framework, implicitly, power seems to be material interests – wealth, 
military arms, or territorial control, all of which function as means and ends for distributive 
power, or domination.  Furthermore, because Realists consider morality to be removed from 
considerations of pure raison d’etat, ideological and (domestic) political concerns are conceived 
of as disguises for actual material interests, in other words, as means to an end.  This eliminates 
two of the four sources of social power identified by Michael Mann in his I.E.M.P. model, 
 
81 see P Bachrach and M Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', The American Political Science Review, vol. 56,issue 4, 
1962, 947-52. 
82 S Lukes, 2004, p. 28. 
83 T Parsons, “Distribution of Power in American Society: review of C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite,” The Talcott 
Parsons Reader, Blackwell, Malden, Mass, 1999, p 232. 
84 op. cit. Mills p.171 
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Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political power.85   In the case of ideology, Mann does 
indicate that ideology can be configured as “immanent morale,” intensifying the power of an 
already-established social group, which would correspond with the idea that ideology can be 
simply justification for material state action.86  However, ideology can also be “sociospatially 
transcendent,” when emergent properties of social life “transcend the organizational reach of 
secular authorities.”87  In other words, ideology can have autonomous power of its own, as in the 
case of Christianity during Medieval European history, which transcended national borders and 
material interests.   
 Without even bringing in the complex issues of power brought up by Nietzsche and 
Foucault at this time,88 the point can be clearly made that classical Realism and Neorealism did 
not adequately incorporate the many faceted debates concerning the philosophy and sociology of 
power.89  By not examining the particular nature and configurations of power at the abstract 
level, Realism contended itself to identifying the objective interests of state in terms of brute 
power, hegemony, or security, but not in terms of human rights, true religion, or even 
cooperation for its own sake.   This is further complicated by the fact that throughout the 
twentieth century Realist scholars like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and George 
 
85 Mann’s political power is dual (domestic and geopolitical).  To be more precise, geopolitics is the combination of 
military and political power.  The argument above refers to domestic politics, not geopolitics. op. cit. Mann 1988, p 
ix 
86 M Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol. I : A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York, 1986, pp. 23-24 
87 ibid. p.23 
88 F Nietzsche, The Will to Power, an Attempted Transvaluation of All Values, The Macmillan company, New York,, 
1924; M Foucault and J Faubion ed., Power, New Press ; Distributed by W.W. Norton, New York, 2000; op. cit. 
Foucault 1980. 
89 This cannot be said of International Relation Theory as a whole, which is not to be equated solely with Realism 
and Neorealism as outlined by Morgenthau, Waltz, and others initially.  see, for example, A Wendt, Social Theory of 
International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 1999. 
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Kennan have actually made the policy decisions that are supposed to be hypothesized by the 
theory, proving the case by making the case exist.90   
 This has led to what John Hobson has called “tempocentrism” and “chronofetishism.”91  
Chronofetishism is the assumption that the present can only be explained by examining the 
present and ignoring the past.  This leads to reification of the present which makes the modern 
international system appear static and self-constituting.  This illusion, in turn, leads to a sense of 
the naturalness of the system, as opposed to having been historically constituted in a particular 
time and place: the modern era in Europe.  Finally, this leads to an illusion of immutability as the 
structure of the system becomes eternalized.  The perspective does even more epistemological 
damage when the condition of the present (which is reified and misunderstood) is extrapolated 
backwards throughout all of history.  This is what Hobson means by tempocentrism.  History 
done as such would have Imperial Rome operating off of balance-of-power imperatives identical 
to the Duke of Burgundy in 1477.  A famous (and inane) example of tempocentrism can be 
found in the comparison between the “bipolar” worlds of competing Sparta and Athens and the 
Cold War United States and the Soviet Union.   
 Chronofetishism and tempocentrism cause Realism to suffer from the same teleological 
and functionalist problems characteristic of some of the Marxist readings of war and modernity 
described earlier.  Like Wallerstein’s big bang concept of capitalism, tempocentrist projections 
of the present state of things back in history forces events into the analysis to fit the theory.  
 
90 In the context of economics, George Soros has called this phenomenon “reflexivity,” in which economists use 
theories to explain the economy, all the while acting upon the economy, causing systemic instability that is obscured 
because the observers are not included within the model.  Soros has used this concept to explain and predict several 
financial bubbles and crashes.  G Soros, The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the Mind of the Market, Simon and 
Schuster, New York, 1987; G Soros, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets : The Credit Crisis of 2008 and 
What It Means 1st edn., PublicAffairs, New York, 2008. 
91 J Hobson, 'What's at Stake in 'Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International Relations'?  Transcending 
'Chronofetishism' and 'Tempocentrism' in International Relations', in Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (ed.), 
Historical Sociology of International Relations,Cambridge University Press,New York, 2002), 3-41. 
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Events can be explained equally well by states engaging in their pure material state interests, or 
by acting on ideological or psychological grounds, which are considered as cover for actual state 
interests.  This causes cherry-picking and a misreading of history, for example, by explaining the 
European Crusades of the Levant as the result of demographic growth or the desire for access to 
the riches of the wealthier Near East.  The religious motivations actually felt by Pope Alexander 
II or Bernard of Clairveaux are considered “irrational” and are assumed to be either false 
consciousness of their true material interests, or secondarily important.   
 I do not mean that material interests are irrelevant; for the productive capacities of states’ 
economies and the states’ ability to extract resources from the economy are important variables 
that can determine the outcome of geopolitical rivalries and wars.92  A brief review of Paul  
Kennedy’s encyclopedic history of European politics from 1500 to 1986, The Rise and Fall of 
the Great Powers, will demonstrate the merits of this type of analysis, while also showing the 
way teleological laws of history develop which are similar to Realist IR theory in many ways.93 
He summarily states:  
The triumph of any one Great Power in this period, or the collapse of another, has 
usually been the consequence of lengthy fighting by its armed forces; but it has 
also been the consequence of the more or less efficient utilization of the state’s 
productive economic resources in wartime, and, further in the background, of the 
way in which that state’s economy had been rising and falling, relative to the 
other leading nations in the decades preceding the actual conflict.94 
 
Kennedy’s analysis begins with the first major contender for European dominance, Hapsburg 
Spain during the reign of Phillip II (1554-1598).  Early access to New World gold provided the 
Spanish throne with unusually large resources with which it could challenge the other European 
states.  However, excessive debts that eventually led to multiple bankruptcies, rising inflation, 
 
92 C Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1990, B. Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., USA, 1990. 
93 op. cit, Kennedy 1987. 
94 ibid. p. xv 
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and the inability to transform the agricultural economic base toward a more commercial one, led 
to the steady decline of the Hapsburg Empire in Spain, Flanders, and Austria.95 As an early 
prototype for the typical trajectory of many aspirants of European hegemony, the Hapsburg 
Empire prequels the rise and decline of modern European states, including Holland, France, 
Britain, Russia, and Germany.  Similarities can be immediately drawn between Kennedy’s 
historical theory and the cycles of hegemony witnessed by world-system theorists, Immanuel 
Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi.96  
 However, as Niall Ferguson argued in The Cash Nexus, Kennedy’s law-like analysis is 
tautological and represents history incorrectly.97  Ferguson suggested that, in particular, the case 
of the British Empire does not seem to correspond to the military over-stretch argument.98  
Though Great Britain in the late nineteenth century controlled 13 million sq. miles of the Earth’s 
surface and up to 25% of the world’s population, the imperial administration was comparably 
minimal.  The British defense budget prior to 1914 was only 3.2% of GNP, much less than that 
of Russia, France, Italy, and Germany.  Kennedy’s argument resembles nineteenth century critics 
and modern counter-factual economic historians who have suggested that Britain could have 
relinquished her territories in the late nineteenth century to receive a “decolonization dividend” 
in the form of a 25% tax cut.99 Ferguson debunked this claim by pointing out:  the idea that the 
imperial colonies would have maintained the same level of trade and investment without military 
support assumes that international free trade was a naturally occurring condition in which Britain 
could reap the same rewards in a global free market without direct administration.  He suggested 
 
95 ibid. p. 46 
96 op. cit. Wallerstein 2000; G Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century : Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times, 
Verso, London ; New York, 2010. 
97 N Ferguson, The Cash Nexus : Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000, Basic Books, New York, 
2001 pp. 390-418 
98 ibid. p 406. 
99 ibid.  p. 410. 
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that Kennedy’s argument in the British case is contradictory and tautological, “It is not clear 
from this what Kennedy thinks Britain should have done: while some governments are damned if 
they spend too much on defense, others are damned for spending too little.”100   Even on 
materialist grounds, the argument that military overstretch causes unsustainable deficits that lead 
to decline is too narrow a view, and seems to reflect the contemporary concerns related to the 
United States’ giant deficit of 1.4 trillion dollars in the late 1980s.101 
 Indeed, the projection of very historically specific conditions in the immediate postwar 
period back in time made the geopolitical configuration of the Cold War seem natural.102  The 
problem of chronofetishism, however, is not exclusive to Realist IR theory, and has been a 
charge leveled at the functionalist sociology of Talcott Parsons that was also hegemonic in the 
postwar period.103  In fact, functionalist logic was characteristic of Neorealism, as it was in 
Marxism. Ostensibly, Neorealism tried to remove the causal power of Hobbesian human nature.  
However, in attempting to establish social scientific foundations for empirical research, Kenneth 
Waltz suggested that balance-of-power is the norm in international state systems, which seems 
similar to economic theories of supply and demand equilibrium.104  In Man, the State, and War, 
Waltz identified three levels of analysis: the individual, the nation-state, and the international 
state-system, through which the “polarity” of international relations can be examined.105  While 
the heuristic value of the three levels is useful in many regards, ultimately, the assumption that 
 
100 ibid. p. 406 
101 At the time of this writing (May 2010) the U.S. debt is $13 trillion according to Hwww.usdebtclock.org 
102 For this reason, Neorealism came under substantial attack following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up 
of the Soviet Union.  As a predictive measure, Realism failed to predict 
103 cf. C W Mills, The Sociological Imagination, Oxford University Press, Oxford England New York, 2000; A W 
Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, Basic Books, New York,, 1970.  
104 A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations : A Selected Edition, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford ; New York, 2008; J B Say, A Treatise on Political Economy, Transaction Publishers, New 
Brunswick, NJ, 2001. 
105 op. cit. Waltz; K Waltz, Theory of International Politics 1st edn., McGraw-Hill, Boston, Mass., 1979. 
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the “normal state” of international relations is balance-of-power gives primacy to the system 
level.  Again, as Levy and Thompson pointed out, “systems do not have goals.  Only actors 
(individuals, organizations, states) have goals.”106  
 However, one can even question whether states, within the second level of analysis, have 
goals.  Suggesting that states have rational goals implies a rational mind, either internally (in the 
sense that “Poland” decides to do this or that) or as deemed by an observer (as in “Poland’s” 
actions were rational.) This runs a substantial risk of reifying states into characters.  So France 
goes to war with Britain, then changes her mind and signs a treaty with Britain against Germany.  
In certain instances, descriptions of this sort are useful.107 However, there is a risk that this 
essentializing of states obscures complexity in the realm of domestic politics (was all of France’s 
population happy about this change of diplomatic relations?) and in history (what are the 
continuities vs. the differences between the France of the 1890s and the France of the Hundred 
Years’ War (1337 to 1453?).   
 For this reason, the analytic level of the individual actors that make state decisions are, 
indeed, important.  Who decides that France joins the Triple Entente?   Questions of this sort 
have led to an emphasis on “great leaders” – kings, diplomats, and generals who make the 
decisions of state.  For example, in the historical work of Henry Kissinger, Metternich, 
Bismarck, Stalin, or Clemenceau either act according to the objectively “correct” raison d’etat, 
or fail by disrupting the balance-of-power.108  However, this can also lead to tautological 
analyses.  In Kissinger’s view, Metternich established the best possible scenario of balance-of-
power through the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe established at the Treaty of Vienna 
 
106 op. cit. Levy and Thompson, p. 39 
107 see C Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1990, B. Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., USA, 1990.  
108 H Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994. 
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in 1815.  However, Bismarck disturbed this balance-of-power by unifying Germany under the 
Prussian banner in 1871.  Though Bismarck acted as a master statesman in regard to Prussia it 
left the continental geopolitical order unstable which was inherited by lesser statesmen before 
World War I.  This analysis begs the question: if Metternich’s balance-of-power system was so 
great, why did it fall apart in 56 years?  How can Bismarck be considered a great statesman, who 
made all the best calculations of state interest, while simultaneously making the decisions that 
led to Germany’s ruin 43 years later?        
 Beyond tautology, this approach emphasizing Aussenpolitik over Innenpolitik generates 
an elitist model of the state itself.  The state corresponds with the individual actors who represent 
the mind and will of the state.  Michael Mann called this analysis “true elitism.”  Though elite 
theories of state are right to emphasize the autonomous power of politics, their model is based on 
distributive power of state elites over society which radiates outward from, not inward to, the 
state.109  Mann made the suggestion that “true elitism” should be distinguished from 
“institutional statism.”  While there is some room for the autonomous power of elites, there are 
also autonomous effects exerted by state institutions on the political actors themselves.  Laws 
and constitutions developed at one time can have tremendous effects across time and space - 
constraining actors through social contracts limiting declarations of war, or through 
institutionalized elements of popular sovereignty.  In the Realist framework, however, states are 
active rather than passive.  Here, then, we have a major difference between the Marxist 
conception of the state as a “place,” as opposed to being an “actor.”  Again, Mann pointed out 
that neither view is correct: the state is actually an “active place.” 
 
109 op. cit. Mann 1993, p 48.  
40 
                                                           
 While the epistemological assumptions that underlie Realist theories of war lead to 
problematic ontological conclusions that overemphasize materialist concerns and accord primacy 
to the international system, the theory cannot be wholly discarded.  One of the important insights 
of Realist IR theory is that attention should be paid to the international system.  States exist 
within a network of other states.  It is a realm and a context for action - specifically war.  As 
Anthony Giddens pointed out in The Nation-State and Violence, states exist based on the 
legitimacy accorded by its territorial subjects, but also based on the reflexive recognition of other 
states.  
The conception of the ‘sovereign state’ has so often been discussed as a purely 
internal affair that it is worth stressing that it necessarily has external implications 
for the state in the context of others.  The state is to have exclusive authority 
within its own domain, all other rights being conferred by the sovereign and 
revocable by him.  By its very nature, this formula draws a clear-cut distinction 
between the authority of different states, and gives a new significance to the 
territorial demarcations between.110   
 
Another sociologist, Michael Mann, recognized the utility of the geopolitical realm of analysis 
which has been neglected in the wider discourse of sociological theory.  His description of 
geopolitics seems to draw from the Realist perspective on the anarchic state-system, though the 
system is a context, not a functionally determining system.111  
  
Diplomacy is far less regulated, routinized and predictable than are major 
domestic politics.  Diplomacy involves a number of autonomous states among 
whom there are few normative ties, yet continuous re-calculation of the main 
 
110 A Giddens The Nation-State and Violence: A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1985. p. 88 
111 John Hobson has argued that Mann’s geopolitical perspective is actually too much derived from Neorealist 
International Relations theory and suffers from an over-emphasis on materialism as well.  J Hobson, 'Mann, the 
State and War', in John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (ed.), An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael 
Mann,University Press,Cambridge, UK, 2006.   Indeed, in States, War, and Capitalism, Mann even indicates his 
assumption of a kind of Hobbesian human nature: “That mankind is restless and greedy for more of the good things 
of life, and that essentially this is a quest for greater material rewards.” op. cit. Mann 1988, p. 59 
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chance.  The actions of one set up ripple reactions among others, amounting to an 
unpredictable whole.112 
 
Indeed, one of the problems with sociology more generally is its lack of attention for the 
geopolitical realm, which is where wars occur.  Hence the influence of geopolitics and war on 
social order is often underrated or missed.  In this regard, the insights of IR theory can be useful 
correctives for the pacific social theories discussed below, provided they are not assumed 
uncritically.113   
2.3. Liberal Perspectives 
 
 The characterization of liberal theories of war as economically deterministic may seem 
peculiar.  Indeed, within this tradition, war is not explained by economic activity and material 
interests, as was the case in Marxist and Realist theories of the causes of war.  Rather, the very 
opposite: peace can be explained by the interdependence and cosmopolitanism generated by 
economic markets and liberal democracy.  In other words, truly enlightened modernity would 
amount to peace, if we only let it develop.  Before addressing the specifics of this economic 
argument, however, I should clarify Enlightenment concepts of the human individual, which are 
essential to understanding the way in which the economic argument ‘works’.      
 As in Marxist theory, underlying the Liberal position is a utopian element - in this case, 
derived from a sense of the human individual in nature – ‘the noble savage.’  In a primordial, 
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prehistoric state, aboriginal humans lived peacefully in nature, and only with the advent of 
agriculture, private property, and class and state coercion did wars develop.  Some credit 
Rousseau with the concept of the noble savage, though this origin is misapplied,114 for in 
Discourse on the Origins of Inequality Rousseau suggested that man in a state of nature was an 
animal and could only be made “good” through social organization.’115  However, Rousseau did 
make the point that the imprint of civilization on “man” is problematic and that many of the evils 
that afflict humanity, such as war, are learned behaviors that are not inherent to the human 
species in Nature.   This notion, whether developed by Rousseau or his contemporaries, held 
significant sway for much of the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and 
impacted the social sciences of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, notably economics, 
anthropology, and sociology.  What emerges from this philosophical assumption - that “man” is 
naturally good and is only corrupted by society - is the idea that war is not inevitable, but rather a 
reflection of irrational social organization.   However, because the Enlightenment project leads 
toward a rational society, the phenomenon of war is either not explained at all, because it has no 
place in the object of inquiry (modern society), or war is explained as an atavistic remnant of 
traditional, feudal, or otherwise archaic society. 
 The Liberal worldview is characterized by attention paid toward law, which may be 
emphasized in terms of morality and ethics, or in terms of natural law.  Often modern 
considerations of these emphases can lead to debates concerning “negative rights” (what cannot 
be done to you by others) vs. “positive rights” (what you owe to others and is owed to you).116  
The specifics of this debate are well outside the scope of this essay, but can be briefly 
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demonstrated by looking at the political philosophy of John Locke.  Contrary to Hobbes, Locke 
did not see the natural state of humanity as being characterized by permanent war.  Rather, 
Nature follows the ‘Law of Reason.’117  Stemming from this natural law, humans are free to do 
as they wish, provided they do not infringe upon others’ rights for preserving “Life, health, 
Liberty, or Possessions.”  However, at a certain point, it becomes reasonable for individuals to 
act in coordination with each other to preserve these rights, and via contracts the individuals 
establish a government.  The significance of Locke’s position is twofold:  Firstly, individuals 
precede the state.  Secondly, the state is based upon a social contract.  As in Rousseau, the 
natural human individual enters into the state, society, and civilization as a relatively neutral 
being in terms of good and evil.  In Rousseau’s conception, this neutral being can be corrupted 
by the civilizing process if the society, state, and civilization are not arranged to maximize the 
positive qualities of nature – liberty, equality, etc. 
  Locke’s philosophy was derived from the Christian bible.  However, even without 
theological underpinnings, modern social science has not entirely shoved off the assumption that 
civilization and, by extension, war are cultural constructions.  In Margaret Mead’s anthropology, 
clearly coming down on the side of the noble savage argument, “warfare is only an invention – 
not a biological necessity.”118   The Seville Statement adopted by the American Anthropological 
Association (AAA) in 1986 similarly declared that “it is scientifically incorrect” to believe that 
we have inherited war from our animal ancestors, or that war is genetically programmed into our 
human nature.  Also scientifically incorrect: that natural selection favors aggressive behavior 
over other kinds of behavior, that humans have a “violent brain,” or that war is caused by 
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“instinct” or any other single motivation.119 Military historian John Keegan described the Seville 
Statement critically:   
There is much to be admired…since it seeks to liberate the human race from the 
deadening conviction that war is its natural lot.  Unfortunately, there is little that 
is scientific about it.  Science has thus far quite failed to substantiate any of its 
five articles, some of which are not scientific propositions at all.120 
 
Other critics, including contemporary anthropologists themselves, as well as evolutionary 
psychologists, biologists, and historians have drawn attention to so many factors that can lead to 
war other culture – geography, genetics, psychology (or psychopathology), demographic and 
material crises, etc., that the position of Mead and the AAA seems based on wishful thinking 
along the lines of Rousseau and Locke.121   
 Margaret Mead and the AAA were reacting to evolutionary biological perspectives that 
highlight underlying animal survival instincts or selfish genes in explaining the causes of war.122  
And yet, the Lockian view of human nature corresponds with the sociology of the arch-Social 
Darwinist, Herbert Spencer, who coined the phrase, “survival of the fittest.”  Spencer, too, 
assumed an original humanity of individuals who had become aggregated into society.  However, 
unlike Locke’s model of voluntary cooperation through contract, Spencer saw the origins of the 
state and society as having occurred because of war.  War necessitated centralized control and 
led to a “militarist” state governed by “compulsory cooperation.”123  This led to hierarchical and 
stratified societies that limited individual freedom in favor of a minority of elites.  Due to 
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population pressure, agricultural productivity, and commerce, a new type of society emerged in 
the modern era: “industrial” society, which was evolutionary, in the sense that it replaced the 
static society of military hierarchy and coercion with a compounding and fluid society based on 
the division of labor.  This new society upended the relationship between state and civil society 
(the economy, civic associations, free press, etc.), replacing the former with the latter in terms of 
primacy.  Though Spencer’s evolutionary perspective is today considered the ultimate master 
narrative of Western progress, it is often forgotten that Spencer made no guarantee of the moral 
direction of evolution as a process.  Spencer saw greater complexity and differentiation 
transpiring within industrial society, which was good in so far as it held the promise of greater 
human freedom.  However, toward the end of his life, Spencer saw all around him - in the Boer 
War, the naval and armament races of the Great Powers, and even the Salvation Army - a 
reversion toward a militarist society.  When accused of advocating for the application of the law 
of the survival of the fittest on human society, Spencer responded, “Aggression of every kind is 
hateful to me.”124      
 Talcott Parsons famously challenged in 1937, “Who now reads Spencer?. . . Spencer is 
dead.”125  And, as students in introductory sociology seminars all know, Émile Durkheim fixed 
Spencer’s problems.  However, as Robert Carneiro pointed out, 
The idea of a comparative sociology, an interest in typologies of human society, 
concern with the division of labor, discussions of structure, function, aggregation, 
and integration, all of which are found in Durkheim, occurred earlier in works by 
Spencer with which Durkheim was thoroughly familiar.  Even when Durkheim 
found himself at odds with Spencer, the latter’s views often served him as a 
springboard to launch his own new interpretation.126  
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Perhaps, because of the influence of Spencer’s utilitarianism and/or the positivism of Auguste 
Comte,127 Durkheim could not escape from an evolutionary perspective of modern society that 
suggested a move from mechanical solidarity (à la militarist society) to organic solidarity (à la 
industrial society).   
 However, the important correction Durkheim made was precisely at the level of the 
individual in the state of nature.  Durkheim wrote in The Division of Labor in Society,  
Far from being able to date the effacement of the individual from the institution of 
some despotic power, we ought on the contrary to see in it the first step taken 
along the road to individualism.  In fact, the chiefs are the first individual 
personalities who have risen from the mass of society. . . Dominating society, 
they are no longer constrained to follow its every movement.128 
 
In Durkheim’s framework, “primitive” societies exist within a state of mechanical solidarity, in 
which social functions are regulated by a relatively simple system of norms via the conscience 
collective.129  Only as the size and scale of society increases does a division of labor become 
functionally necessary to maintain organic solidarity, which is more fluid due to the separation of 
social tasks assigned according to merit and choice.  At this point, the idea of individualism 
develops, though it never a fully realized actuality due to the influence and coercion of social 
facts upon social actors.130  This consciousness of an individual psychology comes from modern 
social organization.  Durkheim said,  
Most of our states of consciousness would not have occurred among men isolated 
from one another and would have occurred completely differently among people 
grouped together in a different way.  Thus they derive not from the psychological 
nature of man generally, but from the way in which men, once they associate 
together, exert a reciprocal effect upon one another, according to their number and 
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proximity . . . Society does not find ready-made in individual consciousnesses the 
bases on which it rests; it makes them for itself.131     
 
 So why, then, does Durkheim not provide the theoretical bases upon which war and 
modernity can be assessed, as has been argued by Michael Mann, Hans Joas, Edward Tiryakian 
and others?132  If society and individual consciousnesses exist within a reciprocal relationship, 
why do societies and individuals engage in war?  In the context of modernity, Durkheim 
indicated that the evolutionary development of the state in the context of organic solidarity 
causes individuals to realize their interest in avoiding war.  The increased social population and 
the more complex division of labor in modern society require a larger state performing more 
functions.133  Again, this is the opposite of Spencer’s view.  Among the important functions of 
the state, in this context, is to preserve the sphere of individual liberty.  As the individual 
personality emerges from the social mass “he” realizes that,  
War fetters his activity, diminishes his stature and so becomes the supreme evil.  
Because it inflicts undeserved suffering on him, he sees in it more and more the 
supreme form of moral offence.  In these conditions it is quite contradictory to 
expect him to submit to the same subordination as before.134   
 
In this view, the individual is no longer as compelled to submit to the whim of the despot who 
would send him or her to war, because Reason allows them to distinguish the contradictions that 
underlie the activity of military participation.  Of course, Durkheim was writing this before the 
most irrational of wars, the Great War, in which 70 million soldiers precisely did submit 
willingly to subordination.  Yet, in his pamphlet, “Germany Above All,” published during the 
war, Durkheim suggested that Germany was responsible for having lost its Enlightenment ideals 
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by glorifying war and denouncing international law.135  That Durkheim harkened to morality 
amidst the irrationality of war, confirms Edward Tiryakian’s suggestion that the roots of the 
Liberal assumption of pacifist modernity pervading classical social theory do, in fact, lie in the 
moral principles of the Enlightenment itself.136   
  In “Perpetual Peace,” Kant suggested that the moral foundations of all national 
constitutions imply that wars should be eliminated.137  Through Republican government, 
voluntary international congresses, and economic interdependence, sovereign nation states in 
cooperation could establish the legal framework for this peace to be engendered.  The 
cosmopolitan point of view is also the natural outcome of the Universal Historic trend toward 
Reason and Freedom.138  Nature provides the conditions through which individuals come to 
realize themselves through conflict between one another and with Nature herself which 
establishes the motivation for hard work and positive action.  For individuals themselves, this 
may not represent a trend towards Reason.  Only for the species as a whole can a Universal 
History be conceived of that leads toward the final culmination of the trend towards moral 
freedom – the end of war.139  This does require concerted human effort, however, as the idea of 
cosmopolitan law “can only serve as a guiding thread for presenting as a system . . . what would 
otherwise be a planless conglomeration of human actions.”140 
 Kant’s argument for a perpetual peace has been influential in contemporary political 
philosophy and political science.  In 1983, Michael Doyle wrote two essays in Philosophy and 
Public Affairs inspired by Kant that led to an outpouring of historical and empirical research on 
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“Democratic Peace Theory.”141  The argument is simple: ‘democracies almost never go to war 
with each other.’  This is presumably because rational citizens of a democratic state would not 
vote to go to war against other democratic peoples.  Indeed, there exists “extraordinarily strong 
empirical” evidence demonstrating the plausibility of this theory, as Levy and Thompson have 
pointed out.142  However, critics of the theory have challenged the definitions of “democracy” 
used by the Democratic Peace analysts.143  For example, in the War of 1812 (or the Napoleonic 
Wars for that matter), Britain is not characterized as a democracy because the monarchy still 
handled foreign policy.  Similarly, in the U.S. Civil War, the Confederacy did not meet the 
criteria of being a democracy for over three years.  Numerous exceptional cases have been 
raised, often by Realist IR scholars, and defended by liberal peace theorists.  However, one 
reason Democratic Peace theory fails at explaining the problem of war, and modernity in general, 
is that it employs a dyadic model of war and peace, in that the cases are single democratic states 
vs. single democratic states.  Indeed, these states rarely go to war with each other.  But, 
democratic states do go to war with states they deem authoritarian quite often.  Furthermore, 
democratic states are often inclined toward alliances and treaties that organize them into blocks, 
like the Triple Entente, or NATO.  These alliances are based on shared normative values of 
democracy, but also on security concerns that would make attack against an ally fundamentally 
irrational since it would isolate the aggressor from the collective defensive pact.  The power and 
security afforded by these democratic blocs may actually encourage the aggressive actions of 
democracies against autocracies outside their normative international community; for example, 
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in the NATO bombings in the Balkans, covert engagements in Latin America, or Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  In any event, wars have not been eliminated by liberal democracy.  
 However, of the three principles that guarantee Kant’s perpetual peace, the third points to 
the heart of the Liberal economic determinism I have promised to address.144  Kant wrote,  
Just as nature wisely separates nations…the spirit of commerce, which is 
incompatible with war, sooner or later gains the upper hand in every state. As the 
power of money is perhaps the most dependable of all the powers (means) 
included under the state power, states see themselves forced, without any moral 
urge, to promote honorable peace and by mediation to prevent war wherever it 
threatens to break out. They do so exactly as if they stood in perpetual alliances, 
for great offensive alliances are in the nature of the case rare and even less often 
successful.  In this manner nature guarantees perpetual peace by the mechanism 
of human passions. Certainly she does not do so with sufficient certainty for us to 
predict the future in any theoretical sense, but adequately from a practical point of 
view, making it our duty to work toward this end, which is not just a chimerical 
one.145  
 
There are a couple of elements of this argument that are worth highlighting.  First, “the spirit of 
commerce” is incompatible with war.  By this, Kant means that war disrupts economic activity, 
and that commercial states and firms, acting in their own self-interest, will soon prevent wars 
from transpiring.  Second, the material interest of states will force them to prevent war, “without 
any moral urge.”  Because citizens and states following their economic self-interest inevitably 
create the conditions desired by morality, one does not, in fact, have to rest upon those moral 
foundations, since peace will happen ‘naturally.’  Hence, our faith in cosmopolitan peace is 
rested assured “by the mechanism of human passions.” 
 As is well known, Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand” was supposed to achieve similarly 
positive results by having merchants, industrialists, and consumers involved in market exchange 
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regulated by the “law” of supply and demand.  Before globalization, Smith assumed that capital 
would naturally prefer to invest in their home market.  Smith said,  
By preferring the support of domestick (sic) to that of foreign industry, he intends 
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in 
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was 
no part of his intention. . . By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes 
that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.146     
 
Though Smith did provide that one of the state’s necessary duties was to secure the territory of 
the nation with militaries and war deficits,147 ultimately, Smith trusted that states engaged in free 
trade across borders would find that they could increase the wealth of their nation more 
effectively through commercial activity than through pillaging and aggressive war.  Smith, 
therefore, relegated war to the political realm, where it would remain exogenous to the free 
market economy.   
 Hans Joas suggested that Kant and Smith reflect two sides of the same coin.  Kant 
represents the republican tradition, while Smith demonstrates the utilitarian perspective.148  
While Joas noted that there is “productive tension” between these two optimistic positions, when 
combined into the liberal utilitarian position (as in Spencer), the idealism of the perspectives 
became dangerous when used to justify imperialism and colonialism.149  Though Joas did not 
think imperialism happened due to a Leninist model of capital exportation, Jürgen Habermas, in 
his essay, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years’ Historical Remove,” showed 
his Marxist stripes by saying,  
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Kant did not foresee that the social tensions that initially intensify in the course of 
accelerating capitalist industrialization would both encumber domestic politics 
with class struggles and direct foreign policy into the channels of violent 
imperialism.”150   
 
Habermas was correct in pointing out that Kant could not have known in 1795 that, for example, 
nationalism would turn active citizens into willing subordinates to the state, or that philosophy 
could be taken up by anti-Enlightenment thinkers who justified aggression and war.  On the point 
of the economy, Kant’s inattention to the class conflict inherent in capitalism, to say nothing of 
the anomie generated by industrialism and the division of labor, led him to conclude that the self-
interested economic activity of individuals would lead to morally beneficial outcomes in the 
realm of international peace.   
 The symbiosis between the liberal and utilitarian positions is still evident in the current 
discourse surrounding Democratic Peace Theory and free markets neoliberalism.  In “The Nexus 
of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace,” Michael Mousseau found 
evidence to support his theory that “market democracies,” in particular, were especially prone to 
peace.151  Mousseau considered this trend as endogenously contained with market society, since 
free markets directly contribute to the generation of a liberal political culture.  Internationally, 
Richard Rosecrance suggested, in The Rise of the Trading State, that as markets connected states 
together in a competitive, but also mutually reliant system, the rational need to go to war would 
be effectively removed.152 The advent of the Information Age and globalization further increased 
this interdependence, as computer, satellite, and transportation technologies led to an even more 
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peaceful Rise of the Virtual State.153 In 1999, perhaps it seemed reasonable to assert that “the 
world is making steady progress toward peace and economic security.”154 But Rosecrance was 
far more prescient when he wrote: “The factor of land might stage a resurgence and territory 
become more significant…where land and its products still remain the vital factor of production.  
[In] the oil of the Caspian or the Middle-East – territory will continue to exert a delusive 
influence.”155  Indeed, the resurgence of war since 2001, involving democracies engaged in pre-
emptive war in defiance of international law, has (or should have) challenged the liberal 
assumptions behind peace and modernity.  In 1989, Francis Fukuyama had declared the victory 
of two forces, democracy and free market capitalism, which amounted to The End of History.156  
20 years later, it seems history still moves on. 
 How is the continuation of war to be explained?  If, for example, we assume Mousseau’s 
claim that markets generate democracy which generates peace – in other words, that peace is 
endogenous to market society - then war must be an exogenous or atavistic variable to the 
economy – as Adam Smith and Richard Rosecrance have suggested.157  While peace can be 
explained by markets, wars persist in the modern era for reasons other than trade.  Joseph 
Schumpeter, for example, suggested in “The Sociology of Imperialism,” that war “falls in the 
great group of those things that live on from earlier epochs, things which play so great a role in 
every concrete situation and which are to be explained not from the conditions of the present but 
from the conditions of the past.”158  The fact that war still exists is a reflection of the continued 
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existence of war-minded nobles and not due to the logic of capitalist production itself.  This view 
was shared by other classical economists, including Thorstein Veblen and A.C. Pigou, and has 
been reformulated throughout the twentieth century in an economic theory debate that Coulomb 
and Fontanel described as ““Markets-as-Peace” vs. “Capitalism-as-War.”159  The battle lines of 
this debate match up according to whether an economist is a Marxist160 or a Liberal,161 
indicating that one’s position comes down to whether war is considered inherent in capitalism, or 
not.   
 
2.4. A Synthetic Critique of Marxist, Liberal, and Realist Perspectives 
 
 None of the three economically deterministic theories of war and peace are satisfactory 
on their own.  I should note, before proceeding, however, that the positions outlined above are 
not necessarily the sum of Marxist, Liberal, or Realist schools of thought, or even the specific 
theorists.  Rather they should be considered as particular points of view that have been associated 
with these traditions.  In fact, the correctives to deal with the economic determinism within these 
perspectives can be found immanently contained within the assumptions of the theories 
themselves.  
 To start with the Liberal position - that market integration leads to peace and that war is 
an atavism of pre-modern social systems - we should recall Rousseau’s emphasis on the 
civilizing process in corrupting “man” away from the positive conditions of Nature.  If this is the 
case, then the continued persistence of war is a demonstration of the fact that modern social 
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organization is still not correct.  Rather than conceiving of an ideal world, as Kant did in 
“Perpetual Peace,” in order to direct natural human activity toward morally desirable outcomes, 
we should heed Voltaire’s ironic perspective to see that ‘this is not the best of all possible 
worlds.’162  Modern war is not only a continuation of feudal militancy running counter to 
evolution, but has itself evolved throughout the modern era in terms of technology, strategy, and 
military participation.  Rather than calling for a return to a natural state of noble savagery, or 
resort to throwing our hands up by declaring war is simply a cultural construction, we should 
direct our attention directly at the reality of war and society to determine which factors within 
social organization are the causes of war.   
 The undermining use of an ideal, utopian future is also an issue for the Marxist 
perspective.  Indeed, Michael Mann, Hans Joas, and Edward Tiryakian have lumped the two 
perspectives together as the “Liberal/Marxian” tradition, since both consider war to be 
prehistoric and removable in a, yet unrealized, future society.  Yet, the Marxist analysis of 
capitalism does attend to question of what precisely is the element of modern society that causes 
this corruption, concluding that the economic relations of capitalism generate class antagonism 
and stimulate imperialist wars.  Orthodox Marxists would suggest that it is exclusively the 
material economic base that causes these problems.  But this type of thinking leads to exclusively 
economic prescriptions, such as the revolution of property relations attempted by Lenin, which 
could only come about through coercive violence and war.   
 Another side of Marxian thought relates to the consciousness that is required for class 
revolution to take place.  In an objective sense, class relations are determined by economic 
factors, such as income and wealth.  But there is no guarantee that these class actors will become 
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aware of their conditions and unite.  For this, a subjective awareness of being a “class for itself” 
is necessary.  As Michael Mann pointed out, this indicates that the social consequences of class 
are related to both economic power and ideological power.163  Mann outlined Marx’s own 
position on class consciousness in terms of four positions:164 
1. Identity.  The definition of self as working class, as playing a distinctive role 
in common with other workers in the economy.  This self-conception need not 
be associated with class conflict. 
 
2. Opposition.  The perception that capitalists and their managers constitute the 
workers’ enduring opponent.  Identity plus opposition will generate conflict, 
but this may not be extensive.  
 
3. Totality.  The acceptance of the first two elements as the defining 
characteristics of (1) the workers’ total social situation and (2) the whole 
society.   
 
4. Alternative.  Conceiving of an alternative form of power relations to existing 
capitalism.  This will reinforce extensive and political class conflict and 
legitimate revolutionary struggle.165       
 
Some combination of all four components should be present for a proletarian revolution or class 
action to take place.  This is why Marxist activists direct so much attention toward explaining the 
non-self-evident features of the capitalist system to workers who are used to conceiving of issues 
in terms of local, particularistic ways.  While Marx’s polemics against idealism led his followers 
to over-emphasize the material conditions that generate economic class structures, his position 
above demonstrates that conscious awareness actually determines the outcome of overcoming 
current conditions.  Furthermore, contemporary research along Marxist lines, such as David 
Harvey’s examination of neoliberalism, demonstrates that a conscious effort has been made by 
 
163 op. cit. Mann 1993, pp. 23-43 
164 M Mann, Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class, Macmillan, London,, 1973. 
165 op. cit. Mann 1993, p.27 
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the capitalist class to institute conditions that benefit their international economic interest.166  In 
this sense, the ideological awareness of all classes is relevant, not just in clouding the material 
conditions of the present, but in determining the conditions of the present.  With that in mind, 
addressing the persistence of war should not come solely from theories that highlight the 
economic structures that lead to war, but also the ideological factors that stimulate those actions.   
 The same position is also implied within the conception of power that is the basis of 
Realism’s Machtpolitik perspective.  As I suggested, the Realist definition of power is hard to 
find, but seems to suggest material interests as determining the ever-present cycles of war that 
take place at the international systemic level.  However, there are two reasons power should not 
be conceived solely in economic or material terms according to the model’s assumptions.  First, 
there is an underlying idea that humans and states are motivated to increase their power by 
default, according to a kind of Nietszchian ‘Will to Power.’  This implies that power actually 
transcends material desires and represents an end in itself.  Wealth and territory could be simply 
evidence of achievement of the real object of interest: power itself.   
 This leads to a second important conclusion.  Because, at the individual level of analysis, 
Realism represents a “true elitist” perspective of the state, one must look at the individual 
statesmen who act within the state system.  In this view, the statesmen who drive the state toward 
its objective state interest do so, based on particular perceived opportunities or threats, but also 
based on an instinctual or psychological desire to increase their power.  This is the inevitable 
conclusion of Hobbes’ homo lupus view of man.  If one rejects the Hobbesian instinct as 
unscientific, as Kenneth Waltz and the Neorealists do, then the instinct to increase state power 
should be replaced with psychological motivations to increase their power.  These psychological 
 
166 D Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2005. 
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traits, which might be egotism, dominating personalities, or sociopathy, could be just 
characteristic of individuals who rise to the positions of power in foreign policy, and do not 
necessarily have to be universally held by all humankind.  These personalities might also be 
absent in statesmen who fail to operate in their states’ objective interests.  These psychological 
features may come from the biology of the human brain, but they also come from society 
through socialization and interaction.  Here the question becomes, what are the features of 
modern society that cause these actors to have this psychological ‘Will to Power’?     
 All of the issues above point to a misrecognition of the autonomous power of culture and 
ideology on the part of the economistic theories of war.  This is a reflection of the universalistic 
assumptions underlying the theories, which largely stem from the Enlightenment.  As Clifford 
Geertz noted,  
The trouble with this kind of view… is that the image of a constant human nature 
independent of time, place, and circumstance…may be an illusion, that what man 
is may be so entangled with where he is, who he is, and what he believes that it is 
inseparable from them.  It is precisely the consideration of such a possibility that 
led to the rise of the concept of culture and the decline of the uniformitarian view 
of man.  Whatever else modern anthropology asserts… it is firm in the conviction 
that men unmodified by the customs of particular places do not in fact exist, have 
never existed, and most important, could not in the very nature of the case 
exist.167    
   
Indeed, how can we speak of war in the modern era without speaking about the specific cases of 
France during the Third Republic or Germans during the Nazi period?  How can we understand 
the motivations of imperialists during European colonialism without understanding the bourgeois 
sensibilities of Bildungsbürghertum or Social Darwinism?  Though not in whole - in part, the 
economic theories of war tend to neglect these features as either unimportant or irrational.  Even 
 
167 C Geertz, “The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man,” The Interpretation of Cultures : 
Selected Essays, Basic Books, New York,, 1973, p. 35. 
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the best sociological attempts to critique the monolithic power of capital in structural analysis, 
for example, Michael Mann’s Sources of Social Power, vol. II, or Charles Tilly’s Coercion, 
Capital, and European States, 990-1990, do so by emphasizing the additional role of the military 
in constituting society.168  Rarely do they emphasize the symbolic power of national identity, the 
social psychological pathologies that developed in the modern era, changes in gender and 
masculinity norms, the colonial importation and export of culture, or the novelty of bourgeois 
individualism itself.  These were not simply surface manifestations of modern society, but were, 
rather the medium and glue that held together and constituted Western society in the midst of 
dramatic social change.  That these “non-economic” factors could, and did, lead to wars in many 
instances should not be ignored due to theoretical narrowness. 
 Of course, anthropology already deals with war through the lens of culture.169  If we are 
in search of a compatible sociological theory, we cannot let the “see-saw” fall on the proposition 
that “It’s all culture.”  Structures are important.  And with all due respect to the achievements of 
Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, Sapir and Whorf and others, language, semiotics, and mythology cannot 
explain social structure entirely.170  Material and economic relations do have important roles to 
play in determining the channels and possibilities of social action, as do political organizations 
and status hierarchies.  This structure need not be functionally understood according to 
biologistic or cybernetic analogies.  Rather, systems exist due to the reproduction of social 
 
168 Of course, Michael Mann’s I.E.M.P model includes Ideology.  However, many critics have charged that he did 
not emphasize ideology in his second volume dealing with the period of 1760 to the First World War.  see J Hall and 
R Schroeder, An Anatomy of Power : The Social Theory of Michael Mann, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK ; New York, 2006, which includes Mann’s partial admission and defense on pp. 343-396. 
169 American Anthropological Association et al., War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression, Natural 
History Press, Garden City, N.Y., 1968; N Chagnon, Yanomamö, the Fierce People, Holt, New York,, 1968; M 
Meggitt, Blood Is Their Argument : Warfare among the Mae Enga Tribesmen of the New Guinea Highlands 1st 
edn., Mayfield Pub. Co., Palo Alto, Calif., 1977. 
170 C Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology University of Chicago Press edn., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
Ill., 1983. 
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structure by actors and institutions that linger across space and time.171  Neither should structure 
imply a universal model that is applicable transhistorically irrespective of difference.  So how 
then, do we reach an understanding of modern society, which is not transhistorical, but, rather, 
was particularly structured between 1750 and the present, with origins in Western Europe?  As 
Wallerstein and world-systems theorists have clearly shown, a particular economic structure did 
expand from the territory of Europe to encompass the globe during this period – namely 
industrial capitalism.  What are the impacts of (and preconditions for) this economic system 
which seem so important to the constitution of modern society?   
 This question should not be posed simply in terms of a global division of labor or class 
relations, but also in terms of cultural exchange, Orientalist racism, and even religion.  In fact, an 
ontologically and epistemologically correct understanding of modern society, modern capitalism, 
and modern war, would require that there be no distinction between culture and economics made 
at all.172  Rather, culture and material interests are always involved in a dialectical relationship.  
The work of Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, Bourdieu, and others have demonstrated that social 
structure and individual consciousness are not actually distinct from one another.  The societal 
totality (however defined) does not functionally reproduce individual actors, but rather, totality 
and agents reciprocally reproduce each other.173  A conception of social structure conceived 
dialectically makes it difficult to assign primacy to a particular sphere of social life - for 
example, the economy, because economic relations cannot exist without other forms of social 
interaction, like religion, political ideology, or family traditions.  Furthermore, by removing the 
causal power of structural-functional needs, phenomena must be explained in terms of the 
 
171  op. cit. Giddens 1979; Giddens 1984 
172 excepting where actors conceived of themselves in this way (namely in modern society) 
173 see T Adorno, Negative Dialectics, Seabury Press, New York, 1973. 
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relatively conscious action of individuals, who are no longer in the position of “cultural dupes,” 
to use Anthony Giddens’ phrase.174  This becomes especially apparent if we take seriously the 
Realists’ elite theory of the state.  These powerful individuals are acutely aware of their own 
power and the dynamics of power at work in international society.   
 On another level, however, individuals can be considered as cultural products - though 
not in terms of “false consciousness” which can only be subjectively attributed by the analyst.  
Rather, through a dialectical framework, we can see the manner in which existing society 
imprints the cultural traditions, behaviors, and a sense of self on the individual.  This establishes 
highly specific cases of cultural difference at the level of the individual, but also explains why 
societies take on a recognizable form at the aggregate level.   
 When one considers that asymmetrical generational differences persist through all eras, 
while the cultural dynamic generated by immigration, transnational relationships, and the media 
stimulate further changeable grounds upon which society rests – one can see that the dynamic 
structure of capitalism exists within, while also causing, a chaotic social totality moving through 
time.  Wars are similarly situated within the modern era, causing, as well as being caused by, the 
greater modern society.    
 To penetrate the logic of this dialectic at work, we will need to examine particular 
historical cases.  With that in mind, I have decided to look at wars in the nineteenth century – 
1815-1914.  This period has often been overlooked in terms of military development, because it 
is generally considered peaceful, as I will critically discuss below.  Returning to this period is 
important for understanding modernity and war, for, in many ways, the modern world was born 
in the nineteenth century.  Because social theorists living during the period could not bear 
 
174 op. cit. Giddens 1979; op. cit. Giddens 1984 
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witness to the climaxes of modern warfare, World Wars I, II, and the Cold War, their theories do 
not seem to have left specific road maps to understanding war in their time.  Meanwhile, 
twentieth century and contemporary scholars seem to forget that wars even happened in the 
nineteenth century.  In many ways, the nineteenth century can be read as the best comparative 
case for the twentieth century, and though the space of this essay leaves little room for this 
comparison, the historical analysis below should be read in terms of the essential similarities and 
differences between our modern world and our world in the recent past.          
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3. The Myth of the Hundred Years’ Peace: War in the Nineteenth Century 
 
 The previous section identified three theories that have been used to understand the 
relationship between war, capitalism, and modernity – Liberal, Marxist, and Realist.  However, I 
have argued that, in their traditional forms, each places too great an emphasis on economic 
determinates leading to an undervaluation of ideological and cultural factors.  While I have 
identified several problems with the assumptions that underlie the theories, I have also noted that 
the theories do not necessarily preclude the influence of ideology.  Rather, all have immanently 
contained within their respective frameworks positions in which non-material influences have 
considerable importance.  In Figure 3.1 below, I have outlined the core assumptions, the negative 
consequences of these assumptions, and the openings for ideological analysis in each of the 
theories. 
Figure 3.1 - Three Economically Deterministic Theories of War 
 
Theory 
 
Assumption 
 
Consequent Error 
 
Ideology? 
 
 
Marxist 
 
 
 
Mode of production 
causes war. 
 
System causes events.  
States and actors are 
treated functionally. 
 
Class consciousness 
can be determining. 
 
 
 
Realist 
 
 
 
 
States and elites want 
to survive and 
increase their power. 
 
Systemic and 
tautological analyses.  
Elites are equated 
with the state.  
 
“Power” can be an 
end in itself for actors, 
which we may be able 
to explain through 
psychology. 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
War is atavistic.  
Market integration 
and democracy lead to 
peace between 
nations. 
 
Does not recognize 
war’s particular 
character in 
modernity, or the 
persistence of war 
despite the institution 
of liberal democracy. 
 
 
Individuals are 
constructed by culture 
and civilization.  
64 
                                                           
The most significant dichotomy exists between the Marxist and the Liberal perspectives, which 
is reflected in the debate between “Markets-as-Peace” and “Capitalism-as-War.”  The fact that 
each perspective has a more-or-less completely opposite view of the pacific nature of modern 
market capitalism demonstrates how important one’s point of view is in determining the analysis 
of the same series of events.   
 Luckily, between these theories lies a fourth perspective I identified earlier as the 
“Communitarian” position.   This position is not widely held, though there are consonances 
within the communitarian philosophy of scholars, like Michael Walzer, and his influential 
perspective on war.175  In this case, I use the term to distinguish the particular position assumed 
by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 
written in 1944.176  The book’s primary purpose was not to develop a theory of war, and his 
hypothesis regarding the “Hundred Years’ Peace” (1815-1914) occupied only the first two of 
thirty-five chapters.  However, Polanyi’s argument figures especially well within the context of 
the three theories discussed above.  In terms of his economic perspective, Polanyi is aligned 
closely with the Marxists, who would suggest that the growth of the capitalist market has led to 
alienation and social disintegration.  His political economic ideology could just as easily be 
termed “socialist,” but this would run the risk of associating Polanyi with the Marxists all 
together.  For Polanyi also ceded to Liberals that transnational capitalism did appear to have led 
to peace in the nineteenth century.  He challenged Lenin specifically for suggesting that finance 
capital was responsible for wars, when, in fact, it appeared as though they had averted a major 
 
175 M Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars : A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 2nd edn., Basic Books, New 
York, 1992. 
176 op. cit. Polanyi 
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conflagration until 1914.177  Finally, less explicitly, there is some indication that Polanyi 
regarded the Realists’ ‘Will to Power’ as a condition that would have taken place in the 
nineteenth century had there not been a countervailing trend (transnational capitalism).  In other 
words, Polanyi still feels as though peace needs to be explained.     
 Because Polanyi made an explicit argument regarding war in a specific historical period, 
I will use his argument regarding the “Hundred Years’ Peace” as a hypothesis reflective of the 
economic determinism generally found in all of the theories.178  In disproving the absolute 
validity of this hypothesis I hope to show the merits and inadequacies of looking at war, 
modernity, and capitalism in this overly economic way.   
 The first part of the critique will consist of a historical challenge to Polanyi’s claims on 
materialist grounds themselves – that is, by highlighting alternative historical evidence within the 
framework of power as traditionally conceived.  The second part of the critique will examine 
cultural and ideological factors that are not considered important by Polanyi or other materialist 
scholars.  Though I have argued in the previous section that the separation between economy and 
culture is not an accurate representation of reality, it will serve here as a necessary heuristic 
device.  This approach reflects the dramatic cleft within the discipline of history between “social 
history” and “cultural history.”  Since I will not be engaging in primary research at this time, I 
will need to follow the division as it exists within the secondary historical literature.  After 
addressing nineteenth century war and society in this way, I will return to the dialectical 
 
177 ibid. p. 16 
178 The notion of the Hundred Years’ Peace is not the core of Polanyi’s argument in The Great Transformation.  
Rather, the process by which the market economy became “disembedded” from society during the English Industrial 
Revolution consumes the bulk of the book.  The short Part I, about nineteenth and twentieth century war and peace 
is meant to introduce the urgency behind a proper examination of domestic political economy.  The following 
critique of Polanyi’s notion of nineteenth century geopolitics should not invalidate his seminal contribution to the 
field of economic sociology and economic history. 
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theoretical framework to indicate where future research should be directed according to initial 
findings.   
3.1. Polanyi’s Hundred Years’ Peace 
 
 Between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I there lies “a phenomenon unheard of in 
the annals of Western civilization, namely a hundred years’ peace – 1815-1914.”179 So stated 
Karl Polanyi in 1944 amidst the ruins of that very civilization.  Nineteenth century civilization, 
he said, rested on four institutional pillars – the balance-of-power system, the international gold 
standard, the self-regulating market, and the liberal state. Two of these institutions were political, 
two were economic.  In another configuration, two were domestic and the other two were 
international, as can be seen in Fig. 3.2.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 - Four Pillars of Nineteenth Century Civilization 
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The Hundred Years’ Peace was maintained by the international balance-of-power political 
system and the international economy maintained through the gold standard. Though the 
breakdown of the international gold standard was the proximate cause of World War I, Polanyi 
considered the domestic political-economic configuration of the self-regulating market to be the 
underlying root cause of the seemingly stable, but ultimately superficial nineteenth century 
civilization.  Polanyi explained,  
The fount and matrix of the system was the self-regulating market.  It was this 
innovation which gave rise to a specific civilization.  The gold standard was 
merely an attempt to extend the domestic market system to the international field; 
the balance-of-power system was a superstructure erected upon and, partly, 
worked through the gold standard; the liberal state was itself a creation of the self-
regulating market.  The key to the institutional system of the nineteenth century 
lay in the laws governing market economy.180 
 
Note that the other institutional pillars are either created by or are a superstructure upon the self-
regulating economy.  The primacy of the economy in Polanyi’s analysis is most apparent here, 
where the echo of Marx’s base/superstructure model is clearly evident.  Nineteenth century 
civilization, or at least its “specificity,” was itself derived from the capitalist market economy, 
indicating that social relations were determined by the relations of economic exchange.   
 Polanyi’s communitarian position was that the idea of a self-adjusting market is “a stark 
utopia” that could not exist without destroying the human and natural substance of society.181  
Here Polanyi has made a normative judgment about what is “natural,” which he clarified later in 
the book.  In Nature, society is just, egalitarian, and symmetrical based on patterns of reciprocity 
and redistribution, as was the case in the Trobriand Islanders of Western Malanesia.182  Modern 
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society, therefore, is “unnatural.”  It had to be created by capitalists in their image.  The majority 
of The Great Transformation is a remarkable examination of how this creation was developed in 
England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Indeed, an enduring legacy of 
Polanyi’s work is his identification of a natural “double-movement” in which civil society reacts 
against the transgressions of capital in an attempt to restore social reciprocity, redistribution, and 
social order – for example, during the American New Deal.  By restraining unchecked greed, the 
double movement prevents capital from completely “disembedding” the economy from society.  
Removing social constraints to allow greater economic freedom is always in the capitalist class’s 
interests; however, the process is never complete since the economy will always be “embedded” 
within society.  On the one hand, capital itself needs the political apparatus of the state and 
society to maintain its legal and cartel privileges.  On the other hand, society never lets itself 
become fully reduced to economic cogs, but rather fights back against the deadening life of 
economic exploitation by reembedding the economy under social control.  Polanyi’s perspective 
has been criticized as “primitivism,” by Murray Rothbard, in that he implied our advanced 
market society should return to its “primitive” roots in egalitarianism.183  This positions Polanyi 
differently than Marx, who would overcome capitalism through industrialism, taking advantage 
of modern technological achievements.  However, Polanyi’s communitarian ideal of a collective 
society that has been distorted by the stark utopia of the self-regulating market is not entirely 
essential to his analysis of war.  Rather his attempt to connect the horrors of World War I and II 
to the international gold standard served to provide brutal evidence of the consequences of an 
unquestioned liberal state protecting an unregulated free market.  
 
183 M Rothbard, 'Down with Primitivism: A Thorough Critique of Polanyi', <http://mises.org/daily/1607>, accessed 
05/20/2010  
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 Polanyi’s observed that peace was not the normal state of international relations in 
previous and subsequent centuries.  In order to identify the cause of the peace, one must identify 
the novel variable that could explain the difference within the new era.  Polanyi acknowledged 
new diplomatic relations that institutionalized balance-of-power, notably the Congress system, 
but suggested that these held a loose confederation that convened rarely and were not aligned.  
There needed to be something that bound these powers together.  He said, “We must seek some 
undisclosed powerful social instrumentality at work in the new setting, which could make the 
peace interest effective.  This anonymous factor, we submit was haute finance.”184  Haute 
finance was an institution peculiar to the last third of the nineteenth century and the first third of 
the twentieth (at the time of Polanyi’s writing).   
 Polanyi argued that transnational capital functioned as the main link between the political 
and economic organization of the world, representing a permanent independent agency dedicated 
to peace between Great Powers.  According to Polanyi, “There was intimate contact between 
finance and diplomacy… neither would consider any long range plan, whether peaceful or 
warlike, without making sure of the other’s goodwill.”185  The members of the elite class of 
bondholders, embodied in the Rothschilds and J.P. Morgan, would have to float the loans 
required to pay for wars.  They held the reins of states, and yet were independent of national 
organizations.  Because international banking was not restricted to financing governments, and 
included foreign investment in industry, public utilities and banks, as well as long-term loans to 
public and private corporations abroad, any risk of war that would jeopardize these investments 
would be emphatically discouraged.  Trade had become linked with peace through an 
international monetary system which could not function in a general war.  Any holders of 
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government securities were bound to lose if currencies were affected, and to the extent that 
governments relied on these financiers in multiple directions, they listened.  Polanyi asserted, 
“Consequently, there was never a time when the peace interest was unrepresented in the councils  
of the Concert of Europe.”186  Their motivation was purely for economic gain.  Peace was, in 
fact, an unintended consequence.     
 The logic behind this assessment is similar to that of the Liberal market peace theory.  It 
is natural that businesses will lobby for peace because it is in their rational self-interest to leave 
the international economy undisturbed.  Polanyi, however, offered a list of specific mechanisms 
that provided capital with the necessary power to ensure this peace in the nineteenth century.  
The gold standard limited fluctuations in budgets since loans and the renewal of loans hinged on 
good credit behavior.  Finance had substantial power over smaller sovereign states because of 
loans and credit, allowing the City of London to make “its voice heard” in these smaller 
countries with a “timely pull of a thread in the international monetary network”.187  Finance also 
provided de facto administration of semi-colonial regions in the Near East, North Africa, etc.  
Capital intensive projects such as railroads across the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria, Persia, Egypt, 
Morocco, and China, were long-term enough that states considered the risks to their investments 
in time of crisis.  Soon enemies’ banks were investing in each others’ markets.  While it might be 
controversial to invest directly in a potential enemy’s domestic market, this was less of an issue 
in colonies, as evidenced, for example, in the case of Germany’s investments in Algeria and 
Morocco late in the century while assuming a hostile posture with the French.  During this period 
legal frameworks were set up to safeguard loans and business during wartime.  The Napoleonic 
wars were the last major examples of confiscation of private property in belligerent territory 
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(until the twentieth century), and, during the Crimean war, enemy merchants could come and go 
at port, maintaining international trade.  Slowly, but surely, throughout the century the influence 
of transnational capital grew, making it the only other international organization with sufficient 
power to motivate nations toward maintaining the balance-of-power and peace.  As Polanyi said, 
“Budgets and armaments, foreign trade and raw material supplies, national independence and 
sovereignty were now the function of currency and credit.”188 
 Polanyi did cede that haute finance were anything but pacifists, noting that “they had 
made their fortune in the financing of wars; they were impervious to moral consideration; they 
had no objection to any number of minor, short, or localized wars.”189  As we shall see below, 
there were plenty of these to be found.  Industrial and agricultural capital interests also worked 
against international finance by encouraging aggressive action that would lead to increased 
armaments spending or mercantilist customs regulations.  The road toward financially-instituted 
peace between Great Powers was not inevitable or easily won, but eventually became the 
invisible causal link that contained war within Continental Europe, in Polanyi’s view. 
 There are several historical points on which Polanyi’s analysis can be criticized, as will 
be discussed below.  Yet, there is merit in his attention toward the novel factor of transnational 
capital and the international gold standard as an influence in decisions of war and peace in the 
nineteenth century.  Indeed, on the bond market especially, where states gathered the loans 
necessary to fund wars, one can see the relationship that existed between political and economic 
events.  Historian Niall Ferguson identified four political assumptions, based on the experience 
of the French Revolution of 1789-1815, felt by nineteenth century financiers themselves.  2 - 4 
relate to war: 
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1. That a political move to the left, ranging from outright revolution to a change 
of ministry due to elections, would tend to loosen fiscal and monetary policy; 
 
2. That a new and radical government would be more likely to pursue an 
aggressive foreign policy which might, in turn, lead to war; 
 
3. That any war would disrupt trade and hence lower tax revenues for all 
governments;  
 
4. That direct involvement in war would increase a state’s expenditure as well as 
reducing its tax revenues, leading to substantial new borrowings.190 
 
These fears led to market crises during, for example, the Revolutions of 1848 and the outbreak of 
the Crimean War, demonstrating that investors priced bonds in response to political news as 
often as fiscal or monetary indicators (see Appendix A, Table A.1).  Indeed, this was the 
perspective of particular financiers, like the members of the Rothschild family.  During the threat 
of revolution in France in 1830, James de Rothschild said, “We have a holding of 900,000 
rentes; if peace is preserved they will be worth 75 percent, while in case of war they will drop to 
45 percent…I am convinced that if peace is maintained rentes will improve on three month by at 
least 10 percent.”191  And to be sure, the Rothschilds and other major bond holders did have 
some access to the ears of state.  The personal influence of these lenders, with the impersonal 
pressure of the bond market, certainly affected decisions of war and peace during the nineteenth 
century.   
 But, to what extent?  After all, Polanyi’s argument was that transnational finance was the 
primary cause of peace between Great Powers in this period.  For his argument to work, two 
hypotheses would need to be verified.  First, the influence of bond holders would need to be 
substantially different than previous eras.   Since at least the fiscal crises that beset Habsburg 
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Spain during the sixteenth and seventeenth century following multiple defaults and bankruptcies, 
states have taken note of their bond holders.192  Throughout the eighteenth century, the modern 
international bond and stock markets themselves originated because of the need to finance and 
pay back war debts.193  However - even if we concede that the bond market took on a newer, 
more robust form in the nineteenth century as modern banks, trusts, and economists put their lot 
into the fluctuations of growing and more complex international markets – the necessary proof of 
Polanyi’s primacy argument must come by excluding other explanations for war and peace.  This 
second hypothesis will be the focus of the discussion below.   
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consequently a revenue three or four times greater than the peace revenue.  Supposing that the sovereign should 
have, what he scarce ever has, the immediate means of augmenting his revenue in proportion to the augmentation of 
his expence, yet still the produce of the taxes, from which this increase of revenue must be drawn, will not begin to 
come into the treasury till perhaps ten or twelve months after they are imposed.  But the moment in which war 
begins, or rather the moment in which it appears likely to begin, the army must be augmented, the fleet must be 
fitted out, the garrisoned towns must be put into a posture of defence; that army, that fleet, those garrisoned towns 
must be furnished with arms, ammunition and provisions.  An immediate and great expence must be incurred in that 
moment of immediate danger, which will not wait for the gradual and slow returns of the new taxes.  In this 
exigency government can have no other resource but in borrowing.” op. cit. Smith 2008, p. 458;  
 
During the same period (1795), Kant indicated that the state’s ability to use credit was actually a cause of war, 
saying, “As an opposing machine in the antagonism of powers, a credit system which grows beyond sight and which 
is yet a safe debt for the present requirements--because all the creditors do not require payment at one time--
constitutes a dangerous money power. This ingenious invention of a commercial people [England] in this century is 
dangerous because it is a war treasure which exceeds the treasures of all other states; it cannot be exhausted except 
by default of taxes (which is inevitable), though it can be long delayed by the stimulus to trade which occurs through 
the reaction of credit on industry and commerce. This facility in making war, together with the inclination to do so 
on the part of rulers--an inclination which seems inborn in human nature--is thus a great hindrance to perpetual 
peace.” op. cit. Kant 1939, Section I, Article 4.  
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3.2. Measuring War and Peace in the Nineteenth Century 
 
 Polanyi was not alone in seeing the nineteenth century as oddly peaceful.  Especially in 
the years following World War I, the idea of a “Hundred Years’ Peace” was in the air.  After all, 
those who could remember the belle époque of international peace that existed between 1870 and 
1914 seemed justified in wanting a return to that way of life.  Polanyi, however, provided very 
specific vectors that defined this period as a Hundred Years’ Peace, which we can use to assess 
the historical veracity of such an impression. 
 According to Polanyi, “apart from the Crimean War – a more or less colonial event - 
England, France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Russia were engaged in war among each other for 
altogether only eighteen months,” compared to an average of sixty to seventy years of major 
wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.194  Indeed, in terms of average battle durations, 
battle deaths per year, and a host of other statistical criteria, nineteenth century Europe does not 
rate with either the eighteenth or the twentieth century versions of itself.  Though Polanyi does 
not provide his data sources, the proportions of his facts seem to bear out according to his 
criteria.  During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Great Powers were involved in war 
94% and 78% of the time, respectively, compared to 40% of the time in the nineteenth century 
(including the Napoleonic Wars of 1800-1815).195  Table 3.1 below demonstrates these changes 
in proportion, while Figure 3.3 shows these proportions in three dimensions. 
 
194 ibid., p. 5 
195 op. cit. Tilly 1990, p. 72; Tilly’s definition of Great Powers is slightly more inclusive than Polanyi’s, see Tilly, p. 
170 
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 If we focus on wars between Polanyi’s ‘Great Powers’ - the Austro-Sardinian War, the 
Roman Republic War, The War of Italian Unification, The Seven Weeks War, and the Franco-
Prussian War amounted to a total of 17.7 months, as seen in Table 3.2 below. 
 
Table 3.1 - Wars Involving Great Powers 
 
Century 
 
Number of wars
 
Average duration 
of wars  
(years) 
 
 
Proportion of  
years war 
underway (%) 
 
 
16th 
17th 
18th 
19th 
 20tha 
 
 
34 
29 
17 
20 
15 
 
1.6 
1.7 
1.0 
0.4 
0.4 
 
95 
94 
78 
40 
53 
     
 a through 1975 
 Source: Tilly 1990, p. 72 
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Figure 3.3 – Magnitudes of Great Power War by Century, 1500-1975 
 
 
 
Source: Tilly 1990, p. 73 
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Table 3.2 - Great Power Wars According to Polanyi’s Criteria 
 
War 
 
Great Powers 
Involved 
 
Years 
 
Duration  
(months) 
 
 
Austro-Sardinian 
War 
 
Austria v. Italy 
 
1848-49 
 
4.7 
 
Roman Republic 
War 
 
France v. Austria 
 
1849 
 
1.8 
 
War of Italian 
Unification 
 
France, Italy v. 
Austria 
 
1859 
 
2.5 
 
Seven Weeks War 
 
Prussia, Italy v. 
Austria 
 
1866 
 
1.4 
 
Franco-Prussian 
War 
 
Prussia v. France 
 
1870-71 
 
7.3 
 
 
 
Totala 
   
17.7 
 
 
 a Total with Crimean War (+28.3 months) is 46.0.
 
 Source: Singer and Small 1972 
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 However, before accepting Polanyi’s claim outright, his calculation needs to be examined 
further.  For one, there is no reason why the Crimean War should be left out – it was not “a 
colonial event,” as Polanyi suggested, but was rather one of the century’s most significant wars, 
involving Britain, France, and Turkey against Russia.  The war dramatically shifted the balance-
of-power as Austria-Hungary became isolated from the Holy Alliance;196 Russia stalled its 
persistent incursion through the Caucasus and Black Sea in the hopes of seizing 
Constantinople;197 while Britain preserved the Ottoman Empire and its communications network 
to India. As Winfried Baumgart suggested, “if the fighting had carried on during 1856, the First 
World War would then have taken place 60 years earlier.”198 Adding this conflict’s 28.3 months 
back into the calculation brings the ‘Great Power’ total to 46.0 months – nearly 4 years.  This is 
still a long shot from previous centuries’ 60 to 70 years of major wars. 
 But, Polanyi’s six powers (England, France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Russia), while the 
greatest, were not the only European, or “Western” powers during this period as states declined 
out of, or entered into the core inter-state system. One could add the Ottoman Empire (Turkey), 
Holland, Spain, the United States, Japan, and China by the end of the period. Wars between these 
twelve powers would yield an additional 88.4 months of war between “Western” powers (See 
Table A.2).  If one adds all of the wars that were not between these powers, but involved one or 
 
196 op. cit. Kissinger, p. 93-94. Though Austria was neutral throughout the Crimean War, her ultimate entry on the 
side of the Allies led to the cessation of hostilities.  Russia no longer felt bound to the principles of the Holy 
Alliance after Austria’s betrayal. 
197 A Avtorkhanov and M Broxup. The North Caucasus Barrier : The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World, 
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992. Russia engaged with the various empires and peoples of Central Asia 
throughout the century, in part, due to a fantastical idea of reaching India from the north.  From 1825-1859 a major 
effort was directed toward the Caucasus mountain regions of Chechnia, Daghestan, and Georgia at the expense of 
the Ottoman, Persian, and Circassian Muslims.  The transfer of Caucasus troops to the siege at Sevastapol 
effectively delayed this campaign in this region until the early twentieth century.   
198  W Baumgart, The Crimean War : 1853-1856, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999.  Baumgart’s history of 
the Crimean War pointed out that the possession of the Crimea was never the issue, and the war was fought as far 
afield as the Baltic and White Seas and the Pacific Ocean.  What was at stake was Russia’s bid for suzerainty over 
Turkey, which was effectively stopped by the victors.   
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more of the powers against weaker states, like the newly independent Latin American199 or 
Balkan states200 an additional 125.5 ‘nation-months’ of war can be accounted for (see Table 
A.3).  Adding colonial wars by these powers against non-state actors yields an astonishing 
additional 784.1 months (see Table A.4).  All of these figures combined amounts to 
approximately 87 years of war in which major powers were involved, as seen in Figure 3.4 
below.  
 
Figure 3.4 – Wars by Western Powers, 1815-1914 
46.0
88.4
125.5784.1
Total Duration in Nation-Months
Between Great Powers
Between 'Western' Powers
By Western Powers against 
Lesser States
By Western Powers against 
Non-State Actors
Total : 1044 months (87 years)
 
 
199 M Centeno, Blood and Debt : War and the Nation-State in Latin America, Pennsylvania State University Press, 
University Park, Pa., 2002. Miguel Centeno’s analysis of Latin American conflict struggles to incorrectly 
characterize Latin America as a region void of significant inter-state war by dismissing the major conflicts: The War 
of the Triple Alliance (1864-70) and the War of the Pacific (1879-84).  Nonetheless, historical attention to this 
region is admittedly poor.  For a brief, yet relatively thorough synopses see J Black, War and the World : Military 
Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450-2000, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1998.; J Black, War in the 
Nineteenth Century : 1800-1914, Polity, Cambridge, 2009 
200 Black, War in the Nineteenth Century : 1800-1914, pp. 184-186.  The First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-1913) 
were the best opportunities for contemporary military observers to see the effects of modern technology, including 
airplanes, before World War I.  In fact, these wars between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Turkey could be 
considered the first battles of World War I in which a million troops were involved in trench and artillery-based 
warfare. 
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In this light, it is difficult to characterize states as peaceful during this period of time. They were 
involved in nearly constant preparation for, and execution of war at home or abroad.  Even 
within Continental Europe, Kalevi Holsti determined that during the ninety-nine years after the 
Congress of Vienna there was only a 13% lower occurrence rate of war than the previous period 
- one war every 3.3 years compared to one every 2.8 years (see Table A.5).201 
 Furthermore, Holsti’s comparative data reflects the causes of war in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, providing us with a window into the relative proportion of economic 
motivations in the execution of war (see Tables A.5 and A.6).  According to Holsti’s calculation, 
the most frequent war-generating issues in the nineteenth century were:  
1. Maintaining integrity of state/empire – 55% of wars 
2. Territory – 42% of wars 
3. National liberation/state creation – 29% of wars 
4. National unification/consolidation – 26% of wars 
5. Protecting ethnic confreres – 16% of wars202 
Several of these motivations were novel, either as agenda items at all, or in terms of relative 
significance.  For example, ‘national liberation/state creation’, and ‘maintaining the integrity of a 
state/empire’ each went from being a part of 8% of all wars from 1715-1814, to being a part of 
29% to 55% respectively.  National unification and ethnic protection were not issues listed at all 
 
201 K Holsti, Peace and War : Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989, Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 1991, p. 142. Holsti’s data set from 1648-1989 is different that Singer and Small 1972.  In the nineteenth 
century, Holsti excluded some conflicts, like the Mexican-American War, which did not ‘impact’ the system of 
mutual relations, while adding other “major armed interventions” like the conflict over Belgian Independence from 
1830-33, which did not fit the criteria of 1000 battle deaths in Singer and Small 1972.  See Table A.5 for Holsti’s 
complete list. 
202 ibid. p. 145; see Table A.6; note that multiple issues could be reasons in individual wars, so that percentages will 
not add up to 100% 
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in the preceding period.  At the same time, the issues of the past became less important.  
‘Territory’, for example, while still accounting for 42% of all wars had dropped from being a 
part of 67% of wars in the preceding period.  The other two most important issues from 1715-
1814 were ‘commerce/navigation’ and ‘dynastic succession claims.’  The comparative difference 
between these selected issues in each period can be seen in Figure 3.5 below.   
   
 
 
Figure 3.5 – Key Issues in War, 1715 – 1914 
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 Source: Holsti 1993, p. 145 
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In Table A.6, I have attempted to reduce the complexity of Holsti’s list of war causes using 
Michael Mann’s I.E.M.P. model, which identifies Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political 
sources of power.203  While all of these sources overlap, making it difficult to isolate a single 
primary cause in most of the 31wars Holsti examined, the issues themselves could be defined in 
terms of their emphasis on economic, ideological or military power.204  For example, support for 
ethnic confréres would be more ideologically driven (I) than wars to secure strategic territory, 
which would be more important militarily (M).   
 As Fig. 3.5 demonstrates, the economically motivated (E) wars about commerce and 
navigation declined from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century.  This could be the indication 
of two possible scenarios in relation to Polanyi’s and the Liberal market peace theses.  The first 
confirms, while the second contradicts the thesis. 
1. The increase in the scale and scope of the free market decreased the use of war as a 
means to resolve competition for resources and commerce, or 
 
2. The major commerce and navigation issues were resolved in the eighteenth century, 
with Britain as the dominant naval power controlling sea lanes.   
 
Indeed, there are many indications that the second proposition could have been the case.  Holsti 
noted that, although the occurrence of war decreased by only 13%, “except for the three brief 
wars of German nation-building and Russia’s armed interventions into Hungary and Poland at 
mid-century, the center of Europe running from London, through Paris, Berlin, and Vienna 
constituted a significant zone of peace.”205  At sea, and in the core of the Western European state 
system, the unresolved territorial, dynastic, and navigational issues that plagued Europe through 
the eighteenth century seemed to have been settled by 1815, following the breakdown of 
 
203 op. cit. Mann 1986; 1993 
204 most issues and wars listed here could be considered political 
205 ibid. p. 142 
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France’s claim to hegemony.206  The largest remaining questions of this sort were in Central 
Europe, and were resolved by war as will be discussed below. Simply observing that peace 
existed does not tell us whether the peace that transpired in Central and Western Europe was due 
to market integration, or whether international trade was a byproduct that was allowed to take 
place due to the territorial security established by Continental balance-of-power and naval 
hegemony.   
 Paul Kennedy suggested that there were, in fact, three materialist causes for this 
pacification of the core.  First was the growth of the integrated economy, as was explained by 
Polanyi and others.  Second was the fact that Europeans focused their energy abroad against less 
developed peoples, as shown in Figure 3.4 above.  Third, technology derived from the Industrial 
Revolution led to uncertainty and changes in the nature of power and war, itself.  According to 
Kennedy, “Although it is difficult to generalize, the shifts in the Great Power balances caused by 
the uneven pattern of industrial and technological change probably affected the outcome of mid-
nineteenth-century wars more than did finance and credit.”207 
 Consider, for example, the expansion of railways and telegraph lines.  On the one hand, 
railways were economically motivated, linking territories by land that were previously 
commercially isolated from one another.  Railroads and telegraphs, however, increasingly 
assumed military significance throughout the century, as the case of the Franco-Prussian War 
and the U.S. Civil War showed especially.  As early as 1859, the French were able to move 
 
206 Within world-systems literature, hegemonic cycles have persisted throughout the modern era (1500 to present) as 
aspirants try to unseat the current hegemon.  Hegemonic stability theory is also analyzed by International Relations 
scholars such as George Modelski, who has traced five hegemonic powers (Potugal, Netherlands, Britain (I), Britain 
(II) and the United States) and their corresponding failed aspirants (Spain, France (I), France (II), Germany, USSR).  
see op. cit. Goldstein 1988, p. 127.  For an account of France’s failed bid for hegemony see I Wallerstein, The 
Modern World System, Vol. III : The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s, 
Academic Press, San Diego, 1989, pp. 55-126 
207 op. cit. Kennedy 1987, p. 144 
84 
                                                           
50,000 men to Italy by rail during the War of Italian Unification to gain the upper hand against 
60,000 Sardinians.208  By 1871, Prussian General Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke had 
developed a carefully planned strategy of rail movements, in which uniform length trains were 
run at uniform speed, linked and responsive to telegraph instructions.209  When Napoleon III 
rashly declared war with Prussia over an issue of Spanish succession, beginning on July 15, 
1870, over 1,500 trains travelled to their destination in Alsace, turned around and went back for 
another load, until nineteen days later the field force of over 380,000 men and supplies was 
gathered while the French were still ferrying reservists from Algeria.  Even during peacetime, 
Prussia used their railways as a military threat.  As Michael Mann noted,  
Railways resembled spiderwebs, each spun over a state’s territories, with only a 
few threads connecting the national webs.  This was deliberate.  A Prussian line 
ran inside almost the whole length of the Saxon border, with many connections 
back into Prussia and only one into Saxony.  Military and national economic 
considerations combined …in war the Prussian army could flood over the Saxon 
border, as it did in 1866.210 
 
Additionally, the Prussia monarchy nationalized the railways, providing the state with 44 percent 
of its revenue, which was used to fund wars with autonomous discretion from the 
inconsequential Reichstag.  Railroads led to three consequences in relation to war.  
1. Railroads served dual purposes – providing economic and military advantages. 
 
2. As the density of railway networks increased within the core of continental Europe, a 
type of check-mate scenario evolved due to the dramatic increase in the numbers of 
troops and armaments that could be mobilized for wars. 
 
3. The few wars that were actually fought became relatively short. 
 
 
208 op. cit. Black 2009, p. 67 
209 ibid. p. 128; D Showalter, The Wars of German Unification, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, pp. 247-
249. 
210 op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 304 
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 All three of these consequences are worth examining further.  First, the dual military and 
economic benefit was not exclusive to railroads alone, but rather demonstrates the dramatic 
power generated by the Industrial Revolution for all realms of society.  Steamships and 
telegraphs connected Britain to her 9.5 million square mile Empire.  By 1880, there were 97,568 
miles of telegraph cable across the oceans, allowing 900 British civil servants and 70,000 British 
soldiers to govern over 250 million Indians with direct contact with mainland Britain.211  This 
contact would prove decisive, for example, during the Sepoy War of 1857-59.212  Because 
Britain could quickly mobilize troops from its scattered regions in South Africa, Australia, India, 
and elsewhere, while also being able to wire money, they could be anywhere they wanted or 
needed to be in ‘all good speed.’213  This amounted to a massive “compression of time and 
space,” to borrow David Harvey’s expression used to describe the postmodern condition of the 
late 1980s.214  Whereas, in the late eighteenth century it took nine days to travel from Frankfurt 
to Berlin (302 miles), by 1872, Phileas Fogg could realistically travel the entire world (23,739 
miles) in eighty days – nearly a nine-fold increase – to say nothing of how quickly he could send 
a telegram.215  The massive increase in the speed of travel and communications made the world a 
 
211 N Ferguson, Empire : The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power, Basic 
Books, New York, 2003, pp, 164-171 
212 The Sepoy War was the result of a mutiny in the Indian Army over a rumor that rifle cartridges were made using 
animal fat.  see V G Kiernan,  From Conquest to Collapse : European Empires from 1815 to 1960 1st American 
edn., Pantheon Books, New York, 1982, pp. 47-50. 
213 A particularly good example was the 1866 rescue of several British subjects from Emperor Theodore (Tewodros) 
of Abyssinia, whose castle was 400 miles off the Ethiopian coast upon a mountain.  Lieutenant-General Sir Robert 
Napier set sail from Bombay with 13,000 British and Indian soldiers, 26,000 camp followers, 13,000 mules, ponies, 
and sheep, 7,000 camels, 7,000 bullocks, 1,000 donkeys, 44 elephants, as well as a prefabricated harbor and railway 
system.  The British defeated the Emperor in three days with no British casualties.  op. cit. Ferguson 2000, p. 176-
179 
214 D Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity : An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change, Blackwell, 
Cambridge, Mass., USA, 1989. 
215 D Blackbourn, History of Germany, 1780-1918 : The Long Nineteenth Century 2nd edn., Blackwell Pub., 
Malden, MA, 2003, pp. 7-8; op. cit. E Hobsbawm 1996, p.52; Phileas Fogg was the fictional hero of Jules Verne’s 
Around the World in 80 Days. The trip had been achieved by travelers prior to Verne’s writing, and was a trip 
offered by U.S. travel agents around 1870.  
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smaller place.216  The territorial ambitions of states were no longer limited by the distance a 
soldier could march in a day with necessary supplies (approx. 10-15 miles).217  European 
colonial powers began fighting upon the far flung continents of Asia, Africa, and Australia, 
perhaps, because of “the need of the world-economy to expand its boundaries,” as Immanuel 
Wallerstien has suggested.218  However, as crises like the Fashoda Incident of 1898 in the middle 
of desert Africa highlights, the Great Powers fought in previously inaccessible parts of the world 
because they could.219        
 However, Wallerstein was right to point out the internal pressures of the capitalist system 
that stimulated the expansion and extension of that system abroad.  These pressures, such as 
unprecedented demographic growth, urbanization, and proletarianization developed as the 
Industrial Revolution changed the European landscape.220  This relates to the second point listed 
above concerning railroads’ impact of military considerations. The density of the railway 
network within Europe itself changed the military potentials of war, particularly in regard to the 
size and speed of mobilization.  Great Powers like France and Austria could no longer count on 
 
216 This increase in communications was itself partially derived from war, especially following the Napoleonic 
period.  see M McLuhan, War and Peace in the Global Village, HardWired, San Francisco, CA, 1997. 
217M Van Creveld, Supplying War : Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton 2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2004.  Michael Mann considered logistics to be one of the determinates of the scale of 
authoritative power.  For example, the fact that armies could not travel quickly in pre-modern civilizations 
necessitated that they be organized federally, even within empires. op. cit. Mann 1986, pp. 9-10      
218 op. cit. Wallerstein, 1989, p. 129.  This need “was itself the outcome of pressure internal to the world economy” 
– a view that should not be discounted. 
219 The Fashoda Incident did not result in war, but was, instead, resolved as a diplomatic victory for Britain.  
Fashoda was the intersection point between Britain’s goal of claiming a straight line from Cape Town to Cairo and 
the French goal of a West-East line from Dakar to the Red Sea.  A French expeditionary force travelled for 14-
months to secure Fashoda only to find an Anglo-Egyptian army that had recently finished defeating the Mahdi at the 
Battle of Omdurman in present day Sudan.  The resolution of the crisis is often considered the end of the “Scramble 
for Africa.” A Moorehead, The White Nile, Vintage Books, New York, 1983.   
 
For the argument that technology provided the “means” of European imperialism, that proceeded along three phases 
of imperialism (penetration, conquest, and consolidation) see D Headrick, The Tools of Empire : Technology and 
European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981. 
220 L Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects, Harcourt, New York, 1989, 
pp. 410-481 
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the numerous buffer states of the German Confederation or the Northern Italian region providing 
breathing space should conflict arise.  With the exception of Russia beyond her Polish territories 
and Britain secured behind her wall of ships, states with connected railroad networks became 
neighbors.  With this in mind, Eric Hobsbawm’s figures related to railroad building take on 
remarkable significance (See Tables A.7 and A.8).  Where railroads became densely situated in 
the core of the European system, the size of armies necessary to compete was substantially 
increased.  Whereas in the Napoleonic Wars, there was only one battle (Leipzig [1813]) in which 
more than 300,000 men were involved, by 1860, these numbers were par for the course (as in the 
battles at Sadowa [1866], Gravelotte[1870], and Sedan [1870]).221  Though the French Republic 
accomplished the historically unprecedented achievement of a standing army of over one million 
men through the Levée en masse begun in 1793, only forty years later saw 2.5 million men 
mobilized in the U.S. Civil War out of a population of 33 million, and 1.7 million in the Franco-
Prussian war of 1870.222  The introduction of machine guns, breech-loading rifles, artillery and 
trenches further increased the number of infantry required to pitch battle.  In the battle of 
Mukden in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, 624,000 men engaged before each side lost nearly a 
third of their forces to machine gun fire.223  The persistent progress of technology throughout the 
century led to the evolution of mass warfare that characterized the twentieth century.  This form 
did not emerge autopoetically in the First World War, but was, rather, tentatively engaged in 
during the various wars that did happen over the course of the Hundred Years’ Peace.  
 The industrialization of war that occurred throughout the nineteenth century led to 
relatively short conflicts that were resolved quickly and decisively, as indicated in the third 
 
221 op. cit. Hobsbawm 1996, p. 79 
222 ibid., p. 79 
223 G Jukes, The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905, Osprey, Oxford, 2002, pp. 66-68 
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consequence attributed to railroads above.  The Wars of German Unification (The Second 
Schleswig War [1864], The Austro-Prussian War [1866], and the Franco-Prussian War [1870]) 
stand as the best examples of this trend.224  On the one hand, wars in the mid-century were still 
based upon the principles of eighteenth century diplomacy.  They were about specific issues that 
were intended to be settled decisively on the battlefield without involving civilians or risking the 
stability of the domestic societies of belligerents.  This was apparent in the Austrian Habsburg’s 
decision to end the war in 1866 as soon as it was clear that the Prussian’s substantially greater 
mobilized force would win, providing the war with the moniker the “Seven Weeks War.”  The 
significance of this chess move, however, cannot be adequately summed up in the duration of the 
conflict.  The terms of the treaty ended the hopes of the numerous other German states who lined 
up behind the Austrians (Hanover, Bavaria, Baden, Saxony, Würtemberg, Hesse Electoral, Hesse 
Grand Ducal, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin) for a Grossdeutsch  solution to the German question.  
Instead, Catholic Austria was eliminated from Bismarck’s plan to extend the Zollverein customs 
union to political unification of the German Empire under a Prussian banner.  All that was 
needed was to unite the independent German militaries according to the terms of the pact against 
a non-German foe.  Napoleon III’s declaration of war provided this opportunity, and in 1871 at a 
conquered Versailles, Bismarck established the unified German Reich.225  The goal of a unified 
German state in Central Europe had evaded statesmen since at least Ferdinand II’s last attempt to 
consolidate the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).226  To suggest 
that these wars amounted to peace simply because, in sum, they only took a few months clouds 
the overwhelming importance of the motivations behind the wars and the consequences of their 
 
224 op. cit. Showalter 
225 G Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War : The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2003. 
226 C V Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War, P. Smith, Gloucester, Mass., 1969. 
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resolution.  Not only did the Wars of German Unification resolve the German question, but they 
allowed the maneuverability necessary for Mazzini to unify Italy under King Victor Emmanuel 
II of Piedmont.  That these wars would have taken several months in the eighteenth century 
should not be the conditions by which we measure nineteenth century war and peace.  Equating 
wars with duration or even battle deaths minimizes these wars’ impact of geopolitics and society.       
 Additionally, suggesting that these short industrial wars amounted to a period of peace 
shifts our attention away from the profound ways warmaking still impacted society.  Consider, 
for example, the dramatic increase in arms, battleships, and armies during the long peace.  
Conscription, which had begun in Revolutionary France, was instituted in Prussia, Austria, and 
Russia early in the century.  Though conscription was initially very unpopular, by the end of the 
century, serving two or three years in active service followed by reserve duty became a taken for 
granted experience in many young men’s lives.227  Ute Frevert described the manner in which 
Prussian enlisted men in either the Landwehr (militia army), or the regular army, were 
conditioned by the army as a “total institution.”228 Individual identities were broken down in 
order to become incorporated into life in the barracks, through a process of trimming, 
programming, stripping, and leveling.229  By 1910, as much as 20 percent of adult males in most 
countries had been disciplined in this manner.230  The gray uniformed soldiers of World War I 
had truly become a mass army through conscription and “provided the human fodder for total 
war,” as Anthony Giddens has said.231  Recall that Napoleon’s army of 1.3 million men was 
historically unprecedented, with the hypothetical exception of the Chinese military during the 
 
227 U Frevert, A Nation in Barracks : Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society, Berg, Oxford ; 
New York, 2004; op. cit. Black 2009, pp. 187-196 
228 see E Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, Aldine Pub. Co., 
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229 op. cit. Frevert, p. 182 
230 op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 430; Since one of the side benefits of army service was easy access to growing number of 
civil service jobs, a segmented caste of reservists, veterans, and civil servants grew to collectively associate 
themselves directly with the state.  The consequences of this indoctrination in terms of nationalism will be important 
to our discussion of ideology below.    
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Ming Dynasty.232  The large battles that followed this precedent in the nineteenth century were 
made possible due to the amount of enlisted populations ready to go to war, as seen in Table 3.3 
below.  Even accounting for substantial population growth, the percentage of active military 
personnel in these societies were high.  In 1900, Austria’s army represented 6.9%, France’s 
8.8%, Britain’s, 6.6%, and Germany’s 6.3% of the male population aged 20-44 years.233  These 
mass armies, developed and trained during peacetime, provided statesmen with tremendous 
diplomatic bargaining power with which the stalemate of Europe was precariously maintained.   
 
Table 3.3 – Armies (in 000s) 
 
  
1879 
 
1913 
Peacetime Mobilized Peacetime Mobilized 
 
Great Britain 
 
136 
 
600 
 
160 
 
700 
            (India) 200 - 249  
 
 
Austria-Hungary 
 
267 
 
772 
 
800 
 
3,000 
 
 
France 
 
503 
 
1,000 
 
1,200 
 
3,500 
 
 
Germany 
 
419 
 
1,300 
 
2,200 
 
3,800 
 
 
Russia 
 
766 
 
1,213 
 
1,400 
 
4,400 
 
 
 Source: Hobsbawm 1987, p. 351 
  
                                                            
232 W H McNeill, The Pursuit of Power : Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982, pp. 24-62 
233 op. cit. Tilly 1990, p. 123 
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 Advances in arms technologies further increased the capabilities of states to execute 
lethal violence.  This can be seen by considering the hegemony maintained by Britain, who had 
one of the lower numbers of soldiers above, but was the dominant naval power throughout the 
century.  Though Britain had succeeded at eliminating her French rival at sea during the Battle of 
Trafalgar in 1805,234 her lead in the Industrial Revolution was the true key to commanding the 
seas during the nineteenth century.  Navies depended on sophisticated infrastructures of bases 
and supply systems.  Britain’s advantage lay in its capacity to build and maintain more ships of 
different kinds due to technological leads in metallurgy and hydrodynamics.235  These 
advantages, and indeed Britain’s industrial capacity generally, were themselves products of the 
Napoleonic wars.  During the wars, the government provided massive capital expenditures in 
ironworks, establishing the foundry base upon which the nineteenth century railroad and factory 
networks were built.  As William McNeill said, “The men who built the new coke-fired blast 
furnaces in previously desolate regions of Wales and Scotland would probably not have 
undertaken such risky and expensive investments without an assured market for cannon.  At any 
rate, their initial markets were largely military.”236   
 By keeping alive the image of British sea power through the occasional execution of 
“gunboat” diplomacy in Algeria in 1824 or Navarino Bay in 1827, the British were able to 
establish a convoy system that increased their share of the world mercantile shipping.  The Royal 
Navy, in turn, was able to draw upon the trained manpower of substantial merchant marine.  This 
allowed the image of Pax Britannica to thrive even as its actual naval capabilities declined until 
France restarted fleet construction in the late 1820s rekindling a competitive incentive.  
 
234 R Adkins, Nelson's Trafalgar : The Battle That Changed the World, Viking, New York, 2005 
235 op. cit. Black 2009, p. 71 
236 op. cit. McNeill 1982, p. 211 
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Steamships gradually replaced sail ships throughout the period, but both were used together until 
the 1890s when wooden ships were finally considered obsolete.  As steam developed, so did long 
range artillery and armor plate on board.  Inventions, like exploding shells instead of solid shot, 
were useful in naval bombardment and were soon incorporated on land in breech-loading 
artillery.  The mid-century witnessed a brief age of “ironclads,” beginning in the American Civil 
War and climaxing at Lissa in 1866 during the Austro-Prussian war where seven Austrian 
ironclads went up against twelve Italian steamships.  During the Ironclad race between Britain 
and France during 1859-65, the innovations of gun turrets and self-propelled torpedoes were 
introduced.  Torpedo boats and fast moving cruisers soon became the lot in which the so-called 
jeune école of French naval theorists cast their hopes of revanche.237  In 1881 the French 
Chamber of Deputies ordered seventy torpedo ships and cancelled armored warship construction.  
Five years later, they ordered fourteen cruisers and an additional one hundred torpedo boats.  
This action stimulated the British to move away from their Nelsonian strategy of big guns on big 
boats firing from far away toward dreadnaught battleships and destroyers.  Eventually, the 
British dropped their convoy system altogether and focused instead on being able to deliver 
overwhelming force anywhere in the world on short notice.  Around the same period, German 
industrialists pressured the Kaiser to begin what would be termed the Great Naval Race between 
Britain and Germany on the North Sea.238  By the end of the century, most of the Great Powers 
were focusing their energy on building bigger, better ships, as quickly as possible, as can be seen 
in the dramatic jump between 1900 and 1914 (see Table 3.4 below). 
  
 
237 op. cit. McNeill 1982, pp. 263-264 
238 J Rüger, The Great Naval Game : Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge ; New York, 2007.  The Great Naval Game included nationalist spectacles in which miniature versions 
of warships would engage in staged battles in public bodies of water, in a type of industrial gladiator match. 
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Table 3.4 - Navies (In Number of Battleships) 
 
 
  
1900 
 
 
1914 
 
Great Britain 
 
 
49 
 
64 
 
Germany 
 
 
14 
 
40 
 
France 
 
 
23 
 
28 
 
Austria-Hungary 
 
 
6 
 
16 
 
Russia 
 
 
16 
 
23 
 
Source: Hobsbawm 1987, p. 351 
 
 Though the nineteenth century could be considered a “naval” century, similar advances 
occurred in land-based military technology as well.  In logistics, we have already drawn attention 
to railroads and telegraphs mid-century, but these had their origins in Napoleon’s use of 
semaphore and the flexible use of divisional corps to deliver overwhelming and coordinated 
force before his opponents could congregate.239   The semaphore system allowed messages to 
travel 150 miles per hour in clear weather, and Napoleon’s mobile cartographic unit, the Bureau 
Topographique, was the first general staff in history.240  Military academies, including with the 
École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr in 1802, were established to expand the technical 
                                                            
239 op. cit. Black 2009, pp. 5-26; op. cit. Van Creveld pp. 40-74; P Johnson, Napoleon, Viking, New York, 2002. 
240 op. cit. Johnson, p. 28-29 
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capabilities of soldiers.  Initially education was only required of artillerymen, who needed 
special engineering skills, but the mathematically-minded Napoleon encouraged further technical 
knowledge within the ranks. As military theorists like Antoine-Henri Jomini codified the 
principles of Napoleonic warfare, which emphasized flexible corps and sharp, direct attack, the 
armies of Europe became academically imitated and uniform.   
 Chemical and mechanical innovations were developed, such as mercury fulminates which 
allowed an all-weather ignition system - providing reliable rifles when combined with mass-
produced metal percussion caps.  For much of the early nineteenth century arms manufacturing 
proceeded at a slow pace.  However, as inventors produced thousands of patents for exotic and 
new arms technologies to kill the enemy better, stronger, and faster, states began restructuring 
their procurement systems to manufacture new weapons with unprecedented speeds.  For 
example, Prussia’s effort to convert their muzzle-loading rifles to breech-loaders in 1840 would 
have taken 30 years to complete at a rate of 10,000 per annum using existing production 
facilities.  Diktats from military advisors demanding changes in production capabilities resulted 
in increases up to 22,000 per annum by 1863.241  In the United States, mass-produced firearm 
factories and metallurgy forges were built in New England in coordination with the Army 
Ordnance Department and were among the first industrial operations to employ F.W. Taylor’s 
scientific management techniques.242  By the 1880s this development in ships, artillery, rifles, 
and shells was being accomplished by what William McNeill termed, a “Command Technology” 
system, which was essentially a military-industrial-complex eighty years before Dwight 
 
241 op. cit. McNeill 1982, p 236 
242 M R Smith, Military Enterprise and Technological Change : Perspectives on the American Experience, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985, pp. 1-116 
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Eisenhower coined the term.243  McNeill described the gray public/private distinction within this 
command complex:  
Fast acting feedback loops thus arose whereby financial and managerial decisions 
in the Admiralty meshed into financial and managerial decisions made within 
what were still ostensibly private firms.  Public and private policy became 
irremediably intertwined…Marxist or quasi-Marxist historians since the 1950s 
assert that the dominating element in this mix was the private one…This seems a 
distorted vision of human motivation and behavior…Market and pecuniary 
considerations were not firmly subordinated to political command before 1914; 
but then, political and military decisions were not subordinated to profit 
maximizing by private manufacturers either.244 
 
Industrialists like Alfred Krupp, William Armstrong, and Hiram Maxim made fortunes through 
war profiteering; however, military officials were equally motivated to produce the most 
effective weapons in order to earn staff promotions.  The arms industry attracted the best 
technical minds because the most advanced industrial research was being done among the 
drydocks and foundries connected to warmaking.    
 The mutually reinforcing dynamic between private and military industry led to dramatic 
technical innovation throughout the century, as can be seen in Table A.9.  This remarkable 
chronology demonstrates the dramatic acceleration of technical innovation that developed late in 
the century, as game-changing inventions were arriving annually until World War I.  Indeed, in 
Kenneth Macksey’s Encyclopedia of Weapons and Military Technology, from which the table 
was derived, the nineteenth century’s military innovations take up the space of 5 pages, while the 
twentieth century, including both World Wars and the Cold War, only take up 2.5 pgs.  All 
preceding history dating back to 4,000 B.C. and the invention of wheel occupies only 4.5 
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pages.245  While the table does not indicate whether a technology had military or civilian origins, 
the dual purposes of inventions like the telephone or pneumatic tires indicates the advantages 
militaries derived from consumer industrial developments, as well as military “spin-off” 
technology – an effect that is often associated with the Cold War nuclear and space races which 
led to the internet, robotics, LED lights, etc.246  Many products that are today taken for granted 
were inspired for military purposes.  Napoleon III, for example, offered a reward for a cheap 
process of making steel capable of withstanding the explosive force of the new shells.247  The 
Bessemer process was the immediate answer, which has since allowed the construction of 
skyscrapers, high tension cables, and other industrial creations made possible by cheap steel.  
Napoleon III’s incentive strategy also led to the creation of margarine when a substitute for 
butter for the armed services was called for.      
 At this point, Anthony Giddens distinction between “capitalism” and “industrialism” is 
worth considering.  In The Nation-State and Violence, Giddens wrote,    
In European history, the development of capitalism antedates that of 
industrialism, and by a considerable period of time.  The former was also the 
necessary condition for the emergence of the latter.  But capitalism and 
industrialism have their own distinctive features.  They cannot be conceptually 
collapsed into one another and empirically they can exist in some substantial 
separation.248  
 
Giddens considered capitalism similarly to Marx and Weber in that it involves particular social, 
class, and monetary relations and is engineered toward the pursuit of profit.  However, according 
to Giddens, industrialism is a relatively neutral organization of mechanical and technological 
processes and only takes on the particular form associated with Marxian analyses as ‘industrial 
 
245 K Macksey, The Penguin Encyclopedia of Weapons and Military Technology : From Prehistory to the Present 
Day 1st edn., Viking, London ; New York, 1993, pp. xi-xxi 
246 J K Galbraith, The New Industrial State Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1978; H L Nieburg., In the Name of Science, 
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247 op. cit. Mumford 1963, p. 91 
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capitalist society.’ 249  In the realm of military production this distinction can be seen most 
dramatically.  The merging of industry, technology, and the means of waging war has been one 
of the most important features of the processes of industrialization as a whole.250  While 
capitalist profits were drawn by armaments firms, the state’s interest in weapons and technology 
was independently motivated.   
 
Figure 3.6 – Military Expenditure by the Great Powersa, 1880-1914 
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a Germany, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, and France 
  
Source: Hobsbawm 1987, p. 350 
  
 
249  As Theodor Adorno declared in 1968, this is the “fundamental question of our present society.” Whereas 
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phase on the way toward modern industrial society, Marxists such as Adorno would suggest that capitalist relations 
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 And yet, the technological innovation that took place during the nineteenth century could 
not have occurred without the material support of states.  Figure 3.6 above represents the total 
military expenditures of the Great Powers during the most accelerated period of arms production.   
In absolute terms, states’ investment in war grew throughout the century.  Table A.10 provides 
figures that reflect the relative percentages of military and civilian expenditure from 1800-1910.  
One can see that midway through the century spending on non-military services began rising as a 
relative percentage in most states.  The introduction of social welfare programs certainly account 
for some of this increase.  Charles Tilly suggested that welfare and other civilian demands were a 
delayed reaction to extraction by states for war purposes that had been on the rise since the 
eighteenth century.  The initial state functions of statemaking, warmaking, and protection, paid 
for via extraction of resources and manpower from subject population led to new state 
responsibilities: adjudication, distribution, and production.251  Tilly wrote,  
European states began to monitor industrial conflict and working conditions, 
install and regulate national systems of education, organize aid to the poor and 
disabled, build and maintain communication lines, impose tariffs for the benefit of 
home industries, and the thousand other activities Europeans now take for granted 
as attributes of state power.  The state’s sphere expanded far beyond its military 
core, and its citizens began to make claims on it for a very wide range of 
protection, adjudication, production, and distribution…Direct rule and mass 
national politics grew up together, and reinforced each other mightily.252 
 
However, Tilly’s perspective treats the civilian activities of the states as being a function of their 
ultimate and primary goal: making war.  This is in line with his well known quotation, “wars 
made states and states made war.”253  Indeed, as several sociologists, from Perry Anderson to 
Anthony Giddens have pointed out, one of the earliest jobs of states in the modern period was to 
 
251 Tilly suggested that the first three functions of the state (statemaking, warmaking, and protection) most resemble 
the institution of organized crime than anything else.  C Tilly, 'War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime', 
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make war.254  In large part, this was the only job of monarchs up until the beginning of our 
period.255  However, as Immanuel Wallerstein said,  
If we compare the real power (ability to get decisions actually carried out) of 
Louis XIV of France (who reigned 1661-1715), usually taken as the arch-symbol 
of absolute power, with say the prime minister of Sweden in the year 2000, we 
will see that the latter had more real power in Sweden in 2000 than Louis in 
France in 1715.256  
 
It was only during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that states were able to make a 
shift toward direct rule of their internal populations.  If we recall our initial definition of 
modernity itself, according to Mark Raeff, it “was society's conscious desire to maximize all its 
resources and to use this new potential dynamically for the enlargement and improvement of its 
way of life.”257  Through the influences of liberal reformers, physiocrats and social engineers 
like Saint-Simon in France and Stein and Hardenberg in Prussia, states began trying to harness 
the energy of its population toward the increase of power, including both military and economic 
power.258   
 Michel Foucault termed this state interest, “governmentality,” which was fundamentally 
new compared to the earlier Cameralist model of ideal government.  Antecedent to the 
administrative state of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Foucault identified  
A state of government that is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by 
the surface occupied, but by a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume, 
its density, and, for sure, the territory it covers, but which is, in a way, only one of 
its component.  This state of government, which essentially bears on the 
population and calls upon and employs economic knowledge as an instrument, 
would correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security.259    
 
254 P Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, N.L.B., London, 1974; op. cit. Giddens 1985. 
255 see Mann 1986, pp. 450-497 
256 I Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2004, p. 43 
257 op. cit. Raeff, pp. 1222 
258 C Clark, Iron Kingdom : The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947, Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006 pp. 312-344 
259 M Foucault, M Senellart, and A Davidson,, Security, Territory, Population : Lectures at the Collège De France, 
1977-1978, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, 2007, p. 109-110 
100 
                                                           
 
Indeed, Foucault inverted Clausewitz’s famous dictum, “War is politics by other means,” into 
“Politics is war by other means.”260  In Clausewitz, Foucault saw a theory of strategy that 
applied not just to war, but to any ends that are achieved via strategies of power.261  Accessing 
the natural forces of the population, such as the rational self-interest of Adam Smith’s “Invisible 
Hand,” required knowledge of subject populations.  For this reason, the nineteenth century was 
the Golden Age of statistics, and states used their knowledge of society to control and maximize 
the activities of their domestic populations toward the increase of state power.   
 This could also explain the decline in “Territory” as a cause of war, as states dedicated 
their energies internally toward their existing populations.  Prussia, for example, integrated vast 
territories throughout the period through dynastic, military, and diplomatic victories.  The 
partitions of Poland were among the first territories requiring new means of directing the 
population toward the interests of the Prussian state.262  Similar mechanisms, often involving 
compromises with local elites, were required most notably in the German Rhineland, which was 
the most advanced industrial region in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century.263  
While this interest in domestic populations may have been initially motivated by states’ ability to 
go to war, as Tilly suggested, by the mid-century the functions assumed by states were numerous 
and had developed a life of their own through a increasingly autonomous bureaucracy.   
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 Michael Mann’s theory of the state identified several functional crystallizations within 
the modern state which rose to prominence during the period of 1760-1914.  Mann saw state 
crystallizations as being polymorphous, in that they did not need to establish “ultimate” primacy.  
So states could be “Capitalist” in addition to being “Protestant.”  Furthermore, among the five 
states, Austria, Prussia, Britain, France, and the United States, there were many roads to 
nationhood which resulted in multiple variations in form according to which functions were 
emphasized.   Mann’s identification of state functions is not the same as pursuing a 
“functionalist” analysis, as I have criticized Marxist and Realist perspectives for engaging in 
above.  Rather, Mann has pointed to specific decisions in which states identified and pursued 
goals, eventually institutionalizing those that were effective and desirable in specific 
configurations.   
 Mann’s theory of the state differed from Marxist, Realist, and Pluralist theories which 
conceive of the state as a “place,” an “actor,” and again as a “place” respectively.  As mentioned 
above, Mann considered the proper definition of the state to be an “active place.”  His definition 
can be summarized in four points:  
1. The state is territorially centralized.  It does not wield I.E.M. (Ideological, Economic, 
Military power), but must draw on these resources which are outside it.  It does, 
however, have binding powers over a territory. 
 
2. The state contains two dualities.  It is a place and persons and center and territory.  It 
is simultaneously ‘statist’ (vested in elites and institutions at the center), and it is 
composed of ‘party relations’ between center and across territories. 
 
3. State institutions are differentiated, and undertake different functions for different 
interest groups.  Unity or even consistency are not necessary, and do not tend to occur 
because of overlapping, intersecting power networks. 
 
4. States are in relationships with other states.264   
 
264 op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 56 
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Because states are the territorial space and population within borders as well as the actors that 
occupy the elite positions, the third component of Mann’s definition allows us to look at the 
various state functions in the correct light.  The state develops functions, maintained by 
institutions and bureaucratic civil servants, based on the needs of elites and constituents.  States 
may allocate priorities according to four state mechanisms: legal codes and constitutions, 
budgets, party-democratic majorities, or monocratic bureaucracies. These may, indeed, satisfy 
economic functions by reproducing the capitalist mode of production.265  However, these may 
also lead to geopolitical or military interests that run counter to the segmental interests of capital 
– as in the case of Prussian industrialists encouraging naval production despite the increased risk 
to financial capital posed by a provoked Great Britain.  This head-on conflict, which many 
(including Mann himself) have argued led to the outbreak of the First World War, is the result of 
functional crystallizations that are systemic and limiting.  Not all crystallizations are systemic in 
this way, however.  For example, moral-ideological crystallizations between secular, Catholic, 
and Protestant religion may conflict with class crystallizations, but not systemically, and 
therefore do not produce a head-on dialectic.  For this reason, multiple crystallizations developed 
and existed simultaneously in nineteenth century states.  Identifying absolute primacy in regard 
to economic modes of production may be analytically helpful for certain questions, but can also 
lead to neglect of other crystallizations that were often equally important.  No crystallization 
existed purely without interacting with the other state functions. These interactions produced 
emergent unanticipated consequences. 
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 Mann identified six higher-level crystallizations that most Western states came down on 
in one manner or another in the period between 1760 and 1914.  
1. Capitalist – States became capitalist by the end of the period, but only through 
dialectical struggle between classes.  States established private property rights that 
allowed capital accumulation and industrialization. 
 
2. Ideological-moral – These crystallizations concern the official religious denomination 
of the state, or freedom of religion, as well as moral obligations of the state in terms 
of social welfare and humanitarian assistance. 
 
3. Militarist – Though military budgets diminished as a percentage of state expenditures, 
geopolitical and domestic needs for the deployment of violence led to different 
configurations of civil-military relations and military postures.  
 
4. Representative – States varied on the issue of who was represented in the decision-
making processes of the state, falling between the two poles of party-democracy and 
autocracy. 
 
5. National – States needed to determine who was a member of the state, in terms of 
ethnic background, religious affiliation, and language.  Furthermore, states 
coordinated with their broader territories either as a centralized nation-state, or as a 
confederal regime. 
 
6. Patriarchal – As in the capitalist crystallization, all of the states Mann considered 
ended up as patriarchies, establishing repressive gender and sexual roles that were not 
substantially addressed critically until the twentieth century.266 
Mann pointed out that, if a state failed to modernize in terms of the four most important 
crystallizations - capitalist, militarist, representative, and national - that state did not survive.   
 This Darwinian determination resembles Tilly’s conclusion regarding why the national 
state became the dominant governmental form in the modern era, when other forms, such as the 
ecclesiastical state, multi-ethnic empire, or city-state, were equally valid in 990 C.E.  Tilly wrote,  
Over the last three centuries, compacts of powerful states have increasingly 
narrowed the limits within which any national struggle for power occurred…That 
narrowing restricted the alternative paths of state formation.  Throughout the 
world, state formation converged on the more or less deliberate construction of 
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national states…according to models offered, subsidized, and enforced by the 
great powers.267 
 
Tilly saw this as the consequence of competing state strategies that employed varying 
proportions of capital, coercion or both.  Certain states, such as Venice and Holland were able to 
use their financial resources to hire mercenary forces to defend and expand their domains.  Other 
states, like Brandenburg-Prussia or Poland had more coercive trajectories and drew power 
through warlords and direct extraction in kind.  Between these two lay the capitalist-coercive 
trajectory, as exemplified by France, Britain, and Imperial Germany.  These states were able to 
take advantage of a monetized economy, which made extraction via taxation easy, while also 
developing substantial standing militaries and navies to compete for territory and resources.268  
Ultimately the states that combined both capital and coercion became the most powerful states 
and forced other states into their model of “national states.”  The trajectory of these various 
strategies can be seen in Figure 3.7. 
 In terms of state coercion, Jeremy Black outlined the three main functions of the military 
in the nineteenth century: international, domestic and colonial.269 The weaponry, organizational 
systems, logistics and communications employed were similar, but in the case of domestic 
conflict the fighting took place in urban environments, quite different from the traditional open 
field battles of previous eras.  Because military history has traditionally focused on symmetrical  
warfare between nations, the period between 1815 and 1849, which primarily saw military action 
of the domestic sort, has been largely ignored.270  By the years following 1848, the technology of  
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from God : The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848, Random House, New York, 1989. 
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Figure 3.7 – Relative Concentration of Capital and Coercion  
as Determinants of States’ Paths of Growth. 
 
 
 Source: Tilly 1990, p. 133 
  
social control became refined to the point where actual violence was rarely necessary.  This was 
not, however, an “externalization” of conflict toward the geopolitical realm due to the increased 
effectiveness of surveillance, as Giddens and Foucault have argued.271  Rather, as Michael Mann 
indicated, the symbolic use of the military persisted everywhere except Britain, whose night-
watchman state was the exceptional case social theorists based the norm off of.272  Throughout 
the century, the military was gradually supplemented by distinct police and paramilitary forces in 
domestic situations.  The army was only called up when the situation extended beyond the 
control of these two forces.  Repressive militarism proceeded along three stages – first, by 
establishing a “presence,” then engaging in a “show” of force, and only rarely through actual 
 
271 op. cit. Giddens 1985; M Foucault, Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison 2nd Vintage Books edn., 
Vintage Books, New York, 1995. 
272 op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 410 
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violence.273  Success in this regard was supplemented by the state’s monopolization of coercive 
force through the disarming of populations, while advanced technological weaponry, like 
machine guns and cannon, made resistance futile.274 
 The case of Britain’s early ability to stifle domestic violence is exemplary in one way.  
That the military was not needed domestically provided the opportunity to dedicate resources 
overseas toward expanding the British Empire, which grew at an average annual pace of about 
100,000 square miles between 1815 and 1865.275  As other states on the continent resolved these 
domestic problems later in the century this allowed them similar opportunities, which could 
explain the dramatic rise in “New Imperialism” after the 1870s.276  If we recall the three 
functions of the military – domestic, international, and colonial - the third, colonial military 
action, was emphasized most after the domestic crises subsided and the European balance-of-
power became bipolar along lines that would clash in 1914.   In fact, we can associate the 
primacy of each of these functions with three periods within the Hundred Years Peace.   
1. 1815-1848 – Domestic violence / international peace. 
2. 1848-1871 – Localized international violence. 
3. 1871-1914 – International peace / New Imperialism 
 Polanyi described the first third of the hundred years’ peace, as being under the firm grip 
of the Holy Alliance (Prussia, Austria, and Russia): “Its armies were roaming up and down 
Europe putting down minorities and repressing majorities.”277 This was partially true within the 
 
273 ibid. p. 408 
274 N Elias, The Civilizing Process : Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford ; 
Malden, Mass., 2000, p. 268 
275 op. cit. Kennedy 1987. 
276 op. cit. Hobsbawm 1987. 
277 op. cit. Polanyi, p. 7 
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territories they were responsible for, which included the minimally militarized remnants of the 
Holy Roman Empire. The army did not exist solely for repressive purposes, however, nor could a 
military achieve such ends without political and legislative mechanisms in the form of local 
concessions and alliances between middle classes and old regime nobles and patricians, who also 
wanted order.278 Still, Giovanni Arrighi, following Polanyi, described the Holy Alliance and the 
Concert of Europe, the two primary diplomatic mechanisms to emerge from the Treaty of Vienna 
in 1815, as “an instrument of British governance of the continental balance of power.”279  While 
the novelty of the post-Napoleonic international system was a commitment toward domestic 
order, Britain was actually notably absent from Continental diplomatic issues and spent most of 
the period consolidating its overseas empire.280 Furthermore, other than the Metternichian 
interest in domestic order, there was nothing particularly unusual about a period of peace 
following a general European war.  After the Seven Years War of 1756-1763, the Great Powers 
were materially exhausted and dedicated themselves to maintaining the balance-of-power while 
they regrouped.281  The Partitions of Poland, in which Austria, Prussia, and Russia carved up the 
decaying state of Poland to avoid war with each other provides an example of how far these 
powers were willing to go to preserve the peace.  To suggest that the Holy Alliance was simply 
 
278 The gradual political negotiation between local and state bureaucratic authorities within Prussia and the cities and 
towns of the old Holy Roman Empire are well outlined in M Walker, German Home Towns : Community, State, and 
General Estate, 1648-1871, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998.; C Clark, Iron Kingdom : The Rise and Downfall 
of Prussia, 1600-1947, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006.  Rather than being coercively suppressed 
by armed militaries, Blackbourn and Eley indicated that what would have been a traditional (aka British) liberal 
bourgeois class, actually allied with the old regime nobility to establish a ‘party of order’ that was mutually 
interested in suppression of labor and the establishment of industrial capitalism. D Blackbourn and G Eley, The 
Peculiarities of German History : Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1984.; C.B.A. Behrens, Society, Government, and the Enlightenment, Thames and 
Hudson, London, 1985. indicated that this trend was not exclusively German, and could be applied as well to 
France. 
279 op. cit. Arrighi, p. 54 
280 op. cit. Kissinger, pp. 78-102; P Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1994. 
281 op. cit. Schroeder. 
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acting according to British hegemonic interests implies that the continental powers had no 
interest of their own in maintaining order and peace after the exhausting “Great War,” as the 
Napoleonic Wars were called throughout the nineteenth century.  
 The second period, 1848-1871, actually saw quite a lot of intra-European wars.  As has 
been discussed above, some of these were shortened because of new technologies and because 
diplomatic understandings prevented the wars from becoming general conflagrations.  However, 
as we have also seen, these wars involved unprecedented scales of troops and supply 
mobilizations, and should not be measured necessarily according to their duration.  In any case, 
this period also saw several lengthy wars such as the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the U.S. Civil 
War of 1861-1865, the Franco-Mexican War of 1861-67, and the intermittent wars of German 
and Italian Unification.   Polanyi said that during this period, which was “one of the most 
confused and crowded quarter centuries of European history - peace was less safely established, 
as the ebbing strength of reaction met the growing strength of industrialism.”282  But what does 
this mean?  By peace being “less established” does this admit that there was war?  Does this 
mean peace was maintained, but it was precariously stabilized without the presence of either 
reaction or finance?  If one ignores the wars that did happen, as Polanyi did, the second 
proposition might be tenable except for his reasoning regarding the third period.  
 1871 to1914 was the era that best resembled the conditions Polanyi described as the 
peace between Great Powers, though it lasted forty-three years instead of one hundred.  
Considering the dramatic increases in military and naval spending and troop buildup, the fact 
that states resisted deploying their geopolitical power does seem to need explanation.  As we 
know, Polanyi suggested that transnational capital provided the mechanism through which peace 
 
282 op. cit. Polanyi, p. 8 
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was maintained.  However, Polanyi said that “by the end of the seventies the free-trade episode 
(1846-79) was at an end as the actual use of the gold standard by Germany marked the 
beginnings of an era of protectionism and colonial expansion.”283  Indeed, Eric Hobsbawm’s 
breakdown of the nineteenth century’s eras mirrors this assessment.  1789-1848 was the “Age of 
Revolutions.”  1875-1914 was the “Age of Empire,” and, in between, was the “Age of Capital” - 
1848-1875.284  Hobsbawm characterized the post-1848 period as such: 
The era of liberal triumph began with a defeated revolution and ended in a 
prolonged depression…The new era which follows the age of liberal triumph was 
to be very different.  Economically it was to move away rapidly from unrestrained 
competitive private enterprise, government abstention from interference and what 
the Germans called Manchesterismus (the free trade orthodoxy of Victorian 
Britain), to large industrial corporations (cartels, trusts, monopolies), to very 
considerable government interference, to very different orthodoxies of policy, 
though not necessarily of economic theory.285 
 
The economy in the Age of Empire was different from the Age of Capital in four ways.  
  
1. The First Industrial Revolution was replaced by the Second Industrial 
Revolution 
 
2. The domestic consumer market developed. 
 
3. The era of British industrial monopoly was replaced by rival national 
industrial economies 
 
4. Competition led to economic concentration, market control, and 
manipulation.286 
 
In Polanyi’s reading, a powerful unified Germany upset the balance of power and The Concert of 
Europe broke down leaving Britain as the leader of the peace interest.  Colonial rivalry became 
acute and the ability of haute finance to avert the spread of wars diminished rapidly, especially 
 
283 op. cit. Polanyi, p. 19 
284 op. cit. Hobsbawm 1987, 1996; E Hobsbawm. The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848, Praeger Publishers, 
New York, 1969. 
285 op. cit. Hobsbawm 1996, p. 303. 
286 ibid. p. 304 
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after 1904 when the Triple Alliance removed France as a power that could independently 
mediate between the British and the German blocs.  According to Polanyi, the peace effect of 
haute finance peaked around 1890.  If we follow this timeline then, 
 1871 – “Localized” wars between Great Powers end. 
  
1879 – Free trade era reaches an end – Germany’s acceptance of gold standard starts the 
downfall of the Concert of Europe 
 
 1890 – Haute finance peace interest peaks. 
 
 1904 – Concert of Europe is effectively over. 
 
 1914 – World War I 
 
Other than the 1890s and perhaps the 1880s, it seems as though finance maintained the stability 
of the system for a very limited period of time.  As Polanyi indicated, this period was 
characterized mostly by a decline in the stability of the Concert of Europe.  This would be a 
decline from a period in which peace “was less safely established” (1848-71), which, in turn, was 
measured relative to the period in which the Holy Alliance ruled Europe with an iron fist (pre-
1848).   
 In this sense, Polanyi was really talking about two periods – what he calls The Holy 
Alliance and the Concert of Europe.  The “confused” middle period (1848-1871) can be 
dismissed from the analysis as either a 23 year outlier, or as a transition period between the two 
geopolitical configurations.  The problem with this analysis is two-fold.  On the one hand, the 
Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe are two separate things, but not two separate times.  
Actually, both were established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.  Secondly, Polanyi saw the 
Holy Alliance breaking down due to the decline of the Catholic Church and religion as a 
transnational binding force.  This is problematic because religion and ideological sodality did not 
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actually subside within Europe during the nineteenth century, especially not at the level of the 
highest dynastic classes that handled geopolitics.287   
 Polanyi’s bifurcation between the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe makes the 
Concert of Europe seem like a separate secular organization that worked only in the second half 
of the century, while the religious Holy Alliance was at work in the first half of the century.  
Rather, in 1815, the Treaty of Vienna established two major innovations in European diplomacy 
that had not existed prior to the Napoleonic Wars.  One was the Congress system, in which the 
winning powers (and a restored France) would meet to resolve diplomatic issues.  The other was 
the Holy Alliance that was devised by Czar Alexander of Russia because “the course formerly 
adopted by the Powers in their mutual relations had to be fundamentally changed and that it was 
urgent to replace it with an order of things based on the exalted truths of the eternal religion of 
our Savior.”288  However, Russia was Greek Orthodox, Prussia was Protestant 
(Lutheran/Calvinist), and Austria was Catholic.  These confessional divisions provided little 
religious common ground upon which they could establish an international order.  Rather, by the 
time Metternich had revised the plan, preserving only lip-service to matters of faith, the three 
powers were dedicated primarily to preserving the domestic status quo in Europe.  Through the 
Holy Alliance these three powers (and just these three since Britain refused to be involved in the 
domestic issues of other states) intervened in concert to preempt liberal, democratic, or 
nationalist uprisings.  But this begs the question in relation to Polanyi’s analysis of the Holy 
Alliance as the protector of international peace: did radical democrats on the barricades have 
some interest in international war?  Were these not efforts to preserve the internal survival of 
regimes?  The insurrectionary violence of the early century was largely unrelated to potentials 
 
287 This second point will be addressed in the next section.   
288 Czar Alexander quoted in op. cit. Kissinger 1994 emphasis in original. 
112 
                                                           
for Great Power war, which was still left on the diplomatic table.  The only relation the Holy 
Alliance had to international peace was its provision of a normative bond between the rulers of 
these three states.  In other words, it was the common enemy of liberalism that distracted states 
away from war with each other, not their success in putting down the rebellions themselves.   
 The diplomatic mechanism established at Vienna was much more important, the Concert 
of Europe, which as Polanyi noted, lasted nearly up until the First World War.  This diplomatic 
system, which led to five major Congresses throughout the century,289 was initially secured by 
the Quadruple Alliance between Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia.  While Britain conceived 
of the balance-of-power in terms of how well the various nations performed the roles assigned to 
them in their overall hegemonic design, the other powers did not conceive of themselves as cogs 
in Britain’s wheel, but rather in terms of their own national interests, which happened to 
correspond with Britain’s model.  Austria and Prussia were concerned with each others’ potential 
influence in the German Confederation which had replaced the Holy Roman Empire.290  Each 
was also wary of Russia’s ambitions to their east.  The Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe 
were stabilized due to the inability of the others to gain an upper hand.  While I have argued 
above that the International Relations theory of balance-of-power is not always useful in 
explaining geopolitical phenomena, it is appropriate in this instance because the statesmen who 
 
289 The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) incorporated restored France into the Congress system.  The Congress 
of Troppau (1820) involved the decision to act in concert to quell a rebellion in Naples.  The Congress of Laibach 
(1821) concerned similar issues that were unresolved at Troppau.  The Congress of Verona (1822) allowed French 
intervention in Spain.  The Congress of Berlin (1878) revolved around the “Eastern Question” and the breakup of 
the declining Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, which Austria and Russia both hoped to claim for themselves;  op. cit. 
Kissinger 1993; op. cit. Schroeder 1994. 
290 In 1806, Emperor Francis II resigned his title to become Emperor Francis I of Austria according to Napoleon’s 
demands.  This led to the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine, which lasted from 1806 to 1815, at which 
point, the German Confederation was established and included 39 states represented in the Frankfurt Assembly; op. 
cit. Blackbourn 2003. 
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generated the Concert of Europe thought, themselves, in terms of balance-of-power and 
intentionally constructed an institutional framework to preserve it.  
 For some reason, however, Polanyi did not think the Congress system was effective.  He 
said,  
The Concert of Europe was essentially not a system of peace but merely of 
independent sovereignties protected by the mechanism of war…Take the 
economic system away and the peace interest would disappear from politics.  
Apart from it, there was neither sufficient cause for such an interest, nor a 
possibility of safeguarding it, insofar as it existed.291   
 
From a Realist International Relations perspective, however, Henry Kissinger described the 
Concert of Europe as a close approximation of a real government of Europe for fifty years 
following 1818.292  Polanyi’s suggestion actually implies a radically Hobbesian perspective in 
which states could not have possibly wanted to preserve peace themselves.  To be sure, the 
mechanism by which they preserved leverage was war, but this is the case with any binding 
international law, as in the United Nations today, which requires coercive enforcement.  Because 
of the Concert of Europe, powers did not allow Bismarck’s tinkering wars in Germany and 
France, nor Russia and Austria’s simultaneous incursions into the Balkans to upset the balance.  
These disputes were resolved by diplomacy, which became as rationalized and calculated as 
other realms of society during the nineteenth century.   
 Helmuth von Moltke, the pre-eminent general of the age began thinking in terms of 
“risk,” defined in terms of size, space, time and technology, for the first time just before the 
Wars of German Unification, which appeared to have been calculated precisely.  War was 
analyzed as a systemic process in which the application of planned pressure led to predictable 
 
291 op. cit. Polanyi, p. 18-19 
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results.293  When these military planners, monarchs, ministers, and diplomats met they could 
make decisions based on strategy, and calculations of potential success.  More often than not, 
states did not go to war with each other because they knew they could not win.  These 
calculations of caution increased throughout the century as planners could execute wars in their 
heads to see who would win, who would lose, and what might be the unintended consequences.  
For this reason, in the late century, crises like the Fashoda Incident of 1898 between France and 
Britain, and the two Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911 between France and Germany did not 
lead to wars, though they did lead to diplomatic tensions and escalated production of armaments.  
 All of this is to suggest that, while the influence of haute finance was certainly a factor in 
state’s assessments of risks, there simply does not need to be an invisible force that explains the 
Hundred Years Peace.  Geopolitics, diplomacy, and military risk assessment served quite 
legitimately as mechanisms through which peace was preserved.    
 Furthermore, if we focus on explaining the forty-three year peace from 1871-1914, we 
must acknowledge the vast amount of military attention dedicated toward regions outside of 
Europe.  While Europeans had been colonizing regions of the world since the fifteenth century, 
there were two reasons that this impulse was dramatically accelerated in the late nineteenth 
century.  First, the technology stemming from the Industrial Revolution provided the “tools of 
empire” that allowed significantly greater penetration into Asia, Africa, and the Americas.294 
Second, the resolution of domestic conflict through social control and political reform, coupled 
with the stalemate situation between the Great Powers led militant interests abroad.  Between 
1876 and 1915 about one-quarter of the globe was distributed as colonies among a half-dozen 
states, as can be seen in Figure 3.8 below.295 
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Figure 3.8 – Increase in Territory per State, 1876-1915a 
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 Source: Hobsbawm 1987, p. 59 
 
By 1900 Britain had one fifth of the world’s land surface, which rose to one quarter by 1909, 
containing 400 million people out of a total world population of 1,600 million.296  Enhanced 
communications, sanitation, and disease control helped the military requirements of this 
expansion, while the invention of machine guns and artillery eventually overwhelmed resistant 
groups.  Indeed, many colonial conflicts were often considered “war games” by military staffs in 
which new technologies could be experimented with and opportunities for promotion could be 
determined.297  As seen above in Figure 3.4, these actions were the majority of conflicts Western 
 
296 op. cit. Black 2009, p. 161 
297 op. cit. Mann, p. 436 
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powers engaged in, though they were usually grossly asymmetrical and quickly lost by states and 
peoples who dared to resist.298  
 Still, imperialism is not typically understood as having been stimulated by military 
ambitions.  Rather, the most common interpretation suggests that imperialism was primarily the 
outgrowth of economic pressures.  As discussed above, Lenin’s Imperialism as the Highest Stage 
of Capitalism, provided a widely accepted model of capitalist imperialism in Marxian, as well as 
non-Marxian circles.  The problematic functionalist assumptions behind the theory have been 
discussed in detail above, but it is worth outlining Lenin’s analysis again and comparing its 
economic considerations against other perspectives, including Polanyi’s.  Lenin’s theory of 
Imperialism can be summarized in three points.   
1. The capitalist economy cannot absorb its own production, or surplus, 
domestically and must therefore expand in search of markets and investment 
opportunities. 
 
2. Economic competition causes European nations to compete for overseas 
territories. 
 
3. This competition overseas leads to war at home as the Europeans run out of 
land left to carve up between themselves.  At its limits, further expansion 
comes at the expense of rival European states, which leads to violent conflict 
(i.e. World War I).299 
This economistic theory of imperialism has been criticized profusely since it was written in 
1917, but as Eric Hobsbawm noted,  
 
298 While the technological and logistic capabilities of the West were far superior to many states and peoples outside 
Europe, it is also worth noting that this was not an inevitable landslide either.  Throughout the period, Europeans 
lost ground as often as they gained, as in the cases of Britain in Afghanistan and Italy in Ethiopia.  As Jeremy Black 
noted, “Precisely because non-Western societies were not decrepit, primitive, undeveloped or weak, the Western 
success in conquering large areas was a formidable military achievement.” op. cit. Black 2009, p. 161 Europeans 
often secured their positions through allegiances with local groups, as in Buganda and the Punjab region, providing 
them with arms and access to their import/export markets.   This led to increased conflict between previously 
warring local groups, as the Europeans’ client groups became advantaged, then victorious, and then loyal; op. cit. 
Black 2009, pp. 151-171; op. cit. Black 1998, pp. 164-202. 
299 op. cit. Lenin 1917;  cf. R Aron, The Century of Total War, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1954, pp. 56-73 
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Non-Marxist analysts of imperialism have tended to argue the opposite of what 
the Marxists said…They tend to deny any specific connection between the 
imperialism of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries with capitalism in 
general, or with the particular phase of it which…appeared to emerge in the late 
nineteenth century.300  
Anti-anti-Imperialists, as Hobsbawm termed them, instead emphasize psychological, ideological, 
cultural and political explanations.  In critiquing the Leninist perspective, then, we should not 
over-emphasize non-economic issues to the exclusion of the obvious economic issues that were 
involved in imperialist expansion.301  What is at stake at this point, then, are these questions - 
what were the precise economic issues? And, what was their relation to imperialism as a causal 
mechanism?  To do this we need to break down each of the three points listed above, which are 
distinct propositions.   
 The first issue - that capital could not contain its surplus and needed to export it abroad to 
relieve the pressures of the contradictions of capitalism - was inspired by the socialist political 
agenda that would have capitalists redistribute their surplus wealth to the working class at home 
instead of exporting it abroad.302  However, others, including Lenin himself, acknowledged that 
the cheap colonial manufactures benefited the working class with a higher standard of living, 
which was frustrating since this distracted them from their class positions.  That Capital exported 
investments abroad is without doubt.  Figure 3.9 provides relative distributions of European 
capital investments overseas among the three leading imperialist powers, Britain, France and 
Germany, amounting to over $30,000,000,000 in foreign and colonial loans and investments as 
of 1914.303  
 
300 op. cit. Hobsbawm 1987, p. 61 
301 Although these ideological, cultural, psychological, and political issues will be paramount to our discussion in the 
next section.   
302 op. cit. Hobson 1902 
303 R Palmer and J Colton, A History of the Modern World, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965, p. 570 
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Figure 3.9 – Export of European Capital to 1914 
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However, the assumed link between capital export and imperialism is analytically weak.  The 
two occurred simultaneously, but were not entirely commensurate.  For example, between 1865 
and 1914 only a quarter of total British investment went to the British Empire, whereas 45 
percent went to other foreign economies.304   Only one tenth of French investments were in 
French colonies.305  While investment overseas did, indeed, provide substantially higher returns 
than domestic investments in government bonds and industrial stocks, investors still preferred 
“civilized” regions like the United States, Russia, or Latin America where there was less risk of 
default.  In any case, returns on investments overseas peaked around 1884, when they yielded 
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around two-thirds higher returns than domestic investments, falling two-fifths lower 
thereafter.306   
 The second proposition - that economic competition led to imperialist competition - is 
even harder to substantiate.  First of all, while protectionism did rise during this period, as will be 
discussed below, this did not amount to a wholesale ban on mutual cooperation between national 
capital markets.  Indeed, this is evidenced by the transnational, proto-globalized economy 
everyone acknowledges developed during the nineteenth century.  In 1913, over 20 percent of 
Germany’s imports came from the British Empire, which in turn absorbed over 18 percent of 
German exports.307  If we follow the logic that trade wars generate real wars, then Britain’s 
greatest enemy should have surely been the United States which was her outstanding economic 
rival.  Yet, since the War of 1812 over the forced conscription of American sailors into the 
British Navy, the U.S. and Britain has never been on the verge of going to war against each 
other.308  Considering Britain’s aggressive incursion into the Uruguayan and Argentine markets 
in the early twentieth century, which fell within the bounds of the Roosevelt Corollary of the 
Monroe Doctrine, the Anglo-US bond was all the more remarkable.  Furthermore, the greatest 
colonial rivalries of the era, the Anglo-Russian “Great Game” in Central Asia, and the Anglo-
French “Scramble for Africa” were between eventual allies in World War I.    
 This leads to the third proposition, though it most requires the first two to work.  The idea 
- that rivalry for colonies led to European conflict within Europe itself when the peripheralization 
of the world reached its limits - can be disproven on many counts.  Neither the First nor the 
Second World Wars originated directly from a conflict over colonies.  The immediate cause of 
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the First World War was the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria which triggered 
war between Austria and Serbia; which triggered Russia’s mobilization; which triggered 
Germany’s declaration of war against Russia and France; which led to Germany’s invasion of 
Belgium; which triggered Britain’s entry into the war.  All of these were stipulated consequences 
of diplomatic treaties designed (imperfectly) as defensive pacts to prevent war.  The colonies had 
nothing to do with it.  Several colonial crises such as those in Morocco between Germany and 
France were resolved diplomatically without a shot fired.  European powers did not feel that 
colonies were worth general military engagement.  To be sure, armaments were expanded for 
leverage at the diplomatic table, and wars might have occurred between rival Muslim armies 
trained and led by British and Russian officers in Central Asia, but these wars were always 
“localized” to use Polanyi’s term.   
 Reflecting the teleology of functionalist analyses, Lenin’s theory of imperialism takes the 
consequences of the First World War, namely that Germany and Austria were stripped of their 
colonial territories, and infers that this must have been the Europeans’ motivations.  Since these 
were not the expressed motivations of the participants on the eve of war, who pointed instead to 
a burgeoning German navy or the oppression of Slavic brethren, Lenin’s analysis requires an 
orthodox Marxist connotation of false-consciousness onto the protagonists.  As Raymond Aron 
has pointed out, it is difficult to see how this can be proved or disproved.  In fact, one can just as 
easily find evidence that economic interests were propounded as false legitimation of 
unprofitable territorial acquisition which could have been the ultimate goal of imperialists.  As 
Aron put it,  
It is a fact that in each epoch conquerors have found different formulas for 
masking the will to power, which appears to be one of the unchanging features of 
European communities.  It is certain that, once a territory has been acquired, 
enterprising individuals and companies seek to exploit the protected areas.  While 
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this exploitation is not the primary purpose of the governments, they conceive it 
as one of the advantages of conquest.  More than that, at a time when thinking 
everywhere is dominated by economic considerations, the so-called colonialists 
can increase the popularity of their cause by using these considerations to justify 
it. The public might turn away from them or rebel if they spoke of glory or 
national greatness.309  
 
While the merits of this argument are, perhaps, unsustainable in light of the popularity of 
nationalist sentiments during this period, Aron’s argument does demonstrate the ease with which 
expressed motivations, whether economic or political, can be attributed as either true or false 
depending on the agenda of the analyst.   
 Even if we reserve that the incentive of overseas investment and unexplored markets had 
some impact, as they surely did, it appears that the overwhelming economic influence directing 
imperialism ran in the opposite direction.  That is, rather than being stimulated by the need to 
export capital or find markets, territories were needed to extract resources for importation.  New 
industrial manufactures and consumer products in the late century required raw materials such as 
rubber, petroleum, tin, coconuts, tea, coffee, and a wealth of other products that only tropical 
regions could provide.310  Furthermore, because these goods required advanced industrial 
processes to be extracted, Europeans could no longer resign themselves to maintaining isolated 
trading outposts on coasts where pre-industrial natives brought their harvested vegetable 
products and human traffic (in the form of slaves).  They needed to establish direct rule to secure 
heavy capital investments in mines, plantations, docks, warehouses, factories, refineries, 
railroads, river steamships, banks, etc.311  In many cases, these capital investments had be 
encouraged where they were not forthcoming by investors, as in the Italian government’s 
 
309 op. cit. Aron, p. 61 
310 op. cit. Palmer and Colton, p. 618.  
311 ibid. p. 616; Once the Europeans arrived, of course, they also need offices, homes, hotels, clubs, and cool 
mountain resorts to make their stay in the tropics comfortable.   One such refuge was the town of Simla in India, 
perched over 7,000 feet, which became a sort of unofficial seat of the British government for seven months out of 
the year; op. cit. Ferguson 2000, p. 182 
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granting of discount privileges to the Bank of Rome on the precondition that they would invest in 
colonial projects in Tripoli.312  The colonial focus on raw materials turned many regions into 
monocultural exporters, determined according to the worldwide division of labor.  So Malaya 
provided rubber and tin, Brazil coffee, Chile nitrates, Uruguay meat, Cuba sugar and cigars.313  
This dependency is in line with Immanuel Wallerstein’s identification of the core-periphery 
dynamic, evident as far back as the sixteenth century, when “the trend in the core was toward 
variety and specialization while the trend in the periphery was toward monoculture.”314  
 Europe’s need for these resources did not, in and of itself, cause the dash to seize 
territory.  As the post-colonial era demonstrates, these resources can be obtained without direct 
colonial rule (though, to be sure, dependency relations still persist).  Rather, it was the 
protectionism that rose during the late nineteenth century that necessitated access to as much 
territory as possible.  Neo-protectionism, promoted by new economic theories such as the 
“National System” of Frederich List that emphasized high tariffs and managed economies meant 
that, colonial exportation to rival economies became limited, while colonial host nations could 
reserve access to their material imports.  The only way a state economy could secure the 
necessary range of raw materials needed for industrial production was by directly claiming the 
territory within which the materials rested.   
This protectionism was, in fact, what Polanyi considered the leading economic cause of 
imperialism.  Also, high tariffs and state interference in the economy were introduced late in the 
century along with the seemingly contradictory institution of the international gold standard.  
Polanyi wrote,  
 
312 op. cit. Aron, p. 60 
313 op. cit. Hobsbawm 1987, p. 64; Even white settler colonies, other than the United States, failed to industrialize in 
this period because they were reliant on the needs of the core European markets.  
314 op. cit. Wallerstein 1974, p. 102 
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The coming of the gold standard itself hastened the spreading of protectionist 
institutions, which were the more welcome the more burdensome fixed exchanges 
proved.  From this time onward tariffs, factory laws, and an active colonial policy 
were prerequisites of a stable external currency…Only when these prerequisites 
were given could now the methods of market economy be safely introduced.  
Where such methods were forced upon a helpless people in absence of protective 
measures, as in exotic and semicolonial regions, unspeakable suffering ensued.  
Herein we hold the key to the seeming paradox of imperialism – the economically 
inexplicable and therefore allegedly irrational refusal of countries to trade with 
one another indiscriminately, and the aiming instead at the acquisition of overseas 
and exotic markets.  What made countries act in this manner was simply the fear 
of consequences similar to those which the powerless peoples were unable to 
avert.315 
 
Polanyi’s insights into the effects of the introduction of the international gold standard are worth 
considering, especially since contradictory protectionist mechanisms were instituted 
simultaneously.316  Polanyi indicated at least three significant consequences:  
1. The traditionally separate spheres of the economic and political classes were 
merged due to protectionism, so that politicians involved themselves in 
economic matters, while capital became intricately entwined with political 
events. 
 
2. This incestuous union led to higher concentrations of capital and monopolies 
due to protectionist cartel arrangements.  Individual firms and politicians held 
more power in this configuration. 
 
3. The strains produced in the economic realm due to normal currency 
fluctuations caused political upheavals and led to rigid international relations, 
including alliances between military and trading blocs.  
 
These consequences all seem to have been plausible effects of the international gold standard and 
protectionism.317  The era was certainly characterized by an increase in consolidation of firms 
into large monopolistic entities that were necessary for both market protection as well as 
 
315 op. cit. Polanyi, p. 223-224 
316 Although Polanyi’s assertion that Europeans somehow felt insecure - that they might become like the powerless 
peoples they dominated - seems specious considering European chauvinism and racialist attitudes.  These ideologies 
will be discussed below. 
317 Although one of the understandings built within the gold standard was the ability for states to suspend the 
standard in the exceptional case of war; op. cit. Ferguson, p. 333 
124 
                                                           
industrial economies of scale.318  However, whether this was the cause or the effect of the 
incestuous relationship between politicians and industrial capitalists seems more difficult to 
gauge.   
Polanyi’s analysis suggests that independent capitalists, who had extricated themselves 
from the bonds of society, then reembedded themselves into the state through institutional 
mechanisms that linked the fate of markets and states together.  However, the ideal of the 
disembedded capitalist existed only in economic theory.319  Adam Smith wrote the Wealth of 
Nations because trade was not free in 1776.  During the course of the nineteenth century, 
particularly in Britain, the theory of laissez-faire and open-markets promised, and, to an extent, 
delivered greater wealth for individuals and the national state.  Yet, this was allowed to occur 
because the state could see benefit from releasing the energies of individuals engaging in self-
interested market behavior.  If we assume Tilly’s definition of the state as a warmaking 
institution, would it not be the economy that was allowed to prosper because it provided the 
means through which a more advanced military could develop?  In turn, the greater security 
afforded by this advanced military and/or navy would have been the only way the economy was 
allowed to prosper as it did.   
This dynamic between capital and coercion proceeded according to a feedback loop in 
which economy and military developed to each others’ benefit until reaching a fevered pitch 
immediately before World War I.  However, there is no reason to give primacy to the economic 
in this analysis.  Rather, the warmaking state and its military might be considered the agent that 
 
318 see A Chandler, Scale and Scope : The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 
1990 for detailed historical analysis of big industrial development in Britain, Germany, and the United States from 
the 1870s to the 1930s.  
319 There were, perhaps, a few golden years mid-century where a number of the entrepreurial species could be 
spotted in Britain and the United States.  See C W Mills, White Collar : The American Middle Classes, Oxford 
University Press, New York, N.Y., 2002, pp. 3-12 
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made this dialectic come about.  More precisely, the state may have been the agent that allowed 
this dialectic to develop. 
But, there is also no need to assert the primacy of either, for they both existed together, 
and neither would have existed without the other.  The particular economic configuration of 
nineteenth century capitalism certainly impacted the course of military developments in the 
period - by stimulating industrial innovation and providing the monetized resources that allowed 
effective extraction.  At the same time, states’ willingness to expand their territories militarily in 
pursuit of raw materials and markets, whether ahead of, or for capitalist interests, allowed 
particular conditions to exist for the economic market and manufacturing sector.   
 Thus, as Michael Mann, Charles Tilly, Anthony Giddens and other sociologists have 
argued before me, we must submit that economic activity does not solely, or primarily, provide 
the constitution of modern society.  We must include militaries, wars, and violence within the 
historical logic of modernity.  
 But even this addition of military power, while significant, cannot explain the totality of 
modern society; for the economic and military relations that exist do so within a broader frame of 
cultural and ideological landscapes.  In the case of the nineteenth century, both war and 
economics were significantly impacted by, while impacting upon, the symbolic universe of 
European society.  
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4. Culture, Ideology, and War in the Nineteenth Century 
 
 Using Polanyi’s analysis of the Hundred Years’ Peace as a foil, I have pointed to a 
number of indicators to suggest, not only that war has been an important feature of modern 
European civilization, but that it cannot be reduced to solely economic variables.  Though 
Polanyi did effectively argue that transnational capitalism and protectionist tariff policies had a 
novel effect on decisions of war and peace between 1815 and 1914, these do not prove to have 
been the only variables at work.  To summarize some of the findings that have led to this 
conclusion:  
• The Hundred Years’ Peace was not actually peaceful.  States were 
involved in nearly constant preparation for and execution of war.   
 
• Economics as a cause of war declined.  Commerce issues were less of an 
issue stimulating war between European powers.  More often, political 
and ideological factors, like maintaining the integrity of an empire or 
relieving ethnic confreres, were the interests involved with war. 
 
• Industrialism stimulated military development and vice-versa.  
Technological innovations in weaponry and communications accelerated 
throughout the century. 
 
• Armies, navies, and armaments levels increased in scale. 
 
• Wars should not be equated with duration in this period, because many 
were shortened due to the influence of technology, mobilization scales, 
and diplomatic concessions. 
 
• The three major periods (1815-1848, 1848-1871, and 1871-1914) saw 
distinct developments in war, emphasizing domestic, international, and 
colonial war respectively.  Each of these periods contained non-economic, 
as well as, economic explanations for peace.  Especially important was 
the Concert of Europe political system which should not be underrated. 
 
• During the forty-three year peace from 1871-1914, imperialism occupied 
the attention of states and militaries. 
 
• The dialectic between capital and coercion did not allow one (capital or 
coercion) to exist without the other in the modern international state 
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system due to the survivability probability of states that failed to 
modernize in both.  
While critical attention was directed toward Polanyi’s thesis, the economically deterministic 
theories - Marxist, Liberal, and Realist - have come up, implicitly or explicitly, above.  Figure 
3.1 above summarized the assumptions and problems within the three theories.  Figure 4.1 below 
summarizes the pros and cons of these approaches in relation to the Polanyi’s thesis.  
 Yet, as noted in Figure 3.1, all of these theories, while not focusing on ideological 
factors, do allow the possibility for cultural influence.  Marx, for example, suggested that class 
consciousness could be consitituting.  In the Liberal framework, the idea that the rational 
individual is constructed by civilization demonstrates that culturation and socialization can 
generate positive or negative qualities. Realists, who identify a will to power inherent in 
international action, should acknowledge that these power interests are not universally held since 
elites may not act according to raison d’etat.  In this case, the particular personality and 
psychology of elites can tell us why certain aggressive or defensive behaviors occur.  Polanyi’s 
position was closest to the Liberal/Marxian perspective here, since he considered modern market 
society as an unnatural social arrangement that emphasizes certain characteristics.  He wrote,  
Nineteenth-century civilization alone was economic in a …distinctive sense, for it 
chose to base itself on a motive only rarely acknowledged as valid in the history 
of human societies, and certainly never before raised to the level of a justification 
of action and behavior in everyday life, namely, gain.320     
 
 Nonetheless, the economic determinism of the theories tends toward system-level causal 
explanations.  Even the critiques of these perspectives, such as those of Giddens, Mann, and 
Tilly, as well as my own thus far, incorporate military as another structural factor in the 
constitution of society.  Modern society is conceived of as a particular set of institutions through  
 
320 op. cit. Polanyi, p. 31 
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Figure 4.1 – Merits and Weaknesses of Theories in Relation to Nineteenth Century War 
 
 
Theory 
 
 
Pro 
 
Con 
 
Nineteenth Century 
Examples 
 
 
 
 
 
Marxist 
 
Repressive force of 
the state may 
reproduce economic 
relations or deal with 
economic needs. 
 
 
Cannot explain non-
economic military 
compulsions. 
 
Pro: Need for 
resources stimulated 
imperialism. 
 
Con: World War I 
was not directly 
caused by economic 
competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Realist 
 
Balance-of-Power 
institutions can 
establish peace. 
 
 
Cannot explain war 
and peace except 
through systemic 
forces and the rational 
action of elite agents. 
 
 
Pro: The Concert of 
Europe had an effect 
in maintaining relative 
peace. 
 
Con: Does not 
account for the 
internal evolution of 
state societies caused 
by capitalism, 
industrialism, and 
democracy. 
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Figure 4.1 – continued 
 
 
Theory 
 
 
Pro 
 
Con 
 
Nineteenth Century 
Examples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
 
Economic integration 
can lead to peace 
between powers. 
 
 
Does not explain war 
and violence against 
peripheries, or 
hegemonic cycles.  
Nor does it account 
for military alliances 
between trading blocs. 
 
 
Pro: Transnational 
markets established 
grounds that 
cautioned against war 
in the late nineteenth 
century. 
 
Con: Does not predict 
imperialism, localized 
wars between powers, 
arms build-up, or 
Great Power Wars. 
i.e. all of the wars and 
warmaking in the 
period. 
 
 
 
Communitarian 
(Polanyi) 
 
Balance-of-power and 
International Gold 
Standard worked 
together to establish 
peace, however 
precariously. 
 
 
- Cannot explain non-
economic war and 
peace.   
- Gives primacy to the 
systemic institutional 
level. 
- Does not explain 
why the wars that 
happened happened. 
 
 
Pro: Identifies a 
particular relationship 
between economy and 
politics in the 
nineteenth that led to 
both sustained peace 
and failure in war. 
 
Cons: see bulleted list 
above. (p. 125) 
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which social action is channeled.  The primary structuring of these institutions can be either 
economic, or political-economic, or as a military-industrial-complex in these views.  While most 
of the scholars I have mentioned would not suggest that ideology is irrelevant, most seem 
reluctant to incorporate culture and ideology as a causal mechanism into their structural models 
and analyses.  For example, though ideology is the “I.” in Michael Mann’s I.E.M.P model, and is 
carefully distinguished as either “immanent morale” or as “sociospatially transcendent,” in 
Mann’s epic historical study of the period immediately preceding World War I (1760-1914), he 
wrote “that ideological power declined somewhat in significance during the period,” providing 
justification for relative minimization of ideology compared to economic, political, and military 
phenomena.321  This decline may have been the case in terms of the Christian ecumene, but other 
ideologies arose during the period, for example, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, Nationalism, 
Darwinism and, indeed, every doctrine and movement that emerged during “The Advent of the 
‘Isms’” as R.R. Palmer described the period between 1815 and 1848.322  As Palmer described 
them,  
An ‘ism’ (excluding such words as ‘hypnotism’ or ‘favoritism’) may be defined 
as the conscious espousal of a doctrine in competition with other doctrines.  
Without the ‘isms’ created in the thirty-odd years after the Peace of Vienna it is 
impossible to understand or even talk about the history of the world since that 
event.323 
  
 
321 op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 35  Mann did acknowledge the tremendous import of ideology in two regards especially: 
in relation to a transnational literary culture, and in relation to class identities.  Furthermore, Mann has 
acknowledged that ideological analysis might have been lacking in Sources of Social Power, vol. II, and, to be fair, 
its inclusion would have made 800 pg. tome even longer. see op. cit. Hall and Schroeder 2006. 
322 op. cit. Palmer and Colton. Pp. 430-443 
323 ibid. p. 431 
131 
                                                           
 
Some of the “isms” that emerged during this period included: 
 
1819 - Liberalism 
1832 - Socialism 
1835 - Conservativism 
1830s - Individualism, Constitutionalism, Humanitarianism, and Monarchism 
1840s - Nationalism and Communism 
 1850 – Capitalism 
 
Most of these doctrines are still with us today, and though many of these ideas existed prior to 
their naming, the appearance of so many ‘isms’ showed that people were making their ideas 
more systematic.  To a certain extent, this is an advantage to the analyst who can categorize ideas 
according to the professed boundaries established between two or more opposed ideologies – for 
example between Constitutionalism and Monarchism.  On the other hand, this limits the ability 
to distinguish ambiguity that was actually felt by individuals and groups that rarely assumed pure 
ideological orthodoxy.   
 For the purposes of this historical project, a more useful conception comes from Lewis 
Mumford’s term “idolum.”324  Mumford defined an idolum as being similar to Walter 
Lippmann’s expression, “pseudo-environment,” and wrote, 
By idolum I do not mean either an idea or an idol : neither a concept nor a fetich 
(sic) nor an ideology.  By idolum I indicate the existence of an ideological ‘field,’ 
which unites and polarizes, as it were, a number of related images, symbols, ideas, 
and even artifacts.  Idolum is close to the German term Weltbild when taken in its 
literal sense: a picture of the world, that is, the world experienced in and through a 
culture, that people carry in their minds.  I prefer it to the term pseudo-
environment, because as such an idolum is neither fictitious nor false: it is simply 
the dominant mental environment of a particular culture, containing both 
permanently verifiable experiences and temporarily acceptable illusions.325 
 
 
324 L Mumford, The Condition of Man, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1973.  D Miller, Lewis Mumford, a 
Life, Grove Press, New York, 2002. Mumford’s term, “idolum,” never quite caught on in general academia, or, 
indeed, within Mumford’s later work. 
325  op. cit. Mumford 1973, p. 424 
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There are a number of exceedingly useful elements in this term as defined above.  On the one 
hand, the recognition of an ideological “field,” similar to an electro-magnetic field, allows the 
possibility that ideologies can be unifying and polarizing.  The idolum therefore is the totality of 
cultural outlooks, which is experienced as given to individual participants.326  The idolum is 
generated and transformed by the ideas and feelings of social actors, but it is also limited by the 
available ideas accessible at any given time.  The idolum can be conceived of as moving along a 
historical time axis, similar to Hegel’s World Spirit (Weltgeist), though an idolum is not 
necessarily dialectical, or wholly determining.327  
 In the context of an idolum, the “isms” that align themselves against one another as 
discreet ideologies are coherent and recognizable.  However, within individual or group 
consciousness, these ideologies cannot exist so purely.  So an individual may be mostly 
“Conservative,” but have some “Liberal” inclinations, while also being “Nationalist” and/or 
“Capitalist” in varying degrees.  Unlike economic structures and ideologies that can be 
analytically conceived of as discreet entities at the macro-sociological level, individual actors 
may contain several forms of consciousness that could be considered logically contradictory.  
This does not mean that they are false consciousness, in the orthodox Marxist sense, since this is 
the actual consciousness of actors.   Rather a more complicated notion of the human self may 
contain double consciousness, psychologically repressed rationalizations, or “misrecognition” of 
power relations.328  Micro-sociologists from George Herbert Mead to Erving Goffman to Harold 
 
326 However, this does not mean that the idolum is given in the way Althusser might suggest ideology is received by 
subjects from the outside via an Ideological State Apparatus.  In other words, an idolum is not the ideology of the 
ruling class exclusively.  L Ferretter, Louis Althusser, Routledge, London ; New York, 2006, p. 75.  K Marx, 'The 
German Ideology', <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01c.htm>, accessed 11-
25-09 2009. 
327 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of History, Cosimo, New York, 2007. 
328 Double consciousness is associated with W.E.B. Dubois’ idea regarding a black man’s ability to contain two 
identities at all times.  This could be extended to indicate that individuals may have several “selfs” at work at 
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Garfinkle have demonstrated the manner in which the social self is constructed through social 
interaction, making a single “self” difficult to place.329  At the same time, micro-social 
interactions constitute social structure at large.   
 The importance of the above discussion is relevant to our study of war for two reasons.  
First, identification of double, or multiple consciousness in individual actors establishes the 
micro-foundations upon which the overall social theoretical examinations are based.  An analysis 
of large scale structures, such as the modern capital economy, or European ideologies, require 
actors to enact and reproduce these structures.  These actors cannot be reduced to the atomized 
level of their human bodies.  Below even the individual level, the workings of human 
psychology complicate behavioral and structural analysis that might equate social roles with 
particular interests and behaviors, as in models that highlight the rational utility maximizing 
human.  Second, the attention paid toward the idolum moving through time provides a general 
framework through which these social actors have to interact.  For example, there is no way that 
the economic mode of production can stimulate war or peace without stimulating that action in 
actors, who exist within the context of an idolum.  Prevailing ideologies at a given moment may 
further reinforce, or contradict the rational calculations of statesmen.  The mechanism through 
which these two levels work is best captured by Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of Habitus.330  
Habitus results from socialization experiences in which external structures are internalized, 
various times.  W E B  Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk Bantam classic edn., Bantam Books, New York, 1989.  see 
C Calhoun, Critical Social Theory : Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference, Blackwell, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1995.pp. 70-97.  The role of psychology, in terms of socialization and psychic repression will be dealt with 
below.  see S Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents Rev. edn., Hogarth Press : Institute of Psycho-analysis, 
London, 1963.  “Misrecognition” is an important concept in the sociology of Pierre Bourdeiu, and is similar to “false 
consciousness” but involves a more active denial of economic and political interests.  see D Swartz, Culture & 
Power : The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997, p. 89. 
329 E Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Allen Lane, London, 1969; G H Mead,On Social 
Psychology; Selected Papers, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964; Mead’s take on war was described in M 
Deegan, Self, War, & Society : George Herbert Mead's Macrosociology, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 
N.J., 2008. 
330 P Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New York, 1977. 
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generating a “system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, 
functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions,” as Bourdieu 
described it.331  The psychic process of enculturation via familial rearing, class-based social 
interaction, education, and religious upbringing impact the individual with cultural norms that 
are “structuring structures.”  Though at the individual level this externalization is highly 
personalized, at the aggregate level, recognizable patterns can be discerned within the idolum.  
As these patterns change, the reproduction of ideological structures changes as well, according to 
generational processions, discursive favor, and asynchronic social rhythms.332   
 With this in mind, we can return to our discussion of nineteenth century Europe to see 
that there were several idolum evolutions from 1815-1914, the period of Polanyi’s Hundred 
Years’ Peace.  These changes were not as pivotal and segmented as Michel Foucault would 
suggest in his concept of “historical a priori,”333 since new ideologies do not always amount to a 
rejection of previous beliefs, but rather contain legacies and shifting emphases of concepts and 
ideas.  However, cultural concepts and ideological fields do have the potential to change much 
more rapidly than social structures such as the economy or national state, precisely because of 
their discursive, mutable character.  Thus, in the period of the nineteenth century in Europe we 
can identify a number of shifting ideas and concepts that make the early period remarkably 
dissimilar from the end of the period immediately before World War I.  While it is more or less 
impossible to identify one, single European culture during the nineteenth century, there are 
distinctive trends within the overall idolum that should be considered within the context of war 
 
331 op. cit. Swartz, p. 100. 
332 The movement of generations through time as a sociological phenomenon is described in K Mannheim, Ideology 
and Utopia : An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego, 1985.  This 
movement creates what Ernst Bloch called, asynchronicity, in which different paces and rhythms between different 
social systems develop and exist simultaneously.  E Bloch, Heritage of Our Times, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1991. 
333 M Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, Routledge, London ; New York, 2002. 
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and peace.  The purpose of this examination is to identify contexts in which the causal 
considerations discussed above took place.  While it might be difficult to attribute primary 
importance to general ideas such as nationalism, militarism, scientism, etc., these ideologies did 
impact decisions and should be discussed in terms of their influence as qualitative variables.  
 Just as Polanyi identified three periods of war in the nineteenth century – the Holy 
Alliance (1815-1848), the confused middle period (1848-1871), and the forty-three year peace 
(1871-1914), one can identify different idolums beginning with the post-Revolutionary period, in 
which democracy, proto-nationalism, and free speech liberalism were among the important 
issues of the day, remnants of the eighteenth century Enlightenment ideals.  By mid-century, 
entrepreneurial capitalism, and the beginnings of a consumer society were laying the ground for 
the late century “Victorian” culture which is, today, often associated with the century as a whole.  
Men in black top hats and coats, women in painful corsets holding umbrellas; these are 
impressions that arise when we recall Europeans in the 1800s.  However, even this culture was 
not monolithic.  For example, the “Victorian” attribution refers to British industrial/capitalist 
society; all the while Paris was considered the pinnacle of culture throughout the century.  
German-speaking cities like Berlin, Frankfurt, and Vienna witnessed the emergence of Wagner’s 
operas and Romanticism, while similar centers of culture developed in New York City, St. 
Petersburg, Milan, and Geneva.  While each cultural capital was unique and distinct, homology 
developed as these cultural centers became ever more unified due to the increase in discursive 
communication that emerged during this period, which, in turn, led to similarities of concerns in 
the realm of political ideas and cosmopolitan interests.  The emergence of this discursive space 
within entirely novel institutions like the modern research university or widely-circulated 
periodicals, led not just to a communion of culture, but also to a fragmentation of political 
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ideologies as competition within the market of ideas encouraged the calcification and 
rigidification of perspectives.334 
 Before returning to the relevance of this European culture to the study of war and society, 
I request a suspension of our cultural context in the twenty-first century.  There are many 
perspectives that Europeans in the nineteenth century held that may seem “irrational” to us 
today.  For example, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that democracy, as a concept, 
became a foregone political assumption that all states must nominal pay lip service to.  Thus, 
when the Holy Alliance policed the internal politics of Central Europe repressing democratic 
uprisings, we should recall that, in many regions such as the Rhineland, the majority of the 
population was counter-revolutionary and would have overwhelmingly supported the forces of 
Reaction.335  Similarly, we must remember that many scientific and philosophical ideas we take 
for granted did not exist prior to the twentieth century.  For example, imagine a world before the 
psychology of Sigmund Freud and William James indicated that there was such a thing as the 
“unconscious.”336  In this world, one’s thoughts were one’s own; under control; capable of 
discerning the objective reality of Nature in a way humans could have hardly dreamed of a 
century before.  In this light, the Positivism of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer are not 
“irrational” or “chauvinist” but rather, immanently logical from within the nineteenth century.337  
Thus, we must not hold a twenty-first century notion of Racism in our minds as something that is 
not logical - for what is offensive today was not perceived as such in 1853 when Arthur de 
 
334 W Clark, Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
2006; J Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1989. 
335 op. cit. Blanning; op. cit. Rowe; J Sperber, Rhineland Radicals : The Democratic Movement and the Revolution 
of 1848-1849, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1991.    
336 H S. Hughes, Consciousness and Society; the Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930 [1st edn., 
Knopf, New York,, 1958. 
337 That is until, of course, Comte’s turn toward megalomaniacal ambition as the pope of a “religion of humanity” in 
1849, which even close associates like John Stuart Mill and Harriet Martineau could not abide.  
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Gobineau published his “Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races.”338  Like phrenology (the 
scientific study of skulls), the scientific study of biological difference between races became an 
accepted method of grasping natural truth via scientific principles.  Though, as will be discussed 
below, this practice can be considered an “alibi” for ideologies (and psychologies) which 
benefitted from such an interpretation,339 here we should acknowledge that for the actors 
themselves, they were not oppressing indigenous peoples across the world – they were helping 
them by bringing Christian civilization.  They were not suppressing democratic and socialist 
movements – they were assuming paternal responsibility for the wretched of the earth.  Without 
engaging in extreme cultural relativism, we should recall that many similarly “offensive” and 
“irrational” perspectives enjoy broad support today, are tolerated within our public sphere, and 
are, therefore, constitutive elements of our present idolum.340  This is important because, as in 
any era, many individuals in the nineteenth century were not necessarily representative of the 
ideologies we most identify with today.  Radical Jacobin democrats, or abolitionists, or 
transcendentalists were merely a percentage of the population.  Rather individuals, such as the 
statesmen we are interested in understanding, may have been Monarchists, racists, Social 
Darwinists, militarist, or other “offensive” attributes by current standards, and would have still 
 
338 Gobineau did have some critics, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, who could see the underlying ethnic superiority 
in Gobineau’s description of the Aryan race.  Like racial studies as a whole, Gobineau’s scholarship was not 
unchallenged throughout the century.  It was, however, tolerated, and legitimated as a scientific discourse in a way it 
would not be today. 
339 op. cit. Gay  
340 At the time of this writing, the Tea-Party movement is dominating the American political psyche.  While some 
elements exhibit more racist sentiments than others, a simple example of “illogic” can be seen in the “Oath 
Keepers,” a group of military and police personnel who vow to uphold the constitution should they be ordered to 
violate it.   While they claim to be protecting the 10th Amendment which states that powers not expressly granted by 
the Federal Government remains in the states, Article 3 of the constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to 
determine whether a law oversteps the powers designated by the Federal Government.  In short, the Oath Keepers 
are protecting the sacred constitution by giving themselves powers to interpret the constitution the Founders had no 
intention of granting local law enforcement.  This is just one of many examples of contradictory positions (in terms 
of logic) held by the libertarian Right in the United States, while as many contradictions can be seen within the 
ideologies of the Left, such as progressives who would like to keep jobs in the United States (achieved through 
tariffs) while simultaneously demanding support for Third World economies who suffer from high tariffs on exports.        
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been acceptable to broad segments of their constituent populations (which were themselves often 
limited to varying elite segments of the population).   
 An underlying assumption behind much of the literature reviewed above implies a 
distinction between politics and economics.  Polanyi, for example, described the countervailing 
force of transnational capital in terms of the cautionary influence of ‘business’ upon the 
warmaking ‘state’.  While, in analytic terms, distinguishing between the economic sphere and the 
political and geopolitical spheres can be helpful, from a cultural sociological perspective 
attentive to the micro-foundations described above, we must determine how much a distinction 
can be made, in terms of the individuals who occupied roles within those spheres.  As C. Wright 
Mills’ Power Elite demonstrated in the case of mid-twentieth century American society, 
identifiable members of certain classes occupy roles of power that allow them to “make history.”  
These elites might be the owners of large capital firms, diplomats and bureaucrats in state 
service, and, in nineteenth century Europe, high ranking clergy.  In order to understand their 
motivations and the ideological content of their characters we must identify who occupied these 
positions and what sorts of ideas typically stimulated their actions and behavior.   
 The nineteenth century is typically regarded as the century in which the bourgeoisie rose 
to power in Western European society.  In this reading, the expanding role of business replaced 
the role of the church and aristocracy, making way for modern processes of rationalization and 
commodification.  However, in the realm of the military, this class transformation was not 
evident.  Though we have seen above that conscription expanded the Military Participation Ratio 
within Great Power armies,341 and the need for technical skills allowed a certain amount of 
 
341 Stanislaw Andreski developed the concept of the Military Participation Ratio (MPR) which demonstrated that as 
the percentage of the population involved in the armed services increased, a leveling in class inequality took place.  
Stratification might increase as the ranking of military offices expands.  However, the difference between the top 
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meritocracy to enter the nepotistic military hierarchy, war was still left, by and large, to the old 
regime. The vast majority of high-ranking officers were drawn from landed nobility and gentry, 
especially in the General Staffs, which represented a sharp contrast to the democratizing societies 
at large.  For example, in the French army of 1870, 39 percent of division generals were of noble 
origin, with similar proportions persistent even in democratic countries such as Great Britain and 
the United States.342 The same holds true of diplomats, as Michael Mann pointed out: “Foreign 
policy remained the private domain of a small group of notables, plus special interest groups 
advising the few politicians who aspired to be ‘statesmen’.”343 Routine foreign policy was 
handled by a small ruling elite, even in parliamentary countries like Britain, France, and the 
United States, as, indeed, it still is today. Only in crises and wars were outside parties consulted.  
 In the case of diplomacy, the use-value of aristocrats in the foreign service was 
rationalized according to the skills, such as foreign language, that were engendered in elite 
schools.  In the military, however, the expansion of technocratic meritocracy should have led to 
democratization of the higher ranks of officers, though this was not the case.  In the French army, 
for example, 14 percent of division generals had come from the ranks in 1870, while less than 3 
percent in 1901.344  From the Napoleonic era forward, the aristocracy in Europe made the 
military its home and bastion, filling elite positions in the most nepotistic manners.  In turn, the 
military took on a character increasingly distinct from broader society.  By conscripting hundreds 
of thousands of men into the ranks, the aristocratic military caste was able to enculturate a large 
segment of the population loyal to the specific codes of honor and status found within military 
and bottom in terms of social power (e.g. economic inequality) shrank via a middling force; S Andreski, Military 
Organization and Society 2nd edn., Routledge & K. Paul, London,, 1968. 
342 op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 431.  The United States, of course, had no dynastic aristocracy, but even after the Civil 
War, army officers were drawn from “old-family, anglo-saxon, Protestant, rural, upper-middle-class,” as Morris 
Janowitz noted. 
343 Mann, p. 416. 
344 ibid. p. 430  
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establishments.345   While consisting of perhaps no more than 5 percent of the population, the 
aristocratic class was able to maintain a large and powerful influence within politics and society 
through the preservation of its separate military sphere.   
 In certain countries, such as Prussia and Austria, the state (the Hohenzollern or Habsburg 
monarchies) and the aristocracy maintained similar allegiances in relation to the military, which 
was preeminent.  In other nations, such as Third Republic France, the isolated caste of the 
military could become a highly controversial subject, as in the Boulanger Crisis of 1889 and the 
Dreyfus Affair of the 1890s and 1900s.  In these cases, Michael Mann’s distinction between 
military and political power is most evident.  The military existed as a power-wielding entity that 
was, in many ways, autonomous and could be arranged in a variety of configurations with the 
political state at large.346  Since large states could not do without militaries in this period, and 
these militaries had a distinctly aristocratic character, this “militarist” character could be found in 
varying degrees in most states.347  Eventually the term “militarist” became synonymous with 
“aristocratic” and, in a pejorative sense, “feudal,” though it is important to note that this negative 
connotation developed largely after World War I.348    
  Prussia is typically considered the most militarist state during the period.  Indeed, the 
state of Prussia would likely not have risen to her position within the Holy Roman Empire and 
 
345 op. cit. Frevert  
346 The civil-military configuration was of great importance to Frederick Engels, who had served as an artilleryman 
in the Prussian Army, and was abreast of the important advances in military science.  In his essay, “The Armies of 
Europe” Engels analyzed every major European army, how it was organized and how it was related to political 
authority.  F Engels, 'The Armies of Europe', <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1855/armies-
europe/index.htm>, accessed 11-29-09 2009.  See also, F Engels, 'The Prussian Military Question and the German 
Workers' Party.', <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/02/12.htm>, accessed 11-23-09 2009. 
347 The possible exception to this would be the United States, whose federal military was not substantially influential 
before or after the Civil War.  However, the United States did engage in probably the most violent of all the military 
actions of the century – the genocide of the Native Americans during the course of its westward expansion.  
348 While sociologists like Spencer and Engels might have wailed against the “militarism” of nineteenth century 
European society, one must also acknowledge the considerable popularity of military parades among the ‘non-
intellectual’ masses.  As will be discussed below, it was not necessarily unpopular to be “militarist.” 
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German Confederation had they not possessed an unusually large army during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century.349  However, following the Battles of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806, 
Prussia was nearly brought to her knees by Napoleon and only survived by placating and 
submitting to the French emperor’s treaty terms and ongoing diplomatic requirements.  
Following the war, Prussia “modernized” her army through conscription, strategic planning by 
General Staffs, and the incorporation of the most advanced technological means of 
destruction.350  Prussia was the leader which others followed, especially after 1871.  The 
overwhelming success of Prussia in the Franco-Prussian war marked the move away from the 
dominant French model of war toward the Prussian way of war, reflected in the popularity shift 
away from military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini toward Carl von Clausewitz who had inspired 
Field Marshal Moltke’s strategy.  The shift was further reflected in the change in fashion from 
French-style uniforms to Prussian dress throughout the armies of Europe, Latin America, Japan, 
and elsewhere.351  To have a “modern” army, meant to have an army modeled on Prussia.  
Though after World War I Prussia’s militarist character was criticized by Anglo-American 
scholars as “feudal” and “backward,” before the war, their quintessentially modern military was 
the envy of Europe and the world.352     
 
349 op. cit. C Clark, 38-56.  This army was raised in response to the lack of natural defenses from adjacent states on 
all sides, and the humiliation suffered during the Thirty Years War.  By the end of Frederick the Great’s reign in 
1786, the Prussian standing army of 196, 000 was one of the largest in Europe, despite Prussia’s relative small 
territory, population, and natural resources.  As Friedrich von Schrötter said at this time, “Prussia was not a country 
with an army, but an army with a country.” op. cit. Blackbourn 2003, p. 17 
350 I have put “modernized” in quotes, because, in regard to military affairs, Prussia was the leader which others 
followed.  Modernization theories that posit a teleological movement toward democratic capitalism typically suggest 
that Prussia was “backward” or “premodern” because of its feudal legacies.  This implies that having the most 
modernized military is a sign of premodernity.  B Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and 
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966;  R Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in 
Germany, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1979. 
351 op. cit. Black 2009, p. 141  
352 T Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution, A. M. Kelley, New York, 1964. 
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 The problem with this type of negative analysis of Prussian/German exceptionalism, that 
suggests a uniquely “militarist” or “feudal” society in Imperial Germany, is that it disguises the 
illiberal and aristocratic nature of the assumed European norm.353  Germany’s militarist union 
between monarchy, aristocracy, and military represented an alternative path to modernization 
that led to fascism.354  Like the Liberal/Marxian traditions described above, this perspective 
assumes that war and the military are not component parts of modern social organization - 
militarism is “premodern.”  And yet, every major power that exists today did go through at least 
one period of massive militarization - for the most part, willingly.  Why aren’t these non-German 
militarizations considered “backward” or “feudal”?  In the case of France, Great Britain, the 
United States, and even the Soviet Union, the assumption appears to be that Germany’s war guilt 
in World Wars I and II necessitated the militarization of the democratic capitalist West, which 
otherwise would not have occurred.  Therefore, German militarism represents a scapegoat for the 
entire Western world.    
 This perspective is based on an assumption that the bourgeois capitalist class is not 
militant and war-like.  War is the aspiration of the aristocracy, whose members are presumed to 
be antagonistically related to the middle class.  However, this assumption needs to be 
substantially challenged and qualified to understand war, particularly in the nineteenth century.  
As Joseph Schumpeter described English capitalist society, “the aristocratic element continued to 
 
353 That Prussia was “backward” is the argument of the Sonderweg thesis dominant in German historiography, which 
suggests that Germany had a “special path” that led to Naziism.  cf. D Blackbourn and G Eley, The Peculiarities of 
German History : Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1984.  Eley and Blackbourn suggested that the Sonderweg thesis is based on ideal versions of Britain, France, 
and the United States that never existed in these countries in the first place. 
354 Classical modernization theory, in general, would suggest that in the traditional path to modernization democratic 
capitalism developed due to the rise of the bourgeois capitalist class at the expense of the aristocracy and monarchy.  
A third path was the communist trajectory.  see op. cit. Moore, pg. 433-453; Alvin So, Social Change and 
Development : Modernization, Dependency, and World-Systems Theories, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, Calif., 
1990; W Knöbl, 'Theories That Won't Pass Away: The Never-Ending Story of Modernization Theory', in Gerard 
Delanty and Engin F. Isin (ed.), Handbook of Historical Sociology,Sage Publications,London, 2003), 96-107. 
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rule the roost right to the end of the period of intact and vital capitalism.”355  However, as noted 
above, Schumpeter indicated elsewhere that this aristocratic element was “atavistic” and could 
be considered the cause of militancy and imperialism.356  It was widely assumed that the 
aristocracy, who held elitist attitudes and codes of honor and valor, glorified war.  For example, 
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote,  
Feudal honor prescribed vengeance and stigmatized pardon of injuries…It made 
neither humanity nor mildness a law; but it vaunted generosity; it prized liberality 
more than beneficence, it permitted one to enrich oneself by gambling, by war, 
but not by work; it preferred great crimes to small gains.  Cupidity appalled it less 
than avarice; violence often agreed with it, whereas guile and treason always 
appeared despicable to it… Feudal aristocracy was born of war and for war; it had 
found its power in arms and it maintained it by arms; nothing therefore was more 
necessary to it than military courage; and it was natural that it glorified that above 
all the rest.  All that manifested this outwardly, even at the expense of reason and 
humanity, was therefore approved and often commanded by it.357   
 
Indeed, the history of eighteenth century Europe, which is often in practice the history of the 
aristocracy, was full of conflicts over honor and unusual (from our twenty-first century 
perspective) violent behavior.358  As a function of the absolutizing monarch which demanded 
that nobles serve in the central court where they could be surveyed, there was little asked of the 
 
355 J Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Harper Collins, New York, 2008, p. 138.  In Schumpeter’s 
analysis the period of vital capitalism roughly translates to the mid-nineteenth century and begins coming apart in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Some scholars position the end of the aristocracy even later, for 
example, at World War II, while a very good case can be made that aristocratic families have never lost their 
inheritable positions in society.   
356 op. cit. Schumpeter 1918. 
357 A de Tocqueville, Democracy in America / Translated, Edited, and with an Introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield 
and Delba Winthrop, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000, p. 591. 
358 T. C. W. Blanning provided a fascinating account of the level of hunting aristocratic courts engaged in during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  The majority of the time monarchs and nobles spent either hunting hundreds 
of animals daily or gambling at night.  Hunting, for example, was considered a duty for the nobility who needed to 
be trained for battlefield duty.  T.C.W. Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory : Europe, 1648-1815, Viking, New York, 
2007.  Also significant until the mid-nineteenth century was the tradition of dueling, which was required of men of 
honor (nobles), and involved extremely destructive rituals of violence.  This practice was revived in the late 
nineteenth century in university dueling societies, leading to the expectation of facial scars as a sign of manhood. op. 
cit. Gay 1984.   
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nobility except to maintain constant preparation for war.359  Since the highest authority of the 
monarch rested upon the interest of territorial defense, without military action, the entire 
legitimacy of the monarchy could be threatened.   
 The perspective of the bourgeois revolution in the late eighteenth century and early 
nineteenth century stems from Karl Marx’s analysis of the dual revolution – the democratic 
revolution in France and the industrial revolution in Great Britain.360  The analysis implies that a 
rising bourgeois merchant class overtook the monarchy and the aristocracy.  The aristocracy and 
monarchy could no longer enjoy the life of the “leisure class,” and was compelled to deliver 
power to the owners of capital who represented the vanguard of progress.361  However, this 
perspective clouds the persistence of the aristocracy throughout the nineteenth century, 
particularly in cultural and political terms.   
 Rather than Junker Prussia and Imperial Germany, widely considered the most “feudal” 
of Western states, we should examine the case of the most capitalist nation: Great Britain.362 In 
terms of land ownership, with the exception of Austria, Hungary, and Romania, the British 
gentry and grandees owned a greater proportion of territory in the British Isles than any other 
European country in 1880 (see Table A.11).  Though the House of Commons overtook the 
primacy of the House of Lords over the course of the century, as late as 1860, in the lower house 
 
359 A notable exception to this rule (whose ideal type lay in the French court of Versailles), was the Prussian court, 
which, under Frederick the Great and his father, transformed the military into loyal, efficient servants of the state, 
which led to the generation of  the famous Prussian bureaucracy.  op. cit. Rosenberg 1958. 
360 op. cit. Marx 1967 
361 T Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class; an Economic Study of Institutions, B. W. Huebsch, New York, 1924. 
Veblen suggested that the institution of a leisure class is found in its best form within barbarian cultures.  He wrote, 
“The upper classes are by cusom exempt or excluded from industrial occupations, and are reserved for certain 
employments to which a degree of honour attaches. Chief among the honourable employments in any feudal 
community is warfare” p. 1 
362 Of course, the United States did become the most capitalist state by the end of the century, and as a new nation 
did not have the legacy of a substantial landed class, although Barrington Moore suggested that the American Civil 
War was the point at which the Southern plantation owners, who resembled the German Junkers, were eliminated 
from the American democratic capitalist social system.  op. cit. Moore 1996, pp. 111-158 
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it was estimated that three-quarters of all MPs were patricians and that one-third of the 
Commons was filled by no more than sixty families.363  Furthermore, the majority of the most 
significant civil service positions were held by men of patrician status.  If the state is the 
executive committee for the ruling class, the ruling class was the aristocracy.  The Conservative 
(Tory) governments under the Duke of Wellington, Robert Peel, and Benjamin Disraeli made 
some political concessions to the new industrial class, most notably by repealing the Corn Laws 
in 1846.  However, as David Cannadine put it, “in practical terms, these did not amount to much.  
Their position of dominance was so entrenched, so complete, that their generosity … in making 
concessions mattered far less than it was commonplace to suppose.”364  As late as the 1870s, the 
British aristocracy was the wealthiest, the most powerful, and, certainly the most conscious class 
in the country.   While early in the modern era the bourgeoisie may have achieved a coup in 
opening the feudal door so that they were even allowed to minimally participate in power, it is 
difficult to describe the process as revolutionary.   
 Though the economic, political and legal structures necessary for capitalist accumulation 
were established in the major European nations, we must not assume that this was because it was 
in the capitalist class’s interest.  Indeed, in Prussia and Germany under Bismarck, entrepreneurial 
and industrial capitalism needed to be established “from above,” because the state and military 
saw a need for the economic power that would enable it to compete among the Great Powers.365  
Where Schumpeter described this process as “the active symbiosis of two social strata,” the 
typical reading of this relationship has the ‘ascendant’ class, the bourgeoisie, in the drivers’ seat.  
Rather, as Arno J. Mayer said,  
 
363 D Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1990, 
p. 14. 
364 ibid. p. 15 
365 A J P Taylor, Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, H. Hamilton, London, 1955. 
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The rising business and professional classes were in no position to challenge the 
landed and public service elites for parity or first place in Europe’s ruling classes, 
let alone in its governing classes.  Quite apart from their numerical and economic 
disadvantage … the new-fledged industrial and financial bourgeoisies as well as 
the subaltern free professions lacked a coherent and firm social and cultural 
footing of their own.366  
 
Precisely at the social and cultural level, not the economic, this issue of class primacy is essential 
to understanding not only the nineteenth century idolum, but our own.  Against the typical 
analysis of Victorian culture which highlights the “embourgeoisement” of society, I would 
suggest that we note the “feudalization” of the bourgeois middle classes, not just in Germany, 
but throughout Europe as a whole.367   
 Though the remarkable historical work of Eric Hobsbawm highlighted the ways in which 
the hegemonic culture of the European ruling classes permeated society throughout the 
nineteenth century, there seems to be no reason to assume that this was somehow “bourgeois” 
culture.368  Where did the bourgeois get this autonomous culture from?  To be sure, in the British 
Liberal party or the French Doctrinaires under Francois Guizot the state was pressured in the 
interests of capitalism and the bourgeois class.  Through John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, 
Herbert Spencer, and other (typically British) social philosophers, bourgeois class activities and 
interests received important political justification and clarification.  However, this political 
economic theory did not define the sum of European culture then any more than it does now.  
Indeed, the impetus for deploying the political economic theories of Adam Smith or David 
Ricardo were necessary because the aristocratic class, the church, the peasantry, and other realms 
 
366 A Mayer, The Persistence of the Old Regime : Europe to the Great War 1st edn., Pantheon Books, New York, 
1981, p. 79. 
367 This analysis could likely be applied, in part, to the United States as well, when one considers the cultural 
transfer of European bourgeois society to the United States’ urban elite culture.  This cultural exchange was of 
interest in the literary works of Henry James and Edith Wharton, for example.       
368 op. cit. Hobsbawm 1969, 1987, 1996. see also A Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio 
Gramsci International Publishers, New York, 1972. 
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of society were against the valorization of material wealth as an end in itself.  At the same time, 
where relevant and instrumentally useful, these economic theories were used by the patrician 
classes themselves, initially in gambling and agriculture, and eventually in commercial 
investment itself, leading to a further consolidation of their power and influence.  Even in the 
most capitalist of nations, the United States, only 48 percent of millionaires from the Age of 
Capital (1848-1875) came from lower or lower-middle class families, and only 8 percent of the 
“industrial elite of the 1870s” came were sons of working-class fathers.369  In Britain, at least 70 
percent of the millionaires who died between 1858 and 1879 were descendants of at least one 
generation of wealth, over 50 percent of which was based on land.370  All of this is to suggest 
that the “bourgeois” theories of political economy seem to have benefitted the old landed estates 
more than the upstart middle class who joined their ranks in the leisure classes. 
 Since this was not “revolutionary” in the temporal sense in which social order was 
overturned in a quick order of time, we must consider that the bourgeoisie who did rise were 
assimilated into the culture of an existing “high society.”  In pre-Revolutionary France, for 
example, those who managed to attain substantial wealth could purchase hereditary titles – 
literally joining the aristocrat class.371  In England, where noble titles were restricted and non-
proliferating (a unique arrangement in Europe), the distinction between the two separate classes, 
aristocracy and bourgeois, was most evident.  Yet, even here, the rising millionaires and wealthy 
capitalists assumed the cultural characteristics of the noble classes, parroting the nobility in 
broad terms and details from patriarchal household management to lawn landscaping on country 
estates.  The most obvious examples of this trend were the Nabobs, who made their fortunes 
 
369 op. cit Mills 2000, pp. 94-117. 
370 op. cit. Hobsbawm 1996, p. 146. 
371 op. cit. C.B.A. Behrens 2005 
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within the British Empire overseas, typically in India.  They would return from several years of 
sun-baked entrepreneurship, purchase large estates, and ostentatiously spend their money in 
ways that made dukes cringe.372  It is important to not assume that this life of luxury was a 
change in a positive direction, no matter how much we assume a preference for comfort and 
leisure.  As Lewis Mumford described it,  
The ‘performance of leisure’ imposed new sacrifices.  The dinner party, the ball, 
the formal visit, as worked out by the aristocracy and by those who, after the 
seventeenth century, aped them, gave satisfaction only to those for whom form is 
more important than content.  To be ‘seen,’ to be ‘recognized,’ to be ‘accepted’ 
were the supreme social duties, indeed the work of a whole lifetime.373 
 
Elsewhere Mumford similarly quipped, “By his very success in inventing labor-saving devices, 
modern man has manufactured an abyss of boredom that only the privileged classes in earlier 
civilizations have ever fathomed.”374 
 Indeed, the manufacturing potential of modern industrialism, coupled with exotic imports 
from faraway places brought the modern consumer culture into being.  If one understands this 
not as an alleviation of material want, but as a submission to the rituals of “conspicuous 
consumption,” as Thorstein Veblen insisted went hand in hand with leisure society, one can see 
the evolution of modern capitalism as the extension of the aristocratic lifestyle, however ‘gilded,’ 
to broader realms of society; beginning in the bourgeois merchant classes, then extending to 
professional, managerial, and working classes.   This democratization of aristocratic airs was not 
reflected economically, that is as a distribution of wealth throughout society.  As the century 
 
372 This “new money” inexperience, and dilettante identity was quickly shed over the course of generations, so that 
William Pitt could say in 1770, only 79 years after his ancestor “Diamond” Pitt, a rogue Indian merchant had 
purchased a seat in Parliament, “The riches of Asia have been poured upon us, and brought with them not only 
Asiatic luxury, but, I fear, Asiatic principles of government…The importers of foreign fold have forced their way 
into Parliament, by such a torrent of pricate corruption, as no private hereditary fortune could resist…We have 
sitting among us the members of the Rajah of Rangore and the Nawab of Arcot, the representatives of petty Eastern 
despots.” op. cit. Ferguson 2000, pp. 48-50 
373 op. cit. Mumford 1961, p. 377 
374 L Mumford, The Conduct of Life, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1970.p. 14 
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proceeded, the proletarian working class emerged as financial wealth consolidated into 
oligarchies.  Rather, the cultural distribution of old regime values through greater European 
society developed such that members of the middling classes, particularly those in civil service, 
military, and managerial roles identified themselves with the state.  Because of this among other 
reasons, nationalism became one of the most important ideological issues of the period. 
 Yet, despite the convincing attempts of Marxist historians like Benedict Anderson and 
Eric Hobsbawm to connect nationalism to economic forces, the process cannot be understood 
outside of the context of the military.375  In the Central European regions of the Rhineland and 
Prussia, for example, the incursion of the French Revolutionary armies in the territories of the 
Holy Roman Empire caused people to identify themselves as “German” in distinction to the 
hated, hypocritical “French.”376  Though the German states exploited national enthusiasm when 
the time came to expel the French, monarchs and nobles did not immediately recognize 
nationalist ideologies as being in their best interests, as the repressive policies of the Holy 
Alliance demonstrated.  These national movements were distinctly autonomous from the state, as 
in the Turnbewegung, or gymnast’s movement, that developed in Prussia in 1811 to train for the 
coming war with the French.377 The citizen-soldier/acrobats wore matching pajama-like clothing 
and performed routines in parks in Berlin, generating popular enthusiasm for national sentiment, 
physical fitness, and Enlightenment ideals of equality.378  Hegelian philosophy became a popular 
 
375 E Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 : Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge England ; New York, 1990;  B Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism, Verso, New York , 2006. 
376 op. cit. Rowe 2003; Blanning 1983; Blackbourn 2003; C Clark  2006. 
377 op. cit. C Clark, p. 351. 
378 In 1819, Karl Sand arrived at the door of the conservative playwright August von Kotzebue in this gymnastics 
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justification for ideologies on both the Left and the Right, and imbued the state with a quasi-
mystical ‘Spirit.’  Indeed, nationalism as a concept became a reinforcement for all political 
spectrums during the period leading up 1848, as Matthew Levinger described in Enlightened 
Nationalism.379  Levinger identified at least four groups of actors who employed distinct 
conceptions of the national state of Germany: liberal state reformers, aristocrats, romantics, and 
revolutionaries.  The co-option of the term nationalism by the aristocratic class was a particularly 
interesting case.  While proposed national reforms stood as potential threats to their legal 
privileges and way of life, the aristocrats soon managed to use the rhetoric of nationalism to 
defend their position.  While some rejected the concept outright, a significant portion of the class 
invoked the authority of the nation as a means of preserving the old traditions.  Levinger 
indentified this as having two broader consequences.  First, Prussian nobles reinforced the civil 
servants’ definition of the nation as a “harmonious body.”  Secondly, they transformed their own 
social and political identities by conceiving of the nobility as a national, rather than a provincial, 
institution.380 
 In the case of Germany and other nations that utilized conscription, the role of the 
military in the construction of national identity cannot be underrated.  As mentioned in the 
previous section above, as much as 20 percent of the male population in nations had gone 
through the process of trimming, programming, stripping, and leveling described by Ute Frevert 
in A Nation in Barracks.381  Army recruits were, and still are, more or less children.  In the 
nineteenth century, contrary to Frederick Engels’ assessment, the majority of recruits were from 
the countryside, since the urban working class was mistrusted and, more importantly, was needed 
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in the factories to produce armaments.382  These peasants would be stationed in a distant city 
where they had no familiar social identity and learned about the world for the first time in the 
context of military culture.383  Surrounded by flags, insignia like Prussian Iron Cross, military 
music, marching formations and drill instructors cadenced calls, these individuals submitted and 
conformed to the unit and eventually came to identify themselves with their corps, and by 
extension their nation state.384   
 The national state, which had only recently established monopoly over the means of 
violence, was the new feature in military training.  The technique of drill had existed since it was 
recovered from the Classical texts of Julius Caesar, Vegetius, and Aelian in the fifteenth century 
during the so-called “Military Revolution.”385  In sixteenth century Holland, Maurice of Orange 
incorporated the notion of drill. With almost scientific precision, every movement of the 
musketman’s routine was observed and codified so that the entire corps could move like 
clockwork.386 The mechanization and division of labor created one of the first examples of a 
functional top-down organization that communicated vertically and horizontally according to 
rank and instruction.   The broader relevance of this innovation was made quite clear by Lewis 
Mumford: 
The general indoctrination of soldierly habits of thought in the seventeenth 
century was, it seems probable, a great psychological aid to the spread of machine 
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industrialism.  In terms of the barracks, the routine of the factory seemed tolerable 
and natural.  The spread of conscription and volunteer militia forces throughout 
the Western World after the French Revolution made army and factory, so far as 
their social effects went, almost interchangeable terms.  And the complacent 
characterizations of the First World War, namely that it was a large-scale 
industrial operation, has also a meaning in reverse: modern industrialism may 
equally well be termed a large-scale military operation.387 
 
Though Spencer and other contemporary sociologists saw their era as being ‘Industrial’ as 
opposed to ‘Militaristic,’ the gap between these two forms of social organization was not as wide 
as it appeared to those living during the Hundred Years’ Peace.   
 Indeed, this was the period during which the process Max Weber described as 
‘rationalization’ developed to its full potential.  The ‘iron-cage’ of administration, compelled by 
the tyranny of the written rule, led to the disenchantment of the world.  As Weber, himself an 
unsatisfied conscript in the Prussian army, was well aware, bureaucratic administration 
originated in the military and preserved many of its organizational patterns, including even an 
esprit de corps.388  However, Weber’s letter to his mother from military training demonstrated 
his awareness of the mind-numbing character of modernity present within the duties of a “one-
yearer” on base.  He wrote, that “’even far worse’ than the physical exertions was ‘endlessly 
killing time’ and ‘the repetitions of any number of purely mechanical skills, not just a thousand 
times but a million times’ which ‘simply obliterated any power to think and generated a dreadful 
apathy.’”389  Weber’s depressive disposition aside, Ute Frevert compared his letter, written at the 
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time of his service, to that of Friedrich Paulson who wrote about the same monotonous barrack 
lifestyle, but at age 50 within a “unified, meaningful picture of his youth – a phase of 
development ending with his military service year, marking the transition into an adult life.”390  
Service in the military became an essential component of the middle-class résumé.  When one 
considers the high employment of military men in state civil service and business management 
positions one finds both the discipline required of the “Organization Man,” and the direct 
identification with the state that led Michael Mann to suggest that it was this substantial civil 
service/military population that were the most visceral proponents of chauvinistic nationalism - 
not the middle class in general.391   
 But nationalism, of all the ideologies in the age, is the most difficult to place within a 
structural framework, for, as we have seen, it was used as legitimation for several classes and 
social groups.  Nationalism cannot be reduced to a single class, or be explained as the 
propagation of a single source.  It could be conceived of as a relatively neutral set of ideas 
applied differently in different contexts - were it not so emotionally charged.392  Though many 
theorists have struggled to get a handle on such an “irrational” social phenomena, I would like to 
relate nationalism to some of the themes that have been brought up thus far.  In particular, there 
are two trends that run in somewhat different directions, namely ‘rationalization’ and 
‘feudalization’.  The application of rationalized, or instrumental reason found its strangest 
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bedfellow - the popular identification with the nation, military, and aristocracy – in the ideology 
of ‘Scientific Racism’.   
 There are two conceptions of rationalization I am interested in exploring here.  Both are 
related to each other, but are distinct social processes.  The first is the typical sociological 
process of “rationalization” as outlined by Max Weber, and expanded by Jürgen Habermas, who 
recalled that  
Weber sees cultural rationalization in modern science and technology, in 
autonomous art, and in a religiously anchored ethic guided by principles.  He 
designates as rationalization every expansion of empirical knowledge, of 
predictive capacity, of instrumental and organizational mastery of empirical 
processes.  In modern science, learning processes of this type become reflective 
and can be institutionalized in the scientific enterprise.393 
 
Weber thought the expansion of rational organization would continue indefinitely because it 
represented the most efficient and powerful means of achieving goals.  In the analysis of critical 
theorists, such as Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School, this process of rationality leads to 
reification in which social relationships and subjective experiences are turned into “things.”394  
Whereas Weber’s conception of rationality is relatively “value-neutral” in the sense that the 
rational process can be applied in the service of any number of ends, the Frankfurt School 
tradition, like Michel Foucault, considered this scientific process as an instrument of power 
itself.395  This is especially the case in the human sciences, which were modeled on the natural 
sciences, leading to a pattern that is, like the rest of society, dominated by industrial production 
techniques.396  Because of the necessity of an inductive method in sociology, as Durkheim 
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correctly established, value-neutrality is impossible within social science.397  The scientific form, 
beginning with the selection of hypotheses, simply does not allow ideological bias to be 
eliminated.  
 This is related to the second meaning of “rationalization,” which takes place at the level 
of the individual personality.  Just as Horkheimer and Adorno criticized positivism for 
confirming that which is already the case in society, within individual consciousness the actions 
and behaviors one engages in may exist prior to the justification for those actions.  So, for 
example, male householders were engaged in patriarchal relations with their wives and children 
for hundreds of years before they were forced to justify why they did this.  A habitual behavior 
like this - which seems natural since, as far as one knows, it has always existed - is very unlikely 
to be discarded.  Much more likely, one will develop a rationalization for this behavior, which 
may be entirely “irrational” - that is, contradictory or illogical on its own terms.  As one searches 
for justification to counter critical challenges to one’s ways of life – for example, the bourgeois 
capitalist who is accused of materialism, or “mammon worship” – the rationalizing ideologies 
available within the idolum can be employed where available, or developed where lacking.  So, 
in the case of the capitalist, the rational “scientific” theories of classical economics provided 
justification for behavior they would have engaged in anyway.  This rationalizing process leads 
to several reinforcing trends. 
1. The ideology itself is strengthened as more adherents and proponents join the 
movement. 
 
2. Individuals and groups are able to identify with like-minded actors to mobilize 
greater social power and to feel better about the own actions.  This is 
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especially the case when an ideology can be understood as an “objective” 
science.  
 
3. Existing behaviors, institutions, and status structures may become rigid in 
relation to competing ideologies.   
 
     In the light of both forms of rationalization, we should examine the nineteenth century 
most significant socio-cultural trend – the overwhelming belief in scientific progress.  Nineteenth 
century Europe was, above all else, optimistic.  Right up to World War I, Europeans had no 
reason to assume that the progress they were witness to would ever stop.398  Indeed, as Paul 
Fussell has argued, our modern cynical attitude toward everything - from the state, to 
technology, to other human beings - was actually generated, in large part, by the absurdity of the 
First World War.399  Instead, men like Charles Kingsley entered the Great Exhibition of 1851 
and broke into tears, saying,  
If these forefathers of ours could rise from their graves this day they would be 
inclined to see in our hospitals, in our railroads, in the achievements of our 
physical science, confirmation of that old superstition of theirs, proofs of the 
kingdom of God, realizations of the gifts which Christ received for men, vaster 
than any of which they had dreamed.400       
 
It is important to note that science and the ideology of progress are not disconnected from 
religion here.  Though many accounts of the age speak of the “secularization” of society during 
this period, this increase in scientific rationality was rarely at the absolute expense of religious 
sentiment.401  Churches continued to be built by the thousands. Conflicts, like the German 
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Kulturkampf between Prussian Pietism and “ultramontanist” Catholicism, and surges in 
humanitarian missionary work throughout Africa and Asia, reflected a heightened religiosity 
during the period.   James Sheehan has even suggested that religion was a cornerstone of the 
Enlightenment itself; while spiritual disposition was a necessary component of 
Bildungsbürgertum, an untranslatable German word indicating education and civilization.402  
While intellectuals from Nietzsche to Weber spoke of the ‘Death of God’ or the ‘Disenchantment 
of the World,’ this process was primarily in relation to changes in the emerging public sphere.  
That is, as religious tolerance became gradually acceptable in Europe, one’s beliefs became a 
matter of private, rather than public conscience.  This did not, however, eliminate pietistic 
feeling within the (male) individual - who still went to church, held theological opinions of 
others, and demanded allegiance from his ‘private sphere’ (wife and children).  Enlightened 
religion combined with science in various attempts to prove or disprove the existence of God.403  
Beyond denominational Christianity, cults of Nature, spiritualism, transcendentalism, Free 
Masonry, pantheism, and alternative forms of religion still provided quasi-theological visions of 
the world.  The ability of scientists, particularly in Physics, Geology, and Biology to identify 
immutable natural laws, in fact, reinforced the notion of an intelligent designer.404  Europeans 
were, in a sense, being entirely “rational” in identifying themselves as God’s chosen people, for 
they had discovered the techniques to unlock His secrets.  
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 This feeling of superiority increased throughout the century as technology allowed 
contact with peoples throughout the world who appeared to be living in a different stage of 
human social organization.  While colonial Europeans had been treating indigenous races, 
deemed “savages” or “primitives,” with little regard throughout the early modern era, in the 
nineteenth century, this domination needed to be “rationalized.”  What gave Europeans the right 
to exploit and take land from other peoples?  Men like Arthur Gobineau took the latest findings 
in linguistics and anthropology to determine a hierarchy of ethnic groups, nations, and 
communities.405  Indeed, the tangible experience of exploration was immanently related to 
racialized thinking.  Without the vanguard of anthropologists, missionaries, and biologists who 
travelled into the uncharted heart of Africa and Asia, the European public might not have 
become so consumed with the relationship between their race and others.  Missionaries, who had 
been an active element in the inimitable British impulse to export millions of its citizens to the 
corners of the Earth, involved themselves in such humanitarian missions as the banning of suttee 
(the ceremonial immolation of widows) in India, ending the Atlantic and Arabic slave trade, and 
exploring the ‘dark heart of Africa’ around Lake Victoria and the Mountains of the Moon in 
advance of ‘Christian civilization.’406  
 In Lords of Human Kind, V.G. Kiernan described the manner in which racist attitudes 
developed in every region of the world where the Europeans came in contact with native 
peoples.407 In some areas like the islands of the South Seas discovered by Captain Cook this led 
to an idealized image of the ‘noble savage.’ Elsewhere, as in the Sudan, the “horror and human 
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depravity” of the “witches’ brew of African primitivism and Muslim fanaticism” caused the 
British to engage in acts of violence equivalent in ruthlessness and self-righteousness.408 At the 
battle of Omdurman (1898), the Anglo-Egyptian forces used Maxim machine guns to slaughter 
up to 95% of the 52,000 dervishes with a loss of only 48 British soldiers.409 General Kitchener 
followed up the battle by desecrating the Mahdi leader’s tomb and carrying off his skull.410  The 
brutality of some Europeans - for example, those engaged in King Leopold’s notorious rubber 
plantations - represented one of two trajectories of acculturation.411  The first attitude, which 
could be termed the ‘Conrad’ approach, was captured in The Heart of Darkness, in which 
Europeans “went native” - adopting violent practices that were unacceptable in “civilized” 
Europe, while simultaneously using the technical, instrumental skills useful for dominating the 
societies they assimilated into as gods or kings.412  More common, however, was what could be 
called the ‘Kipling’ approach, in which the civilizing mission was seen as a universally 
beneficial gift of a patriarchal race that was willing to sacrifice themselves for the betterment of 
humanity.  The white man was willing to battle against heathenness, malnutrition, and disease to 
“serve their captives” needs.413   
 Though some native races, such as the Zulus under Shaka, became idealized to portray 
the colonials as having put up a fight, most were considered ‘child-races’. As the century went 
on, race-thinking was used to scientifically justify the treatment and confiscation of property 
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from weaker peoples.414 In the twentieth century, this race-thinking was applied back upon 
Europe itself.  Indeed, in The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt argued that, in addition 
to Anti-Semitism as emerged in France’s Dreyfus Affair, late nineteenth century imperialism 
was a primary source of twentieth century totalitarianism.  As she said,  
When the European mob discovered what a ‘lovely virtue’ a white skin could be 
in Africa, when the English conqueror in India became an administrator who no 
longer believed in the universal validity of law, but was convinced of his own 
innate capacity to rule and dominate, when the dragon-slayers turned into either 
‘white men’ of ‘higher breeds’ or into bureaucrats and spies … the stage seemed 
to be set for all possible horrors.  Lying under anybody’s nose were many of the 
elements which gathered together could create a totalitarian government on the 
basis of racism.415 
 
Indeed, it was not just scientific racism that developed, but also the bureaucratic administration 
of death that would become deployed during the purges under the Soviets and the Holocaust 
under the Nazis.  Though developed in Cuba in the 1890s, concentration camps were first used 
substantially in war against the “white tribe” of Africa - the Dutch Afrikaners during the Boer 
War of 1899-1902.416  In the same vein, Isabel Hull convincingly linked Germany’s organization 
of mass death during their colonial administration in German Southwest Africa from 1904-1907 
to the administration of concentration camps during World War II.417  
 Indeed, the cases of the Boer War, German Southwest Africa, and the Belgian Congo 
were among the major scandals at the turn of the twentieth century that led to a breakdown in the 
popular perception of pure imperial motives.418  The rationalization, or “alibi” as Freudian 
historian Peter Gay termed it, could no longer support the contradictions between the professed 
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values of “Civilization” and “Christianity,” and the realities of economic and military 
exploitation.419  Though popular social movements, like the Congo Reform Association rose to 
shut down specific egregious cases, the notions of racial superiority continued to grow unabated 
among segments of the European population.  When coupled to nationalism, as in the Pan 
movements (pan-Germanic, pan-Slavic, etc.), these racialized political projects began dividing 
biologically identical populations from one another according to linguistic or cultural 
differences.420  As Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis of Anti-Semitism theorized, negative 
domestic social attributes could be ascribed to particular ethnicities.421  So in Germany, enemies 
of the empire (Reichsfeinde) were considered to be foreign powers as well as domestic enemies 
(socialists, Leftist liberals, ethnic minorities, Catholics, etc.).  The internal enemies were 
identified with international conspiracies (Catholics with Austria, Poles with Slavs and Russians, 
Jews with capitalism, Alsatians with France, liberals with Britain and France, etc. etc.). 422  This 
reification of social conflict onto ethnic groups and nations allowed the process of “social 
imperialism” to contain some of the internal disorder threatening to undermine the legitimacy of 
the old regime political system during the fin de siècle and early twentieth century.  The result 
was an intensely chauvinistic public affect.  This was, on the one hand, the expression of official 
state communications reported by the media, but was also generated by the yellow media itself.  
In 1899, Conan Doyle suggested that the greatest threat to the twentieth century was “an 
irresponsible press,”423 while J.A. Hobson thought that “the modern newspaper is a Roman 
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arena, a Spanish bull-ring, and an English prize-fight rolled into one.  The popularization of the 
power to read has made the press the chief instrument of brutality.”424 
 This jingoism, as well as scientific racism, patriarchy, demagoguery, and other 
‘pathologies’ of nineteenth century European society, were reflections of psychologically 
repressed violence according to Peter Gay, who said,  “Every culture, every class, every century, 
constructs its distinctive alibis for aggression.  And each of these defensive strategems has its 
history.  Most are sheer replicas of time-honored rationalizations, or subtle variations on them; 
only a handful ever manage to be truly innovative.”425  Gay identified three major rationales, or 
alibis, for aggressive impulses in the nineteenth century:  
1. The case for competition – stemming from biological theory to economic, 
political, literary, and private life.  
 
2. The construction of the convenient Other.  
 
3. The cult of manliness – a nineteenth century adaptation of the aristocratic 
ideal of prowess. 
These three expressions together constituted a distinctive “Victorian” culture, which was not 
unique to Britain under Queen Victoria, but also applied to France, Germany, the United States, 
and Europe in general.  In order to understand this psychopathological mechanism at work, we 
should return to the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud that inspired Gay’s theoretical 
framework. 
 In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud considered the process of sublimation in the 
individual ego within the context of civilization as a whole.  He wrote,  
Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural 
development; it is what makes it possible for higher psychical activities, 
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scientific, artistic or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life…it 
is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon a 
renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction 
… of powerful instincts.  This ‘cultural frustration’ dominates the large field of 
social relationships between human beings.426 
 
Freud identified two contradictory instincts, Eros and Thanatos, that motivated individuals’ 
relationship to society.  Eros, the capacity for empathic, altruistic desire for human relationships 
leads individuals to identify with others and establish social bonds.  The contrary drive, the death 
drive, leads individuals to resent ‘civilization’ which provides so many personality 
characteristics, especially the super-ego.  The egoistic desire to sabotage one’s civilization 
provides an inclination towards aggression, which civilization must channel and check.  As Erich 
Fromm suggested, this psychological explanation, when placed in a sociobiological and 
historical framework, does not have to rely on an innate aggressive instinct, as Konrad Lorenz 
theorized in the mid-twentieth century.427 Rather, the real condition of existence of man qua 
man, establishes a neuropsychological structure that may take the form of malignant aggression, 
including sadism – the passion for power over another sentient being; and necrophilia – the 
passion to destroy life and the attraction to dead and purely mechanical things.428  Not every 
individual handles these aggressive impulses in the same way.  Still, at an aggregate level, these 
instincts can be useful explanations for social phenomena.  Not just war, but also competition 
between rigid ideologies and business firms.   
 It is no coincidence that team sports were also institutionalized during this period in the 
late nineteenth century.  Again the technology of railroad provided a precondition that allowed 
remote schools and teams to travel to one another to compete.  This necessitated codification of 
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rules so that teams could coordinate their incredibly varied versions of Football in order to play 
together, leading to the three versions of American Football, Australian Rules (Rugby), and 
Soccer.429  The significance of sport is not most important for the athletes themselves, but rather, 
as in the Roman Coliseum, makes its most vital impact on the mass of spectators.  Lewis 
Mumford described the effect:  
Through his place in the chorus, the spectator finds his special release: usually cut 
off from close physical associations by his impersonal routine, he is now at one 
with a primitive undifferentiated group …The spectator feels himself contributing 
by his presence to the victory of his side…for in the sports arena the spectator has 
the illusion of being completely mobilized and utilized. 430 
 
This is related to Freud’s principles of Group Psychology, which were later incorporated by 
Adorno et al, in The Authoritarian Personality.431  When one identifies with organized, artificial 
masses, such as the church or the army, one transfers the libidinal dependency for the “father” to 
the illusion of a supreme chief, or an authoritative idea, which is frequently negative.432  By this 
mechanism, each individual becomes bound to both the leader and the other members in the 
group.  While the specifics of Freud’s oedipal framework are rightfully controversial, the general 
dynamic that establishes this form of mass psychology seems to be related to a number of the 
processes we have been discussed thus far: sports, nationalism, racism, and war.  Georg Simmel 
theorized a similar process related to his in-group/out-group hypothesis by identifying a “rally 
round the flag” effect that increases support for political leaders.  Conflict with an out-group 
increases the cohesion and political centralization of the in-group.433    
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 However, not all channels of aggression are necessarily harmful.  For example, in the 
case of sports, we see in this period the development of the Olympic movement, intended 
specifically for the establishment of world peace through athletic competition.  One need not 
identify with saber-rattling ideologies either, and could, instead engage with the substantial 
international peace movement that was incredibly vital throughout the century, with its greatest 
success in the decade immediately preceding World War I.434  In 1899, Bertha von Suttner, an 
Austrian aristocrat caused a sensation with her pacifist novel, Die Waffen Nieder, selling more 
than a million copies in eight languages.  She later convinced Swedish industrialist Alfred Nobel 
to establish the Nobel peace prize in 1905, and enlisted Americans Theodore Roosevelt and 
Andrew Carnegie, as well as Czar Nicholas II of Russia to the cause of peace.  Roosevelt soon 
thereafter resolved the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, while 
the Czar Nicholas convened the second Hague Conference to establish armament limitations.  In 
1910, Andrew Carnegie established the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  These 
were the culmination of a century of social peace movements, from the International Red Cross 
established in1863 following the Austro-Sardinian war, to the Salvation Army, to the hundreds 
of Associations dedicated to the establishment of International Law.435   
 Ultimately, two contradictory ideologies were operating simultaneously within the 
idolum immediately preceding World War I: the international peace movement and the jingoist 
nationalist movement.  These ideologies also drew from a number of laterally, dialectically, or 
mimetically related trends that existed simultaneously, such as the leisure consumer culture, free-
market Liberalism, or Evangelical Christianity.   How, precisely, the human individual 
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internalized these varied ideologies is difficult to say from this perspective.  Of course, every 
individual personality was uniquely shaped at a microsociological level.  Of these individuals, 
the ones we should be most focused on are those at the political level at which decisions of war 
and peace were made.  This would certainly include the elites, who we have seen were largely 
composed of old regime class members.  But we must also recall Michael Mann’s definition of 
the state as an “active place.”  That is, these elites were also related to their populations and 
territories at large, from which they drew their power.  These citizens and subjects lobbied the 
state for action that could be contradictory in practice or motivation.  Industrialists might 
encourage arms production, while pacifists might demand arms reduction.  As democratization 
proceeded throughout the century, these conciliations and contradictions became more 
significant even as many principles, such as trade liberalism, balance-of-power, and international 
law became institutionalized across time and space.   
 All of the military, economic, and political structural transformations outlined in the 
previous section were established within a cultural context, or idolum.  Even as structural 
circumstances and considerations, such as accumulated surplus capital or diplomatic alliance 
opportunities might compel state actors to establish particular institutions to reinforce or 
countervail existing power relations, these actors did so with individual personalities shaped by 
their cultural, ideological, and class milieu.  
Conclusion: “Capitalism” vs. “Civilization” 
 
 The above considerations related to war, modernity, and capitalism represent only a 
tentative outline of the major trends that took place across the nineteenth century (1815-1914).  
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However, the goal of this essay has been directed toward challenging Polanyi’s thesis regarding 
the Hundred Years’ Peace, and, by implication, economistic interpretations of war and society.  
In this direction there are several points upon which we can assert that, while economic variables 
were relevant and important, there is no basis upon which we can afford these economic 
conditions primary explanatory importance.  First, geostrategy and war itself were autonomous 
pressures that continued to exert influence upon states.  From the build-up of arms to the actual 
short wars that did take place, the period between 1815 and 1914 did not substantially differ 
from previous periods in military/diplomatic terms.  While the influence of transnational 
capitalism did exert important encouragement in the form of imperialism, and discouragement in 
the form of a peace interest between Great Powers, no less important were the decisions by state 
actors to institutionalize balance-of-power principles.  The consequence of attributing economic 
structural factors primary importance is that the actual development of the military in Europe 
becomes clouded.  Conscription, military industrial development, and the rationalization of 
military theory within General Staffs were essential variables in both war and society.  Without 
recognizing these trends one cannot properly understand the First World War, or the twentieth 
century that followed – a century that was by far the bloodiest period of human history.  By 
looking at the actual development of war and the military in the nineteenth century we see that 
war is absolutely a component part of modernity.   
 By suggesting that war is somehow an atavism that has not yet been removed from 
modern society, the Liberal/Marxian tradition relegates our understanding of war to “feudal,” or 
“pre-modern” traditions held by the aristocratic rulers of national states.  However, though the 
hereditary position of old regime aristocrats has been relatively minimized during the course of 
the twentieth century, this aristocratic class weakness was not present in the nineteenth century.  
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By examining the ways in which the aristocracy imparted their cultural codes of honor and glory 
to the rising bourgeoisie during this period we see the middle and lower classes - especially those 
in civil service positions - engaged in “irrational” jingoistic nationalism.  This phenomenon is 
still with us today, as any newspaper headline regarding this or that “outrage” a nation or group 
has committed against our nation, can provide evidence of.   
 Furthermore, we must also follow the development of the modern individual 
consciousness in the age of industrialism and consumer capitalism.  As traditional social bonds 
were replaced by rationalized and commodified systems of social relations, the individual was 
confronted with a void.  According to Freudian conceptions of the pleasure principle and death 
drive, the individual latched onto illusory groups, or ‘imagined communities’, as Benedict 
Anderson would term them.  Even if one does not assume the validity of psychoanalytic 
conceptions of the self, there can be little doubt that the modern psyche underwent tremendous 
change during the course of the nineteenth century.  By the 1890s, intellectuals including Freud 
himself, as well as Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Karl Jung, Georges Sorel, and others were 
beginning to see how necessary a recognition of human consciousness was in order to understand 
the society they were living in.436  Sociologists, including Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, and 
Vilfredo Pareto, reacted to the distorted Enlightenment principles represented by positivism and 
Marxism to insist that human sciences could not be understood according to mechanistic natural 
laws.  This pessimistic intellectual environment developed in the so-called fin de siècle societies 
of Paris and Vienna.437  Meanwhile, society at large experienced the belle époque, full of exotic 
consumer products available at the Paris Arcades, with public museums, zoos, and libraries 
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extending knowledge to the masses.438  What wars, or threats of wars, existed were handled 
through the medium of a popular press, creating a battle of words between hawks and doves - 
one that has never ceased.  Readers could invest themselves in these issues in entirely novel 
ways, especially as democratic developments proceeded towards fulfillment of the promise of 
the French Revolution.  However, these citizens could just as easily invest their energy into 
following sports, or religious and labor movements, or Harry Houdini, or technical achievements 
like flight and cinema.  All of this is to suggest that war, like other European institutions became 
transformed into a commodity on the market of the public sphere.  In this sense, we can speak of 
the relationship between the capitalist economy and society as cultural practice, at the level of 
the bourgeois individual, as Theodor Adorno or Michel Foucault might term it.   
 As Adorno outlined in Negative Dialectics, individuals have become products of the 
exchange principle, or identity thinking.  He wrote,  
The individuals are not only character masks, agents of value in a supposedly 
separate economic sphere.  Even where they think they have escaped the primacy 
of economics - all the way into their psychology, the maison toleree of 
uncomprehended individuality - they react under the compulsion of the 
universal.439 
 
In this sense, the individual is not, as the ideology of individualism suggests, an autonomous 
utility maximizing agent, but rather a product of social content – of the societal totality, which in 
the modern era has become capitalist.  This dialectical perspective was taken up by Moishe 
Postone in his critical Marxist analysis, Time, Labor, and Social Domination.  Postone suggested 
that Marx was really trying to communicate a theory of capitalism as a social totality, which was 
unique in human history.  Marx’s analysis is therefore exclusively applicable to modern society, 
and is not, as traditional Marxists have suggested, a transhistorical theory of political economy.  
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The modern capitalist social formation is constituted by a qualitatively homogenous social 
‘substance,’ that is alienation.440  Alienation and commodity fetishism allow a single structuring 
principle to penetrate all social relations as a totality, in a way that is not the case in other social 
formations.  These deep structures ground everyday action and thought which reconstitute those 
structures through practice.  In this dialectical interaction between structure and agency, the 
capitalist totality reproduces the actors that willfully regenerate that totality without knowing the 
extent to which their interaction is constitutive of the society at large.   
 In this context, where capitalism is the social totality, we can begin to speak of the effect 
of capitalism on war.  Unfortunately, this project will need to be left for another occasion.  I 
would, however, like to make two points here regarding the dialectical framework of Adorno, 
Postone, and other critical theorists.  First, although Postone borrows heavily from Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theories, which would include room for agents to improvise within the context of 
“fields” – I find the Marxist perspective lacks a positive theory of action.441  Instead, I find 
Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration more useful, in that it allows actors, who are not 
“cultural dupes,” to engage in freedom of action relative to the amount of power resources they 
are able to draw from social structures.442  This power need not be exclusively distributive (i.e. 
domination), but may also include collective power that is not a part of a zero-sum game.  
Structures constrain and enable.   
 Secondly, and more importantly, I find no reason why we should call that modern social 
totality “capitalism.”  Saying modern society is capitalism assumes a normative stance that 
amounts to saying, ‘even if we acknowledge that base and superstructure are dialectically related 
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- as Marx understood and Althusser did not - the social totality is still ultimately determined by 
the economic base.’  As I hope the discussion of war in the nineteenth century has demonstrated, 
there are many cases in which economic actions and structures could be deemed byproducts of 
military activity.  At the same time, war could be stimulated by cultural and ideological concerns 
that were very isolated from economic issues.  The complex totality of social issues, including 
economic, military, religious, ideological, political, scientific, sexual, and other concerns, are a 
necessary context through which any social phenomena needs to be understood.  However, 
unless one is interested in studying exclusively economic phenomena, there seems no scientific 
reason to trace the core of modern society to economic issues.  In many ways, this trend is itself 
a reflection of a modern society which is so economically obsessed; and the Marxian argument 
seems to be the greatest possible submission to the utilitarian idea that all human beings are 
simply materialistic greedy creatures – homo economicus.  Instead, I propose that we return to 
the trend in the nineteenth and early twentieth century social analysis to engage in a discussion of 
“civilization.”443  What we have been talking about thus far concerns modern European 
civilization, and the role of war within it.  Provided we do not reassume the master narrative that 
would associate civilization with the progress of European hegemony, the sociological use-value 
of a concept of social totality could prove very effective.  
 These concluding remarks are clearly only indications toward further research.  By 
analyzing precisely what was lacking in the overly economically-determined Marxian, Liberal, 
and Realist theories, while noting what was effective and useful, a picture of war in the 
nineteenth century has begun to come into focus.  But ultimately - like a grainy daguerreotype 
taken during the Crimean War to provide some context to the interested newspaper subscriber in 
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London or Barcelona - this research on war in the nineteenth century still needs further 
development.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1 – Wars, Revolutions and the Bond Market, 1830-1914 
 
Event 
 
 
Britain 
 
France 
 
Russia 
 
Austria 
  
Starting 
Date 
 
 
Peak 
Date 
 
Increasea 
 
Peak 
Date 
 
Increase
 
Peak 
Date 
 
Increase 
 
Peak 
Date 
 
Increase
          
1 7/27/1830 2/8/1831 67 4/2/1831 273  
2 2/22/1848   4/7/1848 505 4/7/1848 172 4/28/1848 662
3 6/2/1853 3/31/1854 52 4/7/1854 106 3/24/1854 175 3/31/1854 243
4 4/19/1859 4/29/1859 18 5/20/1859 50 5/27/1859 46 6/24/1859 426
5 6/7/1866   6/8/1866 9 6/8/1866 29 4/26/1867 298
6 7/2/1870   3/31/1871 181  
7 4/24/1877 5/4/1877 5 4/27/1877 12 4/27/1877 60 4/27/1877 59
8 2/4/1904   5/10/1906 129 
9 6/28/1914 7/13/1914 22 7/31/1914 5 7/13/1914 52 7/31/1914 42
 
a All increases in basis points (one percent = 100 basis points) 
Key: 
1. 1830 Revolution: revolt against Charles X’s ordinances 
2. 1848 Revolution: revolt in Paris after ban on banquets 
3. Crimean War: British fleet ordered to Dardanelles 
4. Austro-Italian War: Austrian ultimatum to Sardinia to disarm 
5. Austro-Prussian War: Prussian troops occupy Holstein 
6. Franco-German War: Leopold of Hohenzollern’s acceptance of Spanish throne 
7. Russo-Turkish War: Russia declares war on Turkey 
8. Russo-Japanese War and 1905 Revolution: outbreak of war 
9. Approach of First World War: assassination at Sarajevo 
Source: Ferguson 1999, p. 276; orig.The Economist  
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Table A.2 – Wars between “Western” Powers, 1815-1914a 
 
War 
 
 
Western Powers 
Involvedb 
 
 
Years 
 
Duration 
(months) 
 
Franco-Spanish 
 
France v. Spain 
 
1823 7.3
Navarino Bay England, France, 
Russia v. Turkey 
1827 0.1
Russo-Turkish I Russia v. Turkey 1828-29 16.7
Russo-Turkish II Russia v. Turkey 1877-78 8.8
Sino-French France v. China 1884-85 11.8
Sino-Japanese China v. Japan 1894-95 8.0
Spanish-American USA v. Spain 1898 3.7
Russo-Japanese Russia v. Japan 1904-05 19.3
Italo-Turkish Italy v. Turkey 1911-12 12.7
    
Total   88.4
 
 
 a Does not include Great Power Wars listed in Table 3.2 (or Crimean War). 
 bChina, Japan, and USA are included when they entered into “Western” geopolitical orbit. 
 
Source: Singer and Small 1972 
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Table A.3 – Wars by “Western” Powers against Lesser States, 1815-1914 
 
War 
 
 
States Involved 
 
 
Years 
 
Duration 
(months) 
 
Mexican-American 
 
USA v. Mexico 
 
1846-48 21.1
First Schleswig-
Holstein 
Prussia v. Denmark 
 
1848-49 8.1
Anglo-Persian England v. Persia 1856-57 4.6
Spanish-Moroccan I Spain v. Morocco 1859-60 5.2
Franco-Mexican France v. Mexico 1862-67 57.7
Second Schleswig-
Holstein 
Prussia, Austria v. 
Denmark 
1864 3.6
Spanish-Chilean Spain v. Peru, Chile 1865-66 6.5
Greco-Turkish Turkey v. Greece 1897 3.1
Spanish-Moroccan II Spain v. Morocco 
 
1909-10 8.5
First Balkan 
 
Turkey v. Serbia, 
Greece, Bulgaria 
1912-13 6.1
Second Balkan 
 
Turkey, Serbia, 
Greece, Romania v. 
Bulgaria 
 
1913 1.0
   
Total   125.5
 
Source: Singer and Small 1972 
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Table A.4 - Wars Involving “Western” States and Non-State Actors, 1815-1914 
 
 
War 
 
 
States Involved 
 
Years 
 
Duration 
(Months) 
 
British-Mahabattan 
 
England 
 
1817-18 6.9
Greek Turkey 1821-28 85.1
First Anglo-Burmese England 1823-26 29.1
Javanese Holland 1825-30 56.2
Russo-Persian Russia 1826-28 17.0
First Polish Russia 1831 8.3
First Syrian Turkey 1831-32 13.7
First British Afghan England 1838-42 48.4
Second Syrian England, Turkey 1839-40 3.1
First British-Sikh England 1845-46 2.9
Hungarian Austria, Russia 1848-49 11.1
Second British-Sikh England 1848-49 5.1
First Turco-Montenegran Turkey 1852-53 3.4
Sepoy England 1857-59 22.9
Second Turco-Montenegran Turkey 1858-59 12.9
Second Polish Russia 1863-64 14.9
Ten Years Spain 1868-78 112.1
Dutch-Achinese Holland 1873-78 65.2
Balkan Turkey 1875-77 21.4
Bosnian Austria 1878 2.1
Second British-Afghan England 1878-80 18.2
British-Zulu England 1879 5.7
Franco-Indochine France 1882-84 25.7
Mahdist England 1882-85 39.6
Franco-Madagascar France 1894-95 9.7
Cuban Spain 1895-98 37.3
Italo-Ethiopian Italy 1895-96 10.5
First Philippine Spain 1896-98 23.1
Second Philippine USA 1899-1902 40.9
Boer England 1899-1902 31.6
   
Total 
 
  784.1
 
Source: Singer and Small 1972 
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Table A.5 - Wars and Issues, 1815-1914 
 
 
Wars/major armed interventions 
 
Dates 
 
      Issues for original combatants 
 
 
Austria – Naples 
 
1820-21 
 
1. Government composition 
Austria – Piedmont 1821 1. Government composition 
France – Spain 1822-23 1. Government composition 
Russia (Greece, Great Britain, 
France) – Turkey 
1828-29 1. National liberation/state creation (R., 
Gr., B.B., F.) 
2. Protect religious confréres (R.) 
3. Commerce/navigation (R., T.) 
4. Protect ethnic confreres (R.) 
5. Maintain integrity of empire (T.) 
Belgium (France) – Holland 1830-33 1. National liberation/state creation (B., 
F.) 
2. Maintain integrity of state (H.) 
Turkey – Egypt 1832-33 1. Territory 
2. Empire creation (E.) 
3. Maintain integrity of empire (T.) 
Turkey – Egypt 1839-47 1. Dynastic claims 
2. Territory 
3. Empire creation (E.) 
4. Maintain integrity of empire (T.) 
Prussia – Denmark 1848 1. Dynastic/succession claims (D.) 
2. Territory 
3. National unification/consolidation 
Sardinia – Austria 1848-49 1. Territory 
2. National unification/consolidation 
(S.) 
3. Ideological liberation (S.) 
4. Maintain integrity of empire (A.) 
France – Roman Republic 1849 1. Government composition 
2. Maintain regional dominance (F.) 
Russia (Austria) – Hungary 1849 1. National liberation/state creation 
(H.) 
2. Maintain integrity of empire (A., R.) 
Turkey (Great Britain, France, 
Austria) – Russia 
1853-56 1. Protect religious confréres (R.) 
2. National liberation/state creation 
(Wallachia, Moldavia) (R.) 
3. Balance of power (G.B., F., A.) 
4. Maintain integrity of empire (T., 
G.B., F., A.) 
5. Strategic territory (R.) 
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Table A.5 continued 
 
 
Wars/major armed interventions 
 
Dates 
 
      Issues for original combatants 
 
 
Sardinia (France) – Austria 
 
1859 
 
1. Territory (F., S.) 
2. National liberation/state creation (S.) 
3. Ideological liberation (S.) 
4. Maintain integrity of empire (A.) 
German Confederation (Prussia) 
– Denmark 
1863-64 1. Dynastic/succession claims 
2. Protect ethnic confréres (P.) 
3. Strategic territory (D.) 
4. Enforce treaty terms (P.) 
5. National unification/consolidation 
6. Territory 
7. Ethnic unification/irredenta 
Russia – Poland 1863 1. National liberation/state creation (P.) 
2. Maintain integrity of empire (R.) 
Austria – Prussia (Italy) 1866 1. Territory 
2. National unification/consolidation 
(P., I) 
3. Maintain regional dominance (A.) 
Italy – Roman Republic 1870 1. National unification/consolidation 
(I.) 
2. Regime/state survival (R.R.) 
France – Prussia 1870 1. National honor (F.) 
2. Test of strength 
3. National unification/consolidation 
(P.) 
Serbia, Montenegro – Turkey 1876-1878 1. Territory 
2. National unification/consolidation 
(S., M.) 
3. Maintain integrity of empire (T.) 
Russia – Turkey 1877-1878 1. Protect religious confréres (R.) 
2. Territory 
3. National liberation/state creation 
(Wallachia, Moldavia) (R.) 
4. Protect ethnic confréres (R.) 
5. Commerce/navigation (R.) 
6. Maintain integrity of empire (T.) 
Bulgaria – Turkey 1885 1. Ethnic unification/irredenta (B.) 
2. National unification/consolidation 
(B.) 
3. Maintain integrity of empire (T.) 
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Table A.5 continued 
 
 
Wars/major armed interventions 
 
Dates 
 
      Issues for original combatants 
 
 
Serbia – Bulgaria 
 
1885 
 
1. Territory 
Turkey – Greece 1897 1. Protect ethnic confreres 
2. National liberation/state creation 
(Crete) 
Spain – United States 1898 1. Ideological liberation (U.S.) 
2. Commerce/navigation (U.S.) 
3. Maintain integrity of empire (S.) 
4. National liberation/state creation 
(Cuba, U.S.) 
Russia, Great Britain, Germany – 
Chinese rebels 
1898-1900 1. Maintain regional dominance 
2. Commerce/navigation 
3. Autonomy (C.) 
Boer Republics – Great Britain 1899-1902 1. Strategic territory (G.B.) 
2. Autonomy (B.) 
3. Protect nationals/commercial 
interests abroad (G.B.) 
Japan – Russia 1904-1905 1. Empire creation (R.) 
2. Colonial competition 
3. Strategic territory (J.) 
Italy – Turkey 1911-1912 1. Territory 
2. Maintain integrity of empire (T.) 
Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Serbia – Turkey 
1912-1913 1. Territory 
2. Maintain integrity of empire (T.) 
Bulgaria – Serbia, Greece 1913 1. Territory 
Austria-Hungary - Serbia 1914 2. National honor (A.) 
3. Maintain intergrity of empire (A.) 
4. Protect ethnic confréres (S.) 
5. Regime/state survival (A.) 
   
 
Source: Holsti 1991, pp. 140-142 
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Table A.6 – Issues that Generated Wars, 1815-1914 
 
 
Issues 
 
Frequency % of 
wars
 
 Previous  
period %a 
I.E.M.P Typeb 
 
Maintain integrity of 
state/empire 
17 55 8 P
Territory 13 42 67 P
National liberation/ 
state creation 
9 29 8  I, P
National unification/ 
consolidation 
8 26 - I, P
Protect ethnic confréres 5 16      - I
Government 
composition 
4 13 14 P
Strategic territory 4 13 17 M
Commerce/navigation 4 13 36 E
Dynastic/succession 
claims 
3 10 22 P
Ideological liberation 3 10 1 I
Protect religious 
confréres 
3 10 11 I
Maintain regional 
dominance 
3 10 - E, P
Empire creation 3 10 11 P
Regime/state survival 2 6 17 P
Ethnic 
unification/irredenta 
2 6 - I
National crown honor 2 6 3 P
Autonomy 2 6 - P
Balance of power 1 3 3 P
Enforce treaty terms 1 3 8 E
Test of strength 1 3 - M
Colonial competition 1 3 11 E
Protect nationals/ 
commercial interests 
abroad 
1 3 - E
 
Total 
 
92
 
a 1715-1814 
b Ideological (I); Economic (E.); Military (M); Political (P) 
 
Source: Holsti 1991, p. 145 
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Table A.7 – Progress of Railway Building 
 
 
Number of countries 
in Europe 
 
1845 1855
 
1865 1875
 
with railways 
 
9 14
 
16 18
 
with over 1,000  
km. railway line 
 
3 6
 
10 15
 
with over 10,000 
km. railway line 
 
- 3
 
3 5
 
Source: Hobsbawm 1996, p. 54 
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Table A.8 – Density of Railway Network, 1880 
 
 
km2 (per 10,000) 
 
 
Country 
 
over 1,000 
 
 
Belgium 
 
over 750 
 
 
United Kingdom 
 
over 500  
 
 
Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands 
 
250-499 
 
 
France, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Italy 
 
100-249 
 
 
Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Rumania, United 
States, Cuba 
 
 
50-99 
 
 
Turkey, Chile, New Zealand, Trinidad, 
Victoria, Java 
 
 
10-49 
 
Norway, Finland, Russia, Canada, Uruguay, 
Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, Jamaica, India, 
Ceylon, Tasmania, N.S. Wales, S. Australia, 
Cape Colony, Algeria, Egypt, Tunis 
 
 
Source: Hobsbawm 1996, p. 310 
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Table A.9 – Wars, New Technology and Weapons, 1800-1914 
 
 
Year 
 
 
War 
 
Technology/Weapon
1800 French revolutionary Chemical-electric primary cell
1805  Percussion cap
1809  Bottled food
1813  Steam-powered armored warship
1820  Electromagnetic rotation
1821  Natural-gas well
1822  Photographic plate
1827  Water-turbine engine
1831  Steam-turbine engine;
Electromagnetic induction
1833  Plastics
1834  Electric motor;
Computer
1837  Screw-propelled boat;
Practical telegraph system
1839-42 First Afghan 
First Opium 
1839  Fuel cell;
Canned food
1845-9 Anglo-Sikh 
1845  Pneumatic tire 
1846  Nitrocellulose;
Rodman gun barrel;
Anesthetics;
Arc light, Carbon;
1849  Bombs from unmanned balloons
1850  Morse code with telegraph ‘sounding key’
1850-64 Taiping Rebellion 
1851  All-steel artillery piece
1852  Repeater rifle;
Man-carrying, non-rigid airship
1854-7 Crimean 
1854  Periscope
1855  Cowen’s armored fighting vehicle; 
Refrigeration;
Rodman powder
1856-60 Second Opium 
1856  Bessemer steel
1857-58 Indian Mutiny 
1858  Heliograph; Aerial Photography
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Table A.9 – continued 
 
 
Year 
 
 
War 
 
Technology/Weapon
1859 Austro-Piedmont La Gloire armored ship; 
Breech-loading artillery;
Hand-rotated machine-gun;
First successful oil well;
Lead-acid storage battery
1860  Magazine rifle
1861-5 American Civil Turreted ironclad warship
1861-7 Franco-Mexican Pasteurized food
1864 Danish-Prussian 
1865  Antiseptics
1866 Austro-Prussian 
Austro-Italian 
Locomotive torpedo
1870-71 Franco-Prussian Anti-aircraft gun
1870  Xylonite (Celluloid)
1873  Spar torpedo-boat;
Practical typewriter
1874  Barbed wire
1875  Ballistite smokeless powder;
Cordite
1876  Telephone;
Four-stroke gas engine;
Locomotive torpedo-boat
1877-8 Russo-Turkish 
1878-80 Second Afghan 
1879  Electric-light bulb;
Dynamo
1880-81 First Boer 
1881  Searchlight
1882  Armored Steel
1883-5 Sino-French 
1884  Destroyer;
Steam-turbine dynamo
1885  Four-wheel motor carriage;
Smokeless powder;
Semi-automatic machine-gun
1886  Electrically powered submarine
1888  Portable roll-film camera;
Pneumatic tyre
1889  Cine-camera;
Radio waves;
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Table A.9 – continued 
 
 
Year 
 
 
War 
 
Technology/Weapon
1890  Electromechanical computer
1892  Detected radio signal
1894-5 Sino-Japanese 
1895  Radio transmission and reception;
Gyroscope
1897  Steam-turbine-engine ship;
French 75mm field gun;
Cathode-ray-tube oscilloscope
1898 Spanish-American Wire recorder (forerunner of tape recorder)
1899-1901 Second Boer Armored car
1899  Plastic explosive (later RDX)
1900-1901 Boxer Rebellion 
1900  Gas-electric submarine;
Rigid airship
1901  Transatlantic radio link
1902  Thermionic diode valve;
TNT
1903  Powered, heavier-than-air flying machine
1904-5 Russo-Japanese Radio-direction-finding (DF)
1905  Dreadnought battleship;
Scott naval fire-control system
1906  Radio crystal detector
1908  Voice radio
1909  Duralumin;
Bakelite
1910  Aerial bombing;
Armed aircraft;
Nuclear theory;
Shipborne aircraft
1911-50  Chinese revolutionary 
1911-12 Italo-Turkish Seaplane;
Airborne torpedo
1912-13 Balkan Aircraft catapult
 
Source: Macksey 1993, pp. xv-xix 
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Table A.10 – Centrala State Expenditures in Current Prices, 1800-1910 
 
 Austria 
 
Prussia-Germany 
Year Absolute 
(millions 
of  florins) 
% of 
GNP 
% 
Military
% 
Civilianb
Absolute 
(millions 
of marks) 
% of 
GNP 
% 
Military 
% 
Civilian
1810 216  57 15   
1820 160  35 33 201 19 38 45
1830 138 9 33 35 219 17 34 50
1840 165 9 33 35 204 12 35 53
1850 269 11 47 34 252 9 37 48
1860 367 11 51 39 323 8 36 49
1870 332 11 24 46 1,380 15 40 22
1880 432 12 19 45 519 4 82 15
1890 560 13 19 39 1,044 5 78 25
1900 803 15 17 47 1,494 5 59 35
1910 1,451 17 16 60 2,673 6 52 40
 
 France 
 
Great Britain 
Year Absolute 
(millions 
of francs) 
% of 
GNP 
% 
Military 
% 
Civilian
Absolute 
(millions 
of pounds)
% of 
GNP 
% 
Military 
% 
Civilian
1800 726 9 64 24 51.0 19 31 5
1810 934 10 75 9 81.5 27 59 11
1820 907 7 25 48 57.5 20 29 17
1830 1,095 7 30 47 53.7 16 28 18
1840 1,363 8 34 49 53.4 12 26 19
1850 1,473 9 35 29 55.5 10 27 22
1860 2,084 9 39 17 69.6 11 25 34
1870 2,482 10 26 32 67.1 7 32 28
1880 3,141 13 30 39 81.5 8 53 35
1890 3,154 14 34 32 90.6 7 36 37
1900 3,557 12 38 36 143.7 9 48 36
1910 3,878 11 37 40 156.9  40 47
 
a Mann also provides figures for All government expenditures (i.e. beyond central state expenditures).  Adding these 
slightly increases % allocated to civilian expenditures) 
b Civilian + Military + Interest = 100 % 
 
Source: Mann 1993, pp. 363, 366, 373 
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Table A.11 – Land of the British Isles Held in Estates of 1,000+ Acres, 1880 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Number of Owners 
 
Total acres owned 
 
% of total land area 
owned 
 
 
England 4,736 12,825,643 56.1
 
Wales 
 
672 1,490,915 60.78
 
Ireland 
 
3,745 15,802,737 78.4
 
Scotland 
 
1,758 17,584,828 92.82
 
Total (UK) 
 
10,911 47,704,123 66.14
 
Total (Russia) 177,000,000 14.0
Total (France) - 20.0
Total (Prussia) - 40.0
Total (Spain) - 52.0
 
Source: Cannadine 1990, pp. 9, 19 
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